Angry Words Over a Deadlock

Once before, when all seemed bleakest, they had pulled a rabbit out of a hat. This time, Egyptian, Israeli and U.S. negotiators came up empty. There was no last-minute miracle; for the time being, at least, there would be no signing of an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty on the slopes of Mount Sinai or anywhere else, no end to three decades of deep hostility and open conflict.

U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance shuttled for six days between Cairo and Jerusalem in hopes of getting a treaty by Sunday, Dec. 17, a psychologically important deadline because it had been set as the goal for a treaty when the Camp David summit concluded, in a burst of exuberant optimism, exactly three months earlier. But at week's end, reluctantly acknowledging that Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Premier Menachem Begin were still far apart on the few unresolved issues, a disappointed Vance abruptly cut short his shuttle and returned to Washington. As Vance headed home, a weary Sadat met with his aides, and the Israeli Cabinet held a special five-hour session that resulted, to nobody's surprise, in a unanimous rejection of the latest Egyptian proposals.

Angry words flew back and forth, particularly between the U.S. and Israel. Begin accused the U.S. of adopting a "one-sided attitude," and his press secretary, Dan Pattir, protested that Washington was using "direct, brutal pressure" on Israel. Warned Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan: "If peace negotiations aren't renewed soon ... we will have to start everything from the beginning." In Jerusalem, placard-carrying Israelis staged anti-American demonstrations.

Jerusalem's abrupt rejection of the treaty revisions and its shrill rhetoric shocked U.S. officials. When he read the Israeli Cabinet's statement, reports TIME State Department Correspondent Christopher Ogden, the normally phlegmatic Vance seethed with anger, and a senior U.S. official dismissed one especially nasty phrase in it by snapping: "It does not deserve comment." Another American insisted that the Israeli Cabinet response was filled with "misleading inaccuracies." So upset is the Administration that it may take its case to the public by releasing documents refuting Israel's contentions.

As the failure of Vance's mission was becoming apparent, Jimmy Carter said: ''I am very frustrated at this point." He and Vance, the President complained, had spent "hundreds and hundreds of hours trying to bring these two nations together on differences that are almost completely insignificant compared to what they have already resolved."

Because so much has in fact been accomplished, the failure to meet the Dec. 17 deadline, while certainly disappoint ing, does not necessarily doom the Egyptian-Israeli peace process. As a result of the progress made during talks in Washington in October and November, Egypt and Israel agree on most points of a draft treaty. The unresolved issues are truly mi nor, although they relate to the crux of a major Middle Eastern diplomatic problem: How directly should an Egypt-Israel peace be linked to a general Arab-Israeli settlement? So far, the negotiating process has proved remarkably durable, surviving major fluctuations as the hopes for a settlement rose, then plummeted, then rose again since Sadat's "sacred mission" to Jerusalem in November 1977.

Still, the missing of last Sunday's target date was highly symbolic. Said Carter at a press conference earlier this month: "If the Egyptians and Israelis violate the three-month limit on negotiating this treaty, it will be a very serious matter ... It would cast doubt on whether the Egyptians and Israelis would carry out the difficult terms of the upcoming peace treaty."

The missed deadline was especially unfortunate because a peace pact would have brought a welcome measure of stability to the Middle East at a time when the troubles in Iran threaten to plunge the entire region into turmoil. With the Shah's crown slipping and Sadat's peace initiative stalling, the moderate Arab camp is becoming increasingly vulnerable to attacks from radicals. A defeat of the Middle East's moderates would be a monumental setback for Western interests.

These concerns added an extra element of urgency to Vance's shuttle. His last-minute attempt to meet the deadline produced a week of roller-coaster diplomacy. Carrying a battered briefcase bulging with notes and drafts of possible compromises, Vance was typically cautious as he flew into Cairo a week ago Sunday. He knew that he would have to get concessions from the Egyptians and that Sadat was going to try to rewrite parts of the draft treaty. Vance was determined to resist because any tampering with even minor points of a text in the late stages of talks risks unraveling the entire negotiations. He hoped to use the approaching Dec. 17 deadline as a bargaining lever.

