Clear Difference

Riyadh and the U.S. at odds

Less than a year ago, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance described the connection between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia as a "special relationship." That is no longer so. Though the Carter Administration has been exceedingly slow to realize the depth of Saudi anger and bitterness over the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, it is now obvious that the era of Saudi Arabia's almost total reliance on the U.S. has come to an end. Vance has acknowledged that there is now a "clear and sharp difference" between the foreign policies of the two countries.

The Saudis have been increasingly critical of U.S. policy for some time. They felt that Washington failed to give all-out support to their ally the Shah of Iran, thereby contributing to his downfall. The Saudis are appalled by the profligate American attitude toward oil consumption. More recently, they have been angered by stories that CIA agents had reported home that the Saudi royal family was split in its policy over Egypt and that the power of Crown Prince Fahd, generally assumed to be the country's de facto ruler, was in decline.

The beginning of the rift dates back to Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's historic trip to Jerusalem in November 1977, and especially to the Camp David negotiations in September 1978. The Saudis, who felt that they should have been consulted during those talks, are deeply upset that Sadat's initiative has had the effect of splitting the Arab world, and of increasing the influence of the radical Arab states. The Saudis are also distrustful of the terms of the peace treaty itself. As Foreign Minister Prince Saud said early this month: "It is impossible to admit any settlement not based on the return of Jerusalem to its 1967 status as an Arab and Muslim city." Crown Prince Fahd took the same line when he declared during a visit to Paris last week: "We either live in Jerusalem, or we die for it . . . Our position is final."

Sadat is convinced that the Saudis no longer intend to live up to the commitment they made last year to supply Egypt with $525 million worth of U.S.-made F-5 jet fighters. There has also been speculation of late, some of it floated by Sadat himself, that Saudi Arabia was thinking of canceling its deal to buy 60 U.S.-made F-15 jet fighters, and would choose France's Mirage 2000 instead. The sale of the sophisticated F-15 was the subject of heated debate in the Senate last year. The Carter Administration was determined that the sale should go through, not only to assure the Saudis that Washington valued their friendship highly, but also as away of strengthening the military relationship between the two countries. Despite the latest rumors, Fahd insisted last week that his government still wants the American planes.

Until now, the Saudis have relied almost exclusively on the U.S. for their defense, and in turn have tried to adapt their oil policy to American needs, if not al ways to as great a degree as Washington might wish. Today they regard their friendship with the U.S. as important but no longer crucial. They strongly oppose the Egyptian-Israeli treaty, in part because they believe it will strengthen the radical Arab forces that they themselves fear. And they no longer regard Sadat as indispensable.

For their defense needs, the Saudis could easily turn to France (which carefully refrained from being overly enthusiastic about the peace treaty) or Britain, and conceivably they might even begin to buy arms from the Soviet Union. In a way, it is the classic end of an affair: the dependence of one partner, Saudi Arabia, is on the decline, and the dependence of the other, the U.S., is greater than ever before.

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