"To Educate Their Senators"

"To Educate Their Senators" Pro and con SALT lobbyists are focusing on a score of undecided votes

Reaching agreement with the Soviets has scarcely ended the Administration's SALT negotiations. Now the bargaining shifts to Capitol Hill, where the Senate must be persuaded to approve the accord. Obtaining the required two-thirds vote may be the toughest political challenge the Carter White House has faced. Indeed it could be the most difficult foreign policy debate in Washington since the Senate rejected the League of Nations in 1920.

Although the score is certain to change once the legislators come under the full fire of the Administration's offensive, SALT II would be in deep trouble if a vote were held now. In sharp contrast to the 88-to-2 majority by which SALT I sailed through the Senate in 1972, today only 40 Senators appear to be enthusiastically behind the new treaty. Another ten will almost certainly back it though they say that they are still undecided. Definitely opposing the pact are some 20 hardliners, such as Barry Goldwater, Henry Jackson and Jesse Helms, who distrust just about any arms deal with the Soviets. Joining these hawks probably will be about ten Senators now leaning away from the accord. A few doves, such as Oregon's Mark Hatfield and Wisconsin's William Proxmire, are also inclined to vote against the treaty; they view it as a sham because it fails almost completely to reduce existing arsenals.

SALT'S fate is going to depend on the Senate's remaining 20 or so members, who are genuinely undecided. Perhaps the two most important members of this swing group are the Senate's top party officials. Majority Leader Robert Byrd has carefully avoided committing himself. Said he: "I'll sit down and go over the treaty line by line and word by word." Active opposition by Byrd would probably doom the pact. Not so undecided is Minority Leader Howard Baker, whose backing last year was invaluable in the White House's successful drive for passage of the Panama Canal treaties. He told Carter last week that because of "serious misgivings about this treaty," he now tends to oppose it. Still, he has left himself some room to change his mind. Also uncertain of how he will vote is Georgia Democrat Sam Nunn, who is regarded as one of the Senate's leading authorities on military issues. His voice is sure to sway some of his colleagues.

Coming on the eve of the 1980 presidential election campaign, the treaty will be formally submitted to the Senate in early July. The SALT struggle will be a major test of Jimmy Carter's ability as a national leader. Even now his personal prestige could hardly be more completely on the line. He phoned Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford and Henry Kissinger last week, offering them extensive private briefings on the accord. (So far, none of these Republican notables has offered to join the pro-treaty drive.) On the morning that the U.S.-Soviet agreement was announced, Carter was up at dawn to sign letters to all 100 Senators, assuring them that SALT II will reduce the danger of nuclear war. He intends to speak out frequently for the treaty and lobby Senators at a series of White House dinners.

Presidential Assistant Hamilton Jordan and other White House staffers have been developing a SALT-selling strategy for almost a year, and its detailed plans fill three black loose-leaf binders. Potential SALT supporters around the country have been identified and categorized by the staff of Presidential Assistant Anne Wexler. There are, for example, some 7,000 editorial writers who are to receive information kits. There are business and educational groups that will be mobilized, particularly ones that have a special interest in improved U.S.-Soviet relations. Said Wexler of her vast network of contacts: "They are ready to educate their Senators. If [White House Congressional Liaison] Frank Moore says he needs 50 Arizona businessmen to lean on Senator DeConcini, I'll be able to produce them." Meanwhile, Vice President Walter Mondale, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, Defense Secretary Harold Brown and other Cabinet members will take to the hustings across the country to promote the pact.

In the Senate, Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Frank Church will be the floor manager for the treaty and "resolution of ratification," the parliamentary instrument by which the chamber consents to the accord. But the principal SALT-seller is likely to be California's Alan Cranston, the majority whip, although he claims that he has not yet totally made up his mind on how he will vote. He began preparing for the fight last year, when he organized an informal study group of about 20 Senators who basically support arms control, though some have doubts about the new treaty. Most members are Democrats, such as Ohio's John Glenn, Colorado's Gary Hart and Iowa's John Culver. The only G.O.P. regulars are Maryland's Charles Mathias Jr., Rhode Island's John Chafee and Vermont's Robert Stafford.

The group has been meeting almost every other Tuesday in Cranston's large Capitol office, and already has been briefed by Vance, Brown, National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, CIA Director Stansfield Turner and technical experts from the Pentagon and CIA. Several of the group's members will be playing crucial roles in the Senate debate. Culver and Hart, for instance, sit on the Armed Services Committee, which will hold hearings on the pact. And Glenn will be looked to by many of his colleagues for guidance on the question of whether the U.S. will be able to verify Soviet compliance with the treaty. So far, he has grave doubts.

