Searching for the Right Response

A panel of experts tries to redefine U.S. policy for the crescent of crisis

Revolution in Iran. A souring of the important U.S. special relationship with Saudi Arabia. A looming economic crisis, and soon, caused by oil shortages and runaway price boosts. A danger that much of the region might change its tilt away from the U.S. and toward the Soviet Union. A Middle East peace seemingly more elusive than ever. These are the troubles and threats that America faces in the so-called crescent of crisis--that great swath of countries running from the Horn of Africa through Egypt and across the Middle East to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Here, more than in any other area of the world, the U.S. has vital interests that are threatened by forces it has not been able to control, and all too often seems unable to influence.

At his press conference last week, President Carter declared how important it was that the nations of this area "know that we have a real interest, a real national interest, in the stability and peace of that region, and particularly for the supply of oil, the routes through which the oil is delivered to ourselves and to our friends and allies throughout the world."

Friends and foes of the President could not agree more. But in the wake of the revolution in Iran, critics of the Administration, and some of its friends, have charged that the U.S. is not doing enough to convince the nations of the crescent that it does have "a real national interest in the stability and peace of that region." Republican National Committee Chairman Bill Brock, reflecting a frustration that was not entirely partisan, said last week that foreign policy, especially the events in Iran, would be a key issue in the presidential campaign.

Last week the editors of TIME brought together seven foreign policy experts, some with long years of public service (see box), for a wide-ranging discussion on the upheavals in the crisis area and on what the U.S. could do to strengthen its influence there. The experts found signs of alarming weakness in supposedly friendly lands, and they found some encouraging elements in countries supposedly alienated from the U.S. They were convinced that the currents of change were running more swiftly than the Administration believed, and they were afraid, some more than others, that the U.S. was failing to act with enough power, or sophistication, or both, to bolster its interests in the region. Complained Richard Helms, the former CIA director and Ambassador to Iran: "My impression of the Administration is that it is 'big talk, little do.' "

On the other hand, there was a conviction that the U.S. was far from powerless; the country was amply strong enough to act, but what should the acting be? The group agreed that the Administration should move more firmly to exercise its leadership in the region--to create "options of power," in American University President Joseph Sisco's phrase--but there was disagreement about which options should be developed and how they might be used. The U.S. can no longer send in the Marines with impunity. Always in the background was the hard reality that the U.S. has long since lost its power to do almost anything it wanted around the world, the kind of overwhelming role it enjoyed in the aftermath of World War II. As the panel's discussion lengthened, this vexing problem kept coming back to the table. Of course, the U.S. still has enormous strength. Of course, its vital interests are at stake in a threatened part of the world. Still, what precisely should the Administration do to help--and not hurt--U.S. national interests?

Unrest and Upheaval. The challenges cited by the panelists were many and varied. Iran is clearly lost as an ally. Saudi Arabia, the linchpin of the entire area, is very different from Iran but also highly vulnerable. Egypt, supported by the U.S., in part because of President Anwar Sadat's peace initiatives toward Israel, has serious economic problems, and corruption that is "worse than under Farouk," according to retired Career Foreign Service Officer Jim Akins. Turkey once again is the sick man of Europe, sliding into bankruptcy and desperately in need of financial aid.

Overhanging all the ferment is the shadow of the Soviet Union, which has done little to promote the troubles but tries to capitalize on any chance to lessen U.S. influence. Said Kremlinologist Dimitri Simes: "I don't believe the Soviet Union has any grand design in this arc of instability, any master plan, any timetable. All those things belong to the imagination of some editorial writers and intelligence analysts." But Simes thinks that the Soviets are so eager to damage the U.S. that they will even act against some of their own national interests to do it.

For example, said Simes, the Soviets had good reason to be pleased with the Shah of Iran: he bought Soviet arms, "paying very quickly and in hard currency," and he supplied 45% of the natural gas used by three Soviet republics near the Iranian border. Also, the Soviets could not be happy about the rise of a militant Islamic nationalist movement on their borders, since the U.S.S.R. harbors millions of fervent Muslims.

Despite all that, says Simes, "the Soviets discovered that the situation in Iran was of great concern to the United States," and "as soon as they determined for themselves that the Shah had no chance, they immediately found that this was a terrible, corrupt, pro-American and generally horrible government." Moscow then directed much effective anti-U.S. propaganda into Iran. In the months ahead Moscow will be sharply looking for other such opportunities.

