The Watergate Role

Tough but ethical, or shabby and shady?

When Alexander Haig replaced H.R. ("Bob") Haldeman as President Nixon's Chief of Staff in May 1973, the Administration still had 14 months of torment ahead. At Haig's Senate confirmation hearings, Democrats probably will dwell on these questions about his shadowy backstage role during those days:

> Did Haig advise Nixon to lie? According to a transcript of a White House tape recording, Nixon told Haig, "We do know we have one problem: it's that damn conversation of March 21." That was when Presidential Counsel John Dean warned Nixon about "a cancer growing around the presidency." Nixon suggested that Dean's account of the conversation could be refuted by Haldeman: "Bob can handle it ... Bob will say, 'I was there; the President said ...' " Haig agreed: "That's exactly right." And, suggested Haig, "You just can't recall." But if Nixon did, in fact, remember, he would, of course, be lying.

> What was Haig's role in the Saturday Night Massacre? When Nixon wanted to fire Archibald Cox, the first Watergate special prosecutor, Haig joined in a scheme designed to force Cox either to agree to stop seeking more Nixon tapes or to resign. The plan involved having Mississippi Democrat John Stennis, 72, a respected but hard-of-hearing Senator, listen to certain key tapes and verify the accuracy of transcripts to be made by the White House and turned over to the Senate Watergate Committee instead of the tapes. Haig got Stennis and Watergate Committee Members Sam Ervin and Howard Baker to agree to the procedure, but without telling them that Cox had objected to it. When Cox protested publicly, he was fired, and Haig ordered his office sealed off by the FBI.

> Did Haig stall Jaworski? Cox's successor, Leon Jaworski, portrays Haig as a tough but ethical adversary in the ex-prosecutor's post-Watergate book, The Right and the Power, and now contends that Haig merely "had to do what Nixon told him to do and this is what he did." But former associates of Jaworski recall that his attitude was far different during the investigation. Insists one: "Jaworski used to rant and rave aplenty about Al Haig." When Jaworski threatened to protest publicly the White's House stalling over delivery of tapes, Haig pleaded for more time. Jaworski reluctantly agreed--and then Haig finally declared that the White House would not surrender more tapes on grounds of "national security." Says a Jaworski aide: "Leon went right through the roof." But Jaworski now says that if he had been in Haig's position, he would have behaved the same way.

> Why did Haig defend the validity of the tapes? Haig's original claims that there had been no tampering with the tapes was, at the least, overzealous. When the Washington Post reported that two of the tapes might have been re-recordings rather than originals, he charged that this was "blasphemous speculation." Later Haig told Jaworski, "I haven't the slightest doubt that the tapes were screwed with."

> Did Haig improperly ask Ford to pardon Nixon? Haig, in a meeting with Vice President Gerald Ford on Aug. 1, 1974, advised Ford that he would have the power to pardon Nixon for any Watergate crimes after Nixon left office. Both men say this was cited as merely one of several options open to Ford and that Haig did not urge it. Both also insist that no deal was struck under which Nixon would resign only if he were assured of getting a pardon from Ford.

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