SALT'S backers do not claim that the accord achieves miracles. Instead, they emphasize that it simply is the best that can now be negotiated with the Soviets. Brown told TIME: "You have to compare this treaty not with some ideal treaty, but with what would happen if there were no treaty. SALT II will help our national security by limiting the Soviets to levels below those they could achieve if there were no treaty." One startling example: without SALT'S limit of ten MIRVs per SS-18 ICBM, the Soviets would be able to mount up to 40 warheads on these monster missiles. This would give Moscow an advantage of thousands of warheads and almost certainly tilt the strategic balance in its favor.

Most experts agree with the Administration that the strategic arsenals of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. are at the moment in "essential equivalence." Although the Soviets lead in some areas, such as in the number of ICBMS and the size and power of missiles, the U.S. is ahead in bombers, the number of atomic warheads, weapon accuracy and certain other aspects.

The U.S. side of this balance, argue SALT'S advocates, will not be affected by the treaty. The overall ceiling of 2,250 nuclear delivery systems, for example, is actually 190 greater than the nation now deploys. The Soviets, however, will have to scrap about 320 systems. While they probably will do this by decommissioning aging ICBMS and perhaps some bombers, these are still devastatingly lethal weapons that would have continued to be aimed at the U.S.

By limiting each side to one new type of ICBM, SALT II slightly brakes what has been the rapid pace of Soviet missile development. Again, this places no hardship on the U.S. The Pentagon will be able to develop and deploy the MX mobile missile, carrying six to eight MIRVs. As for the air-launched cruise missile, a highly accurate weapon that could become a major component of the U.S. nuclear deterrent, it is almost totally unaffected by SALT II. The only limit on the cruise is that planes carrying it are to be heavy bombers counted toward the MIRV sub-limit of 1,320.

The Administration will emphasize that SALT II will save money. Brown estimates that over the next decade, the treaty will enable the Pentagon to spend about $30 billion less for strategic weapons than would be required without negotiated arms limits.

Former Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman J. William Fulbright, now a Washington lawyer, sees SALT encouraging "a measure of mutual trust between the superpowers and as a precedent for cooperation on other issues." Although the Soviets very much want the SALT II agreement, there is, of course, no guarantee that the accord is linked to Soviet good behavior in other areas, just as defeating the accord should not be seen as a means of punishing Moscow. What seems indisputable, however, is that there would be enormous diplomatic fallout if the Senate rejects the treaty. U.S. ties with Moscow would suffer severely and there would be little chance, at least for a time, for superpower cooperation in other areas. With Brezhnev ailing and the Kremlin on the brink of changing leaders, it seems an especially poor time to chill U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations.

SALT'S opponents inside the Senate are not as well organized as the backers, but have begun to mobilize. Tennessee's Baker could become the natural leader of the antitreaty forces if he decides to oppose the accord actively. Outspoken critics, such as Jackson, Goldwater and Utah Republican Jake Garn will be strongly backed by a number of militant right-wing organizations.

These groups have for months been readying newspaper ads, films and speakers to fight the treaty. The American Conservative Union will kick off its anti-SALT drive with a mass rally in Washington next month, to be followed by a grass roots postcard and phone call campaign. The A.C.U. has also put together a "truth squad" of experts to refute the arguments of those Administration aides who will be promoting the accord.

Another conservative group, the American Security Council, has formed the Coalition for Peace Through Strength to serve as an umbrella for 166 separate antitreaty organizations. The coalition so far has recruited 194 Congressmen (mostly members of the House) and plans to set up 200 local chapters across the country. The first opened in Houston earlier this year. At American Security Council headquarters in Boston, Va., there is a bustle of new optimism. Said A.S.C. President John Fisher: "A few months ago, people were negative about the chances of defeating SALT. These same people are now ebullient about winning. There is a joy of battle."

One thing encouraging the treaty's critics is their feeling that the public has grown concerned because of signs that Moscow's goal may well be strategic superiority. Since the 1972 signing of SALT I, the Soviets have deployed four new types of ICBM, at least one new submarine-launched missile and the Backfire bomber. Another ICBM submarine-launched missile and supersonic bomber are both under development.