The first two Vance-Sadat meetings. held in the Egyptian leader's Nile resthouse at the Delta Barrage, 15 miles north of Cairo, cheered the Americans. Vance emerged from the second session reporting "good progress." He interrupted the Cairo talks for a flight to Jerusalem for the funeral of former Israeli Premier Golda Meir. Sensitive to the impropriety of conducting diplomacy at such a moment, Vance huddled only briefly over coffee in a private room at the airport with Israeli Foreign Minister Dayan and Defense Minister Ezer Weizman.

Immediately after the austere graveside services, held on a chill, wet morning on Mount Herzl, the Secretary returned to Cairo for a third meeting with Sadat. As before, the two men met in the high-ceilinged room at the resthouse while aides scribbled notes on leather-bound pads. The results so heartened the Americans that State Department Spokesman George Sherman exclaimed: "We are completely satisfied. Headway has been made toward possibly breaking the log jam!" Even the cool Vance could not mask his pleasure. Sadat, however, was uncharacteristically silent in the presence of the press, and some observers speculated that he did not want to say anything that might offend the Israelis. Others noted that the Egyptian leader might have been fatigued because he had been fasting to lose weight.

Two questions particularly preoccupied the negotiators. One was the so-called precedence issue raised by the sixth article of the draft treaty. As written, it stated that the new Egyptian-Israeli document would have precedence over accords previously signed with other countries. Although Egyptian negotiators had tentatively accepted Article VI's wording during the Washington talks, Sadat later balked. He wanted the article revised, fearing that it might prevent Egypt from aiding other Arab states if they were attacked by Israel and would open him to the charge of having signed a separate peace with Israel. Vance urged Sadat to go along with Article VI if the treaty were accompanied by a letter recognizing Egypt's right to aid an ally in case of Israeli attack. Egyptian Premier Moustafa Khalil began explaining his objections to the treaty language when he was cut off by Sadat. Drawing on his pipe, the Egyptian President said with a wave of his hand: "It's O.K. We can accept that now."

But Sadat was tougher on another issue, insisting that the Israeli-Egyptian treaty be linked in some manner with the promise Israel made at Camp David to end its military administration in the West Bank of the Jordan and the Gaza Strip. Cairo has argued that without such linkage, Israel will be under no pressure to fulfill its promise once it has achieved its longtime goal of signing a peace treaty with Egypt. Explained a senior Egyptian official: "We cannot let the Israelis get off scot-free after signing with Egypt. We cannot let them feel that they are off the hook."

Sadat wanted a definite timetable for Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza, but he settled for something less firm: a "target date" for the installation of the locally elected council there. In return for this concession, however, Sadat got the Americans to agree to annex yet another letter to the proposed treaty. This letter would state that the exchange of Israeli and Egyptian ambassadors, the final step of normalization, would be delayed until one month after control of the West Bank and Gaza passed to an autonomous authority. Sadat felt this would provide at least some incentive for Israel to fulfill its pledges.

Vance realized that the proposed letter would upset Jerusalem because it would require Israel to meet all its treaty obligations to Egypt before there was any exchange of ambassadors, and that such an exchange could be indefinitely postponed. Still, Vance was greatly encouraged. He felt that the Israelis would recognize that he had won important concessions from Sadat and therefore react favorably to the trade-offs sought by the Egyptian. Abandoning caution, Vance ventured a statement that, for him, was daring in its finality: "We have finished those two issues." Added the Secretary after arriving in Israel: "We are now in the final stages of the negotiations."

How wrong he was. After a first meeting with Begin and other top Israeli officials, Spokesman Sherman said that the talks were at "a delicate stage," a clear signal that things were souring. The second session was even worse. To Vance's suggestion that Israel accept the changes requested by Sadat, an outraged Begin pounded the table and replied: "What kind of behavior is this? You receive some new demands and push them over to us, making it clear that you already accept them. Is this the behavior of an honest broker?" Responded Vance: "We know that you have taken major risks. But it is most important to reach a peace treaty for the sake of this area, the interests of the West and the lives of your people." The Secretary's point was rejected and the session ended in deadlock. Vance left the meeting and headed straight to the U.S. consulate to return a call from Jimmy Carter that had come in on the secure tele phone. After a brief discussion about how the negotiations were going, Carter said: "I called to ask you to come back because I've got something I want you here for." The President, of course, was referring to the dramatic developments in U.S.-Chinese relations. Because it now seemed all but impossible for an Egyptian-Israeli agreement to be reached by Dec. 17, Vance said that he would return to Washington by Friday afternoon.

