"Two Steps Forward . . ."

But always one step back, as a U.N. commission heads for Iran

We are not privy to news and consequently are unaware of what efforts, if any, are being exerted on our behalf. There's no news about our status.

So wrote William Keough Jr., one of the 50 Americans being held hostage in Iran, in a letter to his family in Waltham, Mass. It is one of the cruel and bizarre aspects of the hostages' long ordeal that they probably have no notion of how the search for a means to free them has dominated the nation's concerns ever since they were taken prisoner on Nov. 4.

This search seemed headed for yet another climax last weekend as a special five-man United Nations commission arrived in Tehran to hear the grievances of Iran's new rulers against the regime of the deposed Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi. Arranging this mission took more than a week of feverish diplomatic activity, as officials at times worked round the clock. Their efforts were punctuated with starts and stops, expected deals that failed to materialize, and hints of progress that suddenly dissolved.

Every detail of the U.N. mission was haggled over. At a packed Manhattan news conference, U.N. Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim announced the formation of what he very carefully termed "a commission of inquiry" that would "undertake a fact-finding mission." This appeared to mean that the group was not to be a tribunal, something that the Iranians had requested and the U.S. had strongly opposed. Waldheim added that the commission "will complete its work as soon as possible and submit its report to the Secretary-General."

Will the hostages then be freed? A fortnight ago, officials in both Washington and New York seemed confident that the release was part of a package deal, definitely linked to the formation of the U.N. commission. The only uncertainty, it seemed, was whether the release would come when the U.N. commission was formed or after it finished its work. Iran's new President, Abolhassan Banisadr, appeared to have agreed to such a deal; but when he was asked to say so in writing, he denied that there was any connection at all between the U.N. hearings and the release of the hostages. Some optimistic officials in Washington and at the U.N. insisted that such a package was still being worked on--it is "a gentleman's agreement," said one of the U.N. envoys --and that Banisadr had to sound tough because he still lacks control over the young militants who hold the hostages. Said Waldheim, in his office during an interview with TIME last Friday: "I am confident that we shall find a solution, though nobody can say when." And a senior State Department aide summed up the latest impasse by saying, "We are now in a dance where it's two steps forward, one step backward. Before that, it was always one step sideways."

Both sides were relying heavily on the skill and shrewdness of the five distinguished U.N. envoys. Much care had gone into choosing them: former Venezuelan Ambassador to the U.S. and U.N. Andres Aguilar Mawdsley, Algerian Chief U.N. Delegate Mohammed Bedjaoui, Syrian Career Diplomat Adib Daoudy, Sri Lankan Lawyer Hector W. ("Harry") Jayawardene, and French Human Rights Activist Louis-Edmond Pettiti (see box).

Precisely how the commission is to function remained unclear. Waldheim said that the panel would establish its own procedures and set its own agenda. Syria's Daoudy told TIME that "this is not an investigation in the juridical sense; not a grand jury, much less a court."

Iran's Banisadr, however, insisted that the commission would investigate "the crimes of the ex-Shah and American intervention in Iran." What the Waldheim announcement had said was that the panel would "hear Iran's grievances" and "allow for early solution" of the U.S.-Iranian crisis. In addition, the commission was to "speak to each of the hostages." This is important to the Administration because so far no one has seen each of the 50 Americans being held at the embassy, or the three held at the Iranian Foreign Ministry. The White House thus insisted, as a condition for agreeing to the commission, that all hostages be accounted for and their state of health determined. On the other hand, any public questioning of the hostages might go in unfortunate directions. It was reported last week that the Iranians were already assembling alleged victims of the Shah to appear before the U.N. commission, as they did when Waldheim went to Tehran last January. On that occasion, they mobbed the Secretary-General, waving their crutches and shouting demands for vengeance. If such an emotional atmosphere surrounds the U.N. commissioners, and if the hostages are then asked their views of U.S. policy and of the Shah, the scene might resemble the kind of show trial that the U.S. has sharply warned the Iranians to avoid.

The week of turmoil and confusion began in a spirit of considerable optimism. On Monday, Feb. 18, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance slipped quietly into Manhattan and closeted himself at the U.N. for 6 1/2 hours, obtaining from Waldheim what he thought were assurances of the commission's key elements. Vance insisted, for example, that the panel would not sit as a court, hold a trial or reach a verdict. Yes, Waldheim assured him, Tehran understood that. Vance persisted, saying that he would feel better if it were on paper. The Secretary-General said that he would get the terms in writing, that Banisadr had promised this.

The following day, Waldheim and his staff on the 38th floor of the U.N. Secretariat waited for a telex message from Tehran that would confirm what they felt certain had been Banisadr's verbal agreement. The message finally arrived late in the day. As Waldheim read it, according to a U.N. aide who was present, he swallowed hard, suppressed an instinct to curse and "looked like a man who had been kicked in the pants." The cable mentioned nothing about the hostages and referred to the commission as though Banisadr was expecting it to hold a trial. Said the Iranian cable: "Now that the demand of the Imam Khomeini and the Iranian nation has been conceded regarding the convocation of a court of inquiry and investigation into the past American intervention in Iran's internal affairs, [the commission] may come to Iran."

That very moment, an aide hurried into Waldheim's office to report that Banisadr had said in Tehran that the U.N. commission's task had nothing to do with the release of the hostages. Asked if there had been any agreement on the hostages, Banisadr said, "That's for later."

Waldheim had planned a small dinner that evening at his Sutton Place town house to celebrate what he thought would be the successful culmination of his diplomatic efforts. The guests arrived on time, but the Secretary-General did not appear until 10, sipped a cup of soup, then retired to his study to phone Washington and Tehran. Through most of the night, he tried to arrange a compromise.