The U.S., by contrast, has only modestly upgraded its weaponry. It has finished outfitting the Minuteman III with multiwarhead MlRVs, and tested and canceled the B-I supersonic bomber. Under development are an air-launched cruise missile, the Trident I and II submarine-launched missiles and the MX ICBM. Carter has admitted that he is worried by the Kremlin's military buildup. Said he last month: "What causes us concern is not the current balance, but the momentum of the Soviet strategic buildup ... At some future point, the Soviet Union could achieve a strategic advantage--unless we alter these trends."

The trouble with SALT II, say its opponents, is that it does not reverse these trends and thus benefits the U.S.S.R.

Warned Paul Nitze, once a member of the U.S. SALT negotiating team and now perhaps the treaty's most authoritative critic: "It isn't an equal treaty. Soviet programs are much more elaborate than ours at this stage and during the period of the accord. The Soviets thus are going to end up either equal or ahead of us in every measure of strategic strength."

SALT critics are especially dismayed by the Administration's failure to get Moscow to accept a reduction in the number of its huge SS-18s. By the early to mid-1980s, these Soviet missiles could all be MlRVed and their accuracy improved. Then the Soviets might be able to launch only a small fraction of their ICBMs to destroy as much as 90% of the U.S. Minuteman ICBMs inside their thick concrete silos. This advantage could be politically exploited by the Kremlin. Stated Frank Barnett, president of the hawkish National Strategy Information Center: "In some not too distant crisis, both U.S. will and the morale of our allies can be enervated by the Soviet Union's nuclear preponderance. Strategic imbalance creates a vector for the levers of diplomacy."

Even Secretary Brown concurs with part of this gloomy assessment. He said in a Manhattan speech last month: "If the Soviets ever were to achieve superiority, I am convinced they would make every effort to exploit it politically and even militarily." Brown stressed, however, that he was convinced that "by any reasonable standard, we have a credible deterrent today and will have one for the foreseeable future ... even after an all-out surprise attack."

Verification is another issue raised by SALT'S opponents, even though Carter and other top Administration officials insist that the U.S. will be able to check on Soviet compliance with the treaty. Critics continue to be worried about the loss of two U.S. intelligence bases in Iran, which electronically monitored Soviet missile tests. They argue that satellite surveillance cannot check on such crucial provisions of the treaty as the number of MIRVs the Soviets are actually placing on each ICBM and whether the Soviets are secretly stockpiling more missiles than allowed by the treaty's various ceilings. But Carter has stated: "We are confident that no significant violation of the treaty could take place without the U.S. detecting it."

The protocol section of SALT II is also under attack. Although its ban--on the flight testing of mobile ICBMs and on the deployment of land-and-sea-launched cruise missiles exceeding a range of 373 miles--expires at the end of 1981, SALT'S opponents fear that these restrictions might become self-perpetuating. According to this argument, if a new round of arms talks is at a critical stage when the protocol lapses, Washington might decide that the SALT in process would be undermined unless the U.S. voluntarily continues to abide by the protocol's terms.

Though Western European countries are for SALT, U.S. ties with Britain and West Germany would almost certainly be strained by such an extension of the protocol. Reason: Washington would be prevented from cooperating with its allies in deploying the long-range land-and-sea-launched cruise missiles on which London and Bonn have been counting.

Rather than categorically rejecting SALT II, a number of critics have indicated that they would okay the pact if some of its provisions were changed. Senator Jackson told TIME: "What you will witness is a real effort by the Senate to improve the treaty through amendments and plugging loopholes. The Senate will take seriously its constitutional mandate not only to consent, but to advise as well."

Officially, White House staffers have been warning Senators that the treaty must pass without amendments because changing the document could force a reopening of negotiations with Moscow. If that happens, the entire agreement could unravel. Informally, however, Administration aides concede that they may have to accept some modifications, while Soviet officials privately hint that they may be willing to agree to some amendments that serve a symbolic purpose but do not change the terms of the accord.

Both sides, pro and con, raise valid points in the SALT debate. What seems indisputable is that despite the arduous negotiations, the treaty is a rather modest arms control accomplishment. At best, it is a step toward what might be achieved in SALT III. But at the same time the treaty is a political instrument of consequence.

Senate defeat of it could damage the world's perception of the U.S. Warned Carter last week: "We would be looked upon as a warmonger, not as a peace-loving nation." Sums up Gerard Smith, the chief U.S. negotiator during SALT I and now an ambassador-at-large: "Perhaps the most serious loss that the SALT rejection would entail would be the conclusion by our friends and antagonists abroad that the U.S. Government was incapable of conducting a coherent foreign policy. If the product of six years of negotiation is brought to naught, what would be the chances for success in other negotiations?"

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