U.S. Policy Failures. In contrast to the opportunistic Soviet policy, several panelists felt, U.S. policy in the crescent has been myopic and timid. They complained that the Administration has done little more than issue statements outlining what it would not do. Policy, said Helms gloomily, "is sort of sloshing around. We have statements from our leaders that they don't want to interfere in anybody's internal affairs ever again. But if as a nation we are constantly saying that we don't want to interfere with anybody's national life under any circumstances, then we can't do anything about the situation in the Middle East, and it is doomed to failure." Helms claimed that the tendency to rule out action in advance was why "so many people regard [Administration officials] as a bunch of beginners. You don't tip your hand before you play it."

Akins charged that the U.S. had not really understood the causes of the Iranian revolution. Said he: "There were only two issues. They weren't land reform; you talk to Iranians about land reform and they laugh at you. They weren't women's rights, rights of minorities, all the things that appeared in the American press. One issue was corruption: that included the military expenditures, which were enormous, and the grandiose industrial developments. The other was civil rights: the fact that people were arrested, murdered, tortured, and disappeared, tens of thousands of them."

Added Iranian Scholar Jim Bill: "There is a record of blundering in Iran --the story hasn't even begun to be told yet--that compromised our national interests in a very serious way in that part of the world. We continued to support a succession of losers. We supported the Shah to the absolute last possible moment. The only thing we didn't do for him is send troops. Then when his people drove him from the country, we switched to another loser. Anyone could see that [Shahpour] Bakhtiar [whom the Shah named Prime Minister before he left Iran] was a loser. For a little more than a month, Bakhtiar played the game of losing, with us patting him on the back and providing him with support. Bakhtiar predictably is gone down the pipe also." Bill felt that the U.S. had thereby lost--though not irretrievably--a chance to influence the Khomeini-installed government.

Akins believed that the Administration did too little too late. Said he: "Every pro-American Iranian I know says the same thing: 'For God's sake, why didn't you put pressure on the Shah earlier to make concessions?' If he'd made the concessions a year earlier that he made in December, he could have looked forward to the ten or 15 years of tranquil reign that the CIA predicted."

One of the most important reasons for this excessive caution, several panelists declared, is an exaggerated fear of becoming entangled in another Viet Nam-style war. As he lectures in the U.S., Akins reported, he asks whether the U.S. should fight against a Soviet invasion of Saudi Arabia--admittedly a most unlikely event, but one that in his mind would call for as massive a response as a Soviet attack on West Germany. Said he: "The answer is usually: 'We have to move in, we should move in, we must move in--but we wouldn't move in.' "

Abroad, said Sisco, "the perception of the U.S. in the world today is that we have become paralyzed as a result of the Viet Nam syndrome." However, Sisco finds the public mood changing more rapidly than policymakers realize: "I am absolutely convinced that the Viet Nam syndrome is not broadly shared in the U.S., that the American people went through a psychological trauma at the gas station in 1974, and they are damned tired of appearing to be pushed around. I believe the American people have largely put Viet Nam behind them: they know what we are talking about when we speak of the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula being a vital interest."

Choices of Action. The U.S. must develop, and quickly, a policy demonstrating a will and commitment to remain involved in the crescent, and to use its power to protect its friends and vital interests there. Said Helms: "We're talking now about power politics, and since we are, let's not apologize for the fact; let's talk about it. We have all kinds of people who would be glad to know that the U.S. is in there and committed, and I think we would find, like a magnet, a whole lot of those filings coming toward us." There are many steps that the U.S. could take with both allies and opponents. Panelist Dale Tahtinen argued that Iraq, an important oil producer and supposedly proSoviet, has been making efforts "for the last five, six years, even longer than that" to develop contacts with the U.S. Partly this is because it is afraid of Iran, whoever may be in charge. And Tahtinen even saw opportunities for "lowlevel cooperation" between the U.S. and Afghanistan, which has a treaty with the U.S.S.R.

One vital step would be to shore up the friendly Bulent Ecevit government in Turkey. Said Tahtinen: "We have to find a way to keep the present Turkish government afloat, to provide it $2 billion a year for the next five years to prevent a collapse." The aid should come, Tahtinen felt, not only from the U.S. but from other NATO countries and possibly Saudi Arabia, "which has an interest in stability in the region."

Saudi Arabia. More to the point, the U.S. and the West have a deep interest in maintaining stability in Saudi Arabia itself. Akins and others agreed that the U.S. could not let the Saudis and their oil fall into hostile hands. The country has some forbidding problems that could worsen in the years ahead. Though it does not engage in the kind of police terror that made the Shah so detested, the country is riddled with the same kind of corruption, which could eventually stir social resentment. Akins and others thought that the U.S. was asking too much of Saudi Arabia, which is not strong enough to be the bulwark of U.S. interests in the Middle East. The Saudis are being criticized by other Arab states for cooperating too closely with the U.S., and the result in Saudi Arabia, Akins reported, "is a growing wave of anti-Americanism that has never happened before."