By 3 a.m. Wednesday, Waldheim had made a bit of progress and later told reporters that "both aspects of the problem had been taken into account," referring to Iran's grievances and the freeing of the captives. A U.N. official admitted that it was not much but "there was just enough to make us feel that it would be a mistake to abandon the idea of the commission." Moreover, Waldheim had put an enormous amount of personal effort into the enterprise. Though he has not been highly regarded by the State Department (he is viewed as overcautious and unimaginative), U.S. officials give him high marks for his performance in the hostage crisis.

By Wednesday, the five-man U.N. commission had already gathered in Geneva and was ready to leave for Tehran. All the commission needed was the go-ahead signal from U.N. headquarters in Manhattan. It never came. After waiting several hours in the VIP lounge, the U.N. envoys and their entourage glumly headed back to the city.

In Washington, officials also worked until dawn Wednesday morning. At 3:30 a.m., senior State Department aides phoned the White House and had their urgent call put through to the President's bedroom. Informed of the difficulties that had arisen and what Waldheim was doing about them, a groggy Carter told the aides to meet him in the Oval Office in two hours. The Administration meanwhile toughened the statement about the commission that it had drafted the previous week.

According to a State Department aide, "It purposefully did not give a definitional quality to what the commission's mandate will be. Instead, it said what the commission will not be." The new statement declared that the panel "will not be a tribunal," and "under no circumstances" must the captives "be subjected to interrogation." In addition, the U.S. statement said that the commission will hear "the grievances of both sides" and that "the American people are deeply aggrieved" that Iran has taken the hostages and held them "in intolerable conditions."

Whether the commission will adhere to this unilateral U.S. interpretation is far from clear. Even if it does, the Carter Administration could still find itself criticized for having significantly softened its stance in the Iranian confrontation by sanctioning a commission without receiving any real assurances of the hostages' prompt release. In November the Administration's public position was unyielding: the hostages had to be freed before there could be discussions of any issue with the Iranians. This adamancy was morally backed by a unanimous U.N. Security Council vote, a ruling of the World Court at The Hague, and much of world opinion.

Since then, however, ingredients of the situation have changed. A government has been installed in Iran, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has abruptly revised the diplomatic priorities in the Persian Gulf. Thus Carter aides bridle at the suggestion--potentially explosive in an election year--that they have begun to soften on the Iranian demands. Said a senior State Department official:

"With the obvious exception of the commission, the basics will be preserved." This is questionable, though it might not matter much politically once the hostages are released. Still the fact is that sending a commission to Iran does grant the militants one of their most important points, and will focus global attention on their indictment of the Shah and the U.S.

For some months the Administration's position might not have been as hard as it publicly appeared. U.N. officials, for example, maintain that after Waldheim returned from his trip to Iran in early January, Carter privately agreed to try to negotiate the hostages' freedom by approaching the Iranians through the U.N. Waldheim emphasized the importance that the Iranians attached to having a "day in court," while Carter insisted that the U.S. would not submit to any quasilegal judgment and felt no need to apologize for its past actions. Waldheim felt encouraged to negotiate further.

Central to the Administration's strategy in acquiescing to the U.N. commission idea is the assumption that it will strengthen Banisadr, enabling him to get the hostages away from the militants. Though outspokenly anti-American, the Iranian President is more moderate than many of his colleagues and certainly more so than the militants holding the U.S. embassy. Last week he said that "the students going into the embassy is one thing, taking hostages is another."

Administration aides maintain that Iranian officials now perceive it to be in their interest to free the hostages. At the State Department it is argued that with the formation of an Iranian government, after nearly a year of political chaos, Iran's new officials at last recognize that hostage-taking is a form of blackmail against civil authority that also could be used against them.

There were signs that Banisadr's power was indeed growing last week. In an unexpected development, he was appointed commander of the country's armed forces by Ayatullah Ruhollah Khomeini, Iran's near absolute ruler. Earlier Banisadr had been made chairman of the powerful Revolutionary Council. Yet he was unable to gain Khomeini's full backing on the hostage issue. Though Banisadr had indicated to Waldheim that Khomeini would publicly endorse the commission and call for the hostages' release, the clerical strongman instead went on radio last week to denounce the U.S. and praise "our dear youth" for "having thrown the enemies of religion off the scene." In another broadcast, he declared that "the fate of the hostages" will be decided by the Iranian parliament, a body that will not even be fully elected until early April.

The militants in the embassy echoed Khomeini, adding that "if the Shah is not extradited, any expectation . . . about the reconsideration of the situation of the hostages is a foolish expectation." Lawyers retained by Tehran are expected to file extradition papers in the next week or so in Panama, where the Shah has been living in exile. Though Panama probably will hear the suit, chances are very slim that it will hand over Iran's former ruler.

At week's end, both U.N. and Washington officials stressed the delicate nature of the situation. "Very fragile" and "tenderly balanced" were how Administration aides described the negotiations. Waldheim told TIME: "The whole thing in Iran is extremely complex. But we know that Banisadr and the Revolutionary Council want a peaceful solution. What is needed is patience." But Administration aides were having a hard time masking their disappointment and sense of helplessness after Khomeini's tough-talking broadcasts. Publicly Washington was insisting that nothing Khomeini said had changed the U.N. commission's mandate to win the hostages' freedom. Yet privately, a senior State Department official hedged, saying if the commission process "turns out to be something disastrous, we'll find out soon enough."

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