After speaking to Carter, Vance had one more fruitless session with the Israelis, then returned to Cairo to brief Sadat before flying to Washington. By this time, his team was so demoralized that one member cracked bitterly, "This calls for a trip to the Wailing Wall."

The Israelis were shocked by the proposals Vance had brought from Cairo, and especially by the implicit endorsement of them by the U.S. To Jerusalem, this amounted to adding "new elements" in a negotiating process that, the Israelis felt, was near completion. In its special session, Begin's Cabinet condemned the Egyptian proposals as "inconsistent with the Camp David framework, or not included in it" and declared that it "rejects the attitude and interpretation of the U.S."

Earlier in the week, other Israelis had already vented their feelings about the proposals brought by Vance. One morning, a car pulled up outside Jerusalem's King David Hotel, where Vance was sleeping, and a loudspeaker started blaring: "Vance go home! Vance go home!" From a second loudspeaker came the chant, "Cyrus Vance. Go see your friends in Egypt. We don't want you here."

What most distressed the Israelis seemed to be Vance's support of Sadat on the linkage issue, especially because it would connect the Egyptian-Israeli treaty with the establishment of West Bank and Gaza autonomy. Complained Naftali Lavie, an aide to Dayan: "This is strict blackmailing and not a linking." The Israeli reaction seemed extreme. For one thing, Sadat is willing to accept a target date merely as a goal instead of as a fixed timetable. For another, although Sadat now wants to delay the exchange of ambassadors, all other aspects of normalization would proceed as scheduled, including trade, cultural ties and the right of Israel's ships to use the Suez Canal. Last week's Cabinet declaration did, however, leave open some hope for compromise. It stated that "the letter concerning the autonomy arrangements can be clarified and reformulated."

Almost as bad as linkage, in Jerusalem's eyes, was the letter about recognizing Egypt's right to aid an ally attacked by Israel. Charged Lavie: "This neutralizes the peace treaty of its real and meaningful essence. If this is accepted, we will not have peace with Egypt." There was concern, for instance, that Syria could mass troops threateningly on Israel's border in order to provoke an Israeli pre-emptive attack, thereby giving Cairo an excuse to join in a war against Israel.

Underlying much of the Israeli anger is the feeling that Washington is making no bones about siding with Cairo. Said a close aide of Dayan's: "Carter will spit in our faces, blaming us for the collapse of the negotiations. The Senators and Administration spokesmen will join in happily. They will hope that we will crawl on all fours to Washington." Israelis were further infuriated over a statement by Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd, who had just finished a trip to Israel and six other Middle East countries. Byrd warned that Congress "will be reluctant to increase Israeli aid while Israel continues to spend on the proliferation of new settlements on the West Bank."

In its statements last week, the Administration indicated quite clearly that it blames Israel more than Egypt for blocking a peace settlement. White House Press Secretary Jody Powell declared that the matter of peace "is now in the hands of the Israeli government." While Carter praised Sadat for being "very generous" in making concessions requested by the U.S., the President suggested that Israel was refusing to accept a timetable that actually had been proposed by Dayan and Weizman.

The criticism aimed at Jerusalem is at least in part deserved. At several crucial steps in the peace process, it has been Israel rather than Egypt that has moved grudgingly, split hairs and seemed to shrivel the spirit of the proposed agreement with excessive legalisms. A glaring example is the stubbornness with which the Begin government has pursued its policy of expanding Israeli settlements in the territories occupied since the 1967 war.