Akins advocated a mixture of toughness and sympathy toward the Saudis. "The most important effort is to bring the corruption there under control, because it is great. Extraordinary agents' fees [fees demanded by well-connected Saudis on purchases from the U.S., often suspected of being ill-concealed bribes] have to be cut out. You can point out to them that this is a main topic of conversation in the country, as indeed it is." Since corruption causes social unrest, Akins considers this so important that he believed the warning should be delivered by President Carter "or an emissary of the President" to King Khalid, Crown Prince Fahd or another member of the Saudi royal family. He conceded that such a warning would be unwelcome to the Saudis, but thinks that they might grudgingly take it to heart. Indeed, Akins cites a fascinating historical footnote to buttress his point: "There are many Saudis who believe, and mind you, this is not true, that it was the pressure that President Kennedy put on King Faisal that resulted in the move toward liberalization of society in Saudi Arabia."

Second, said Akins, the U.S. must stop "forcing the Saudis into taking actions that are perceived in the government and in the country as a whole as anti-Saudi and anti-Arab. The Saudis tell me: The U.S. is pushing the government into taking positions against our interests in the economic field on oil production, oil capacity, oil prices, and politically is enticing this government to support you on Camp David far more than we think is in the interests of the Arabs.' "

Akins' most controversial recommendation bearing on the Saudis was to oppose an Egyptian-Israeli peace on the basis of the Camp David plan. Instead, he recommended pressing the Israelis to negotiate a comprehensive peace with the Arab states in which they would surrender all the territory gained after the 1967 War and agree to a Muslim presence in Jerusalem. Akins warned that Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states would stop all aid to Egypt if it reached a separate accord with Israel. "Next," said Akins, "if Sadat doesn't get this aid, he is going to be overthrown and replaced by somebody who is certainly not to our liking."

This view drew a rebuttal around the table. Sisco argued that failure to get an agreement with Israel would make Sadat even more vulnerable, and that while the Arab world might move toward greater unity, "it may very well be the kind of move toward unity that will bring with it an increase in radicalism."

Iran. The loss of the old ally hurt the U.S. sorely, not only in terms of oil but in the loss of facilities that monitored Soviet missiles. Still, the Islamic government installed by Ayatullah Ruhollah Khomeini is likely to be anti-Communist as well as antiWestern, and nonaligned in a true sense. Jim Bill, one of the few Americans who know well some of the people around the Ayatullah, ticked off a list of several who are American-educated, basically conservative, and men the U.S. could deal with to help get Iran's oil flowing again to the West.

Bill counted eight top Khomeini aides who either have lived in the U.S. or have children going to school here, and six who are "very close to France and to Western Europe." Included are two members of Khomeini's Revolutionary Council, Dr. Ibrahim Yazdi and Abbas Amir Entezam. Yazdi lived in Houston for ten years. He studied with Bill, who said, "He is a very serious, pro-American, solid kind of personality." Entezam received a degree in structural engineering from the University of California at Berkeley and "is about as American as you can possibly get," said Bill.

Bill listed steps that the U.S. should immediately take to improve relations with the Khomeini regime in Iran: Publicly recognize the abdication of the Shah ("We have said we will work with the new government, but we have not said an awful lot about the guy sitting out there in Morocco"). Offer the new government technical, agricultural, industrial and educational aid. Disavow convincingly any thought of sponsoring a countercoup, still a subject of great worry to the Iranian revolutionaries. Replace U.S. Ambassador William H. Sullivan, who is thought to have been too close to the Shah. Train some of our State Department officers in Farsi "and send them over in waves. And get people over there very quickly who understand Shi'ite Islam."

In other nations too, Bill asserted, "we can at least get in touch with some of the people that might be running the country" in the future, rather than "chaining ourselves to leaders who are going down the pipe." But Oil Expert Walter Levy wondered if the U.S. should instead do its best to prop up the present leaders, trying to buy time. Levy readily admitted that this approach collapsed in Iran. Call it shortsighted, he said, but supporting the status quo "may give us another five or ten years in Saudi Arabia."

Bill's views on seeking out potential leaders led to a spirited exchange with Helms:

Bill: What's wrong with getting people that speak Arabic, Persian, and Turkish and Urdu out there in the boondocks getting in touch with religious leaders?

Helms: Jim, it is fine to say that, but the minute you're in touch with them, and you're an official representative of the United States Government, it entails a commitment, and that is the hardest thing I know to control. I have been a practitioner of this art and you have not been, so take my word for it.

Bill: I can't take your word for it, Dick, because I have known particular individuals since 1965 in Iran, I can give you their names, who did get in touch...

Helms: Yeah, but what were you going to do about them? Were you going to take them up to the [Shah's] Niavaran Palace and say "Here's a fellow that's objecting to you, Boss, now do something about it"?

