On the Fretful Sidelines

By Jay Palmer

The gulf states: caught in a crossfire of conflicting allegiances

In the first flush of Iraq's attack on Iran two weeks ago, the other Arab states were rooting for an Iraqi victory, almost like so many partisan soccer fans. Once again Arab legions were marching off to war, this time not against Israel but against the Persians, who, though Muslims, are ancient foes of the Arabs. The prospect of a quick and decisive victory seemed at hand, and happy Arab throngs gathered at bazaars, coffee houses and street corners to listen to radio reports of Iraqi triumphs and cheer on their Arab brothers.

Some Arab leaders made it obvious which side they were on. Saudi Arabia's King Khalid phoned Iraqi President Saddam Hussein to express support for his battle against "the enemies of the Arab people," according to Iraqi reports. Jordan's King Hussein publicly applauded the attack. Kuwait's official news agency, which reflects the views of the ruling family, adopted a hawkish, pro-Iraq stand. To varying degrees, Qatar, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Oman all jumped on the Iraqi bandwagon.

But life very quickly became considerably more complicated. It was soon apparent that there was no compelling cause for Arab jubilation at Iran's expense and that hopes for a swift Iraqi conquest were exaggerated. The Iranians, recovering from the surprise attack and beginning to fight back, promptly advised everybody in earshot--and within range of their fleet of Phantom jets--that overt support of Iraq would be considered a hostile act, and implied that the fragile and exposed oil facilities of the gulf states would be the first Iranian targets.

That growl from Tehran was enough to send the gulf states scuttling for the shelter of avowed neutrality. Saudi Arabia immediately contradicted Iraq and insisted that King Khalid's phone call had expressed only his "concern and good brotherly feelings" for Iraq and prayed to "God Almighty to grant what is best for our Arab and Muslim world." Kuwait's ruling Emir, Sheik Jaber al Ahmed al Sabah, implored both combatants to pursue peacemaking channels. Like Kuwait, both Bahrain and the U.A.E. denied reports that they had allowed the Iraqi air force to use their bases and adamantly insisted that they too were strictly neutral.

As the war settled into an apparent stalemate, there was an agonizing reappraisal of the stakes for all the countries in the region. None of the neighboring gulf countries has an army or air force to match Iraq's or Iran's in size. Many of the region's rulers fear that the longer the war continues, the higher the risk that their small nations will somehow be drawn into it. Worse still, the gulf states fear that the Western powers could feel compelled to step in to protect their vital oil supplies.

Every scenario in the unpredictable conflict seems to confront them with a different tangle of crossed purposes and confused allegiances. Conservative monarchies like Saudi Arabia have found themselves on the side of what has been a radical revolutionary regime in Baghdad. On the other hand, militant governments like those of Syria and Libya lean toward once despised Iran. "The Arab world is frustrated and troubled," said one U.S. intelligence analyst. "The moderate states especially see threats all around them."

For most, the principal menace is Iran. One reason is oil--the only source of wealth for many of these nations. The two-week-old war had shown dramatically what vulnerable targets oil installations can be. The gulf states fear that the Ayatullah, rather than accept defeat, might choose to go out with a big bang by bombing the oil fields up and down the gulf. At the same time, Arab countries tremble over the possible repercussions from Khomeini's Shi'ite Muslim fanaticism; most of the gulf rulers are Sunni Muslims presiding over nations with Shi'ite minorities that may be susceptible to the Ayatullah's political influence. For most of the gulf states, it is a no-win situation; an outright victory by either Iraq or Iran would create a too powerful neighbor, while a protracted stalemate could build pressure to expand the conflict.

The most fretful country is Saudi Arabia, the largest OPEC producer. Saudi leaders suspect that Khomeini was behind the seizure of the Sacred Mosque in Mecca last year, as well as subsequent disturbances among Shi'ites in their oil-rich Eastern province. In defense of their oil, the Saudi government last week put in a quick but urgent request for new military hardware from the U.S. Washington sent four highly sophisticated surveillance aircraft, which are known as AWACS and carry radar equipment sensitive enough to detect both high-and low-level bombers more than 230 miles away.

Western intelligence officers believe that the Saudis, at least in the early days of the war, covertly cooperated with Iraqi forces to the extent of giving them the use of base facilities and transit rights for warplanes. That aid and comfort is thought to have dried up as the safety of the oil was placed above the desire to punish Iranian mullahs.

Kuwait's leaders, if they choose to visit their northern border, can see the flames of burning Iranian and Iraqi oil installations; their nation borders on the war zone. Kuwait shares Saudi concerns over its own potentially troublesome Shi'ite minorities. Its protestations of strict neutrality were not very persuasive; reporters crossing the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border last week counted over 100 gleaming new Toyota Landcruisers waiting to roll into Iraq. Nevertheless, Kuwait is also understandably schizophrenic about supporting Iraq because of a special problem: Iraq has longstanding territorial claims on Kuwait. If Iraq were to win the war and emerge as a new gulf superpower, logically it would not bode well for the Kuwaitis.

Among the small gulf states, Dubai appears to be genuinely neutral, evidently because of its large Persian minority. The other United Arab Emirates, as well as Oman, Qatar and Bahrain, all root under their breath for Iraq. Despite apprehensions about Saddam Hussein's long-term military and political ambitions, they sense a more imminent threat from Iran. Bahrain in particular is nervous about Tehran, not only because the mullahs have revived ancient Iranian claims to its territory but because Bahrain's Sunni Emir rules a population over half of whom are Shi'ites.

The only regional Arab state to support Iran was Syria. Relations between the two Baathist regimes in Baghdad and Damascus have long been antagonistic; Syrian President Hafez Assad is known to believe that dissident elements within his country are backed by Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Iraq. Like Iran, Syria views the gulf war as an American-backed plot that could lead to its encirclement by conservative Arab forces. Thus the war has intensified Syria's already nearly paranoiac feeling of isolation. Assad, who in the past has rejected any formal treaty links with the Soviet Union, is scheduled to visit Moscow this week. He just might be ready to sign a friendship treaty with his hosts.

The wild cards in the edgy gulf are the large guest worker populations of Palestinians in all the gulf countries. Many among them support the Palestine Liberation Organization. Though officially neutral in the Iraq-Iran conflict because both sides have supported it against Israel, the P.L.O. is irritated at Iraq for diverting military energies away from Israel. The P.L.O is profoundly concerned about potential Western involvement in the war, and its leaders say they could bring retaliation: saboteurs are said to be standing by ready to blow up oil facilities throughout the region if the U.S. in particular were to try to intervene militarily. No wonder, all things considered, the Iraq-Iran hostilities have given their Arab neighbors an unpleasant case of nerves.

--By Jay Palmer. Reported by William Drozdiak/Bahrain and Gregory H. Wierzynski/Washington

With reporting by William Drozdiak/Bahrain, Gregory H. Wierzynski/Washington

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