To Israelis, however, it is Sadat who, as one Begin aide says, has been "zigzagging all the time, all the way." They claim that earlier this year a high Egyptian official assured Defense Minister Weizman that Egypt was "against the establishment of an independent Palestinian state." But last month Sadat said in a letter to Begin: "The Palestinian issue was always the core of the Middle East conflict. I always demanded, and still do demand, the establishment of a Palestinian state." The Israelis argue, moreover, that Begin has made important concessions, like agreeing to remove Israeli settlements and airfields from the Sinai although he had originally insisted that they remain there for security reasons.

While the Israelis have a point in that at times Begin has been flexible and Sadat has toughened his bargaining position, on balance Israel has been the less compromising and more frustrating negotiating partner. Part of Begin's stubbornness, of course, may be dictated by the realities of Israeli politics. His government needs support in the Knesset from hawks, who feel that Israel must have much of the occupied territory to preserve its security, and also from members of the religious parties, who generally oppose relinquishing lands that they feel were granted to Israel in the Old Testament. Since Camp David, Begin has been attacked harshly by a number of his former comrades in the Irgun underground. They denounce him as a traitor to Zionism because he has been willing to negotiate with Sadat the abandonment of Israeli settlements in the Sinai.

Sadat too is under great pressure. It comes primarily from his fellow Arab leaders who have made Camp David a swear word because, in their view, it largely ignored the question of a Palestinian homeland and skirted the issue of sovereignty over East Jerusalem. Only Morocco and Sudan, of all the Arab states, have endorsed Camp David. This has disappointed Cairo and Washington, which had counted on backing for Sadat from such moderate countries as Jordan, Tunisia and especially Saudi Arabia.

Sadat's insistence on linking in some way the Egyptian-Israeli treaty with movement toward autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza is, in part, a strategy to woo Arab moderates. Saudi Crown Prince Fahd specifically warned Sadat: "The extent of linkage will determine the extent to which we can support Camp David in the Arab world."

What happens to the spirit of Camp David now that the deadline has lapsed? Washington is looking to Jerusalem for the answer. Said Carter late last week: "Now it is up to the Israelis to either accept [the treaty] or reject it." Jerusalem anticipates direct pressure from Washington. Israeli officials speculate that the Administration might delay arms shipments and refuse to discuss extra financial aid. (Israel is due to receive $2.2 billion in U.S. military and economic aid in the current fiscal year.)

Such pressure, however, is likely to stir up the articulate and politically powerful pro-Israeli lobby. While American Jewish leaders remain almost unanimously grateful to Carter for his achievements at Camp David, most are becoming increasingly angry with what they feel is his recent pro-Sadat tilt. Said Irwin Goldenberg, president of the Los Angeles Jewish Federation-Council: "Carter is making out Begin to be the obstacle. That's not right or fair." Added Hyman Bookbinder, Washington lobbyist for the American Jewish Committee: "It was a mistake for Carter to scold Israel. We request that our Administration show some patience during these difficult days."

It is possible that the negotiating atmosphere may actually improve now that there is no pressure to meet an artificial deadline. Sadat, for instance, did not want other Arab states to think that he was being rushed into making concessions. The Israelis have long made a point of refusing to buckle under pressure. One Israeli official speculated that it would be good for the talks to "cool off for a while. The last weeks were hectic. The tension added by Carter's demand for a conclusion by Dec. 17 left us exhausted."

But if the peace process truly deadlocks, some bold action may have to be taken to restore momentum. This is something that perhaps only the U.S. can do. To be sure, Press Secretary Powell griped last week that the Middle East talks have already devoured more Administration time than "any two or three" urgent domestic problems, such as inflation and unemployment. And the thought of convening another Camp David-style summit makes Administration aides shudder. Carter said it is "not my preference," and one senior official declared emphatically: "It is the last thing we want." With the Guadalupe summit of the West's leaders, a crucial round of the arms talks and a visit by China's Teng Hsiao-p'ing all approaching, the calendar does not even have room for a second Camp David.

The U.S., however, may have little choice. Whether it means being host at a new summit or merely launching Vance on another diplomatic shuttle, the Administration cannot afford to lose much time in trying to rekindle the Camp David spirit. The stakes are too high.

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