Bill: You're an intelligence man. In intelligence, aren't we supposed to be in touch with the people in the society, not just the government?

Helms: That's right, but there are ways of doing that without raising this issue of carrying two policies at the same time.

Helms was hinting at establishing usable covert contacts. At other times, he spoke approvingly of covert operations, and how the lack of them today has limited U.S. options. Helms urged that "we go back to some of those good old dirty days when we had an arsenal of things that we used to do around the world and we used to organize our allies and get them to help us out. We don't have to do anything blatant." At another point, Helms said: "We have friends; there are operations we can run."

Simes agreed that the Administration should initiate covert action rather than flaunt its power: "I think it is extremely important for the U.S. to learn to walk slowly."

Obviously, this discussion could not get very specific, since a covert operation openly advocated is a contradiction in terms. But the panel did produce a list of countries where the U.S. could profitably operate. Afghanistan. Iraq, a police state with severe tribal problems. Syria, a minority government beset by corruption. South Yemen, which Akins said "is not considered a country; it is considered a Soviet base. Two-thirds of the population have fled as refugees. They can all be used to go back into the country."

The Military Option. The thorniest problem of all is how the U.S. should use its military power. Tahtinen advocated a kind of presence at one remove: U.S. assistance to Saudi Arabia and possibly other friendly nations to expand their own airfields and naval facilities. By doing that, he says, "you are making the Saudis feel we are not going to let them down." The implication, Tahtinen noted, would be that "we would be willing to utilize those facilities in time of crisis if invited to do so. At least that gives us a potential."

Sisco went a big step further, calling for a modest buildup in the U.S. military presence in the area. He advocated adding a few vessels to the small U.S. Middle East fleet, more frequent visits by that fleet to friendly countries, and strengthening of the U.S. naval base on Diego Garcia, an island in the Indian Ocean. The beefing up, he said, would serve "as a signal that we do view this area as an area of vital interest and would be a psychological bulwark to Saudi and Egyptian leadership."

But some panelists were afraid that showing the flag would hurt, not help, the U.S. and its true friends. Bill felt that "we have an excellent chance in Iran--unless, of course, we send some aircraft carriers storming over there." In Bill's mind, any attempt by the U.S. to form an old-fashioned mutual defense alliance--"Baghdad Pact II, CENTO n, something like that"--would also work against the U.S. Such a step, warned Bill, "would certainly force the Iranians into the hands of the Soviets."

Added Akins: "It would make it more difficult for the House of Saud, for example, if we had a bunch of gunboats tootling around the Persian Gulf. The only reaction [among Saudi subjects] would be: 'Aha! You see, these boys are in the pockets of the Americans. The Americans are pushing them around, and these people have got to go.' "

Pointing out the limitations of force, Akins went on: "We could have protected the Shah against a foreign attack as we can protect the Saudis against a foreign attack, but we are no more capable of protecting the Saudis against internal subversion than we were of protecting the Shah against revolt." If such an internal revolt came, added Akins, "it would not be leftist, it would be Muslim puritan, and we are not going to do anything with those gunboats."

Although Sisco conceded the risks emphasized by Akins and Bill, he thought they could be averted, or at least dampened, by putting out an announcement to the effect that "we are strengthening our position to assure access to the sea lanes and the oil. As long as there is no interference with them, nobody has anything to worry about; the increased presence of the U.S. has nothing to do with the internal affairs of other people. Everybody would read this statement and know damn well that if something occurred the military force was at least there as an option. I think we need to create options of power."

Sisco proudly proclaimed himself to be, like Helms, a member of the "old school" of diplomacy, but he was nonetheless cautious about using gunboats. Closely questioned, he said he would send in the Marines to, say, Saudi Arabia in response to a plea from the government to counter a threat that was at least partly external. Said he: "I would have absolutely no hesitancy whatsoever in responding positively to such a Saudi Arabian request, given all the caveats and conditions."

The finite and risky value of military power is clear proof that the U.S. must not see it as a substitute for sophisticated and imaginative attention to political, social and economic problems hi the area. Not that economic aid is a surefire remedy either. Besides, Levy observed: "I believe our country isn't rich enough to marshal a Marshall Plan for the area."

Quite clearly, no single approach is going to be sufficient. U.S. policy must combine economic and technical aid with some military flag showing and perhaps even covert operations, offering friendship to some governments that are not now especially receptive, trying to induce cooperative regimes to be more concerned about and responsive to social unrest. That will be an exquisitely difficult policy to carry out. As several panelists noted, the U.S., under the best of circumstances, may suffer some further losses. But given enough will, patience and ingenuity, the U.S. has the strength to safeguard its vital interests in the crescent of crisis. sb

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