Clearing the Way for Peace

The Camp David agreements pass one hurdle, but problems lie ahead

It was a moment of triumph for Premier Menachem Begin, but the struggle had clearly taken some toll of the doughty old Zionist warrior. At 3:33 a.m. last Thursday Knesset Speaker Yitzhak Shamir announced the results of a roll call vote on a resolution approving the Camp David peace accords: 84 yes, 19 no, 17 abstentions. His tie uncharacteristically askew, a jubilant but obviously exhausted Begin embraced Deputy Premier Yigael Yadin and two of his key aides, Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan and Defense Minister Ezer Weizman. Next day Begin--who has a history of heart trouble--was taken to a Jerusalem hospital; doctors reported that he was merely suffering from fatigue.

"This is a historic turning point," Begin had said during the intense 17-hour debate that preceded the vote. Indeed, a collective sigh of relief went up in Cairo and Washington when results of the balloting were known. Of course, obstacles remain, and key problems are unsolved, but the Jerusalem decision cleared the way for the start of Egyptian-Israeli negotiations that may well lead to a peace treaty between these neighboring enemies by Christmas.

Even as the Knesset started its deliberations, direct communications between Jerusalem and Cairo were quietly restored; they had been cut off last July by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat because of his frustration over the then deadlocked peace discussions. This week, at the end of the two-day Jewish New Year celebrations, Israeli negotiators will fly to Cairo to discuss where, when and how the negotiations will be carried out. The Egyptians want to hold them at Ismailia, the Suez Canal town where Begin paid a call on Sadat last December, following Sadat's historic trip to Jerusalem. But the Israelis will insist that some of the discussions be held in Beersheba, capital of the Negev.

While the main outlines of an Egyptian-Israeli treaty were determined at Camp David, misunderstandings over the fine print of the accord could still lead to snags and delays. There could be disputes about the precise lines of the initial Israeli military withdrawal in the Sinai or the exact nature of the "normal relations" that both sides have promised to start up after the treaty is signed. Beyond that there is the question of how the Israeli settlements in the Sinai will be dismantled--a potentially explosive domestic issue for Begin's government (see box). It has been taken for granted that United Nations forces will become available to monitor the new agreement, but that issue has yet to be discussed by the Security Council, where the Soviet Union has a veto.

Another problem is the continuing lack of support for Sadat in the Arab world. Syrian President Hafez Assad, who was host to a Damascus summit of radical Arab states that raised $1 billion to overthrow Sadat, was on a tour of the Middle East last week, urging the rejection of the Camp David agreements. Assad's hostility was predictable. More worrisome to the Egyptian President was the fact that his moderate allies, particularly the Saudi Arabian royal family, had so far said little or nothing in his favor. Sadat last week sent his closest confidant, Deputy Prime Minister Hassan Tuhamy, to Geneva to call on King Khalid; the Saudi monarch was resting there on a flight from Riyadh to Cleveland, where he was to undergo heart surgery. Tuhamy reported back to Cairo with the ambiguous message that Khalid was "satisfied with our clarifications."

The U.S. will play a key role in the negotiations. Last week, Washington's roving Middle East ambassador, Alfred Atherton, arrived in Israel after a tour of Arab capitals. There he announced his intention to discuss some of the unresolved questions about the future of the West Bank with Palestinians who live under Israeli occupation.

One of the main goals of U.S. policy at this stage is to lure Jordan's reluctant King Hussein, the Saudis, and possibly even Assad into the peace process. Ever wary about deciding in haste, Hussein has asked Washington for a long list of clarifications about the Camp David agreements as they apply to the West Bank. The State Department is busy complying, even though one high U.S. official impatiently observed that the King was being "a bit precious." Syria's participation in any talks with Israel seems remote, but Congress provided a bit of bait by approving $90 million in foreign aid for Damascus if President Carter attests that the aid would help the peace process. Israel also contributed something. From Jerusalem came a calculated leak that Dayan had told his aides that "neither the Sinai nor the Golan Heights is part of our homeland."

In Jerusalem, the Knesset's agony over whether or not to accept the accords was shared by the country at large. Most Israelis believe that they must retain a presence in the occupied territories as security against future Arab attacks. Religious Jews, moreover, consider much of this land as their God-ordained birthright. Begin shares the religious Zionist view that occupied territories where Jews lived in biblical times are rightfully part of Eretz Yisrael. In fact, he almost torpedoed the Camp David talks on that issue.

One of the lingering complications from the Maryland summit was an unresolved dispute between Carter and Begin about Israeli settlements on the West Bank. Washington insisted that the Premier had promised there would be no new settlements for five years--the transitional period during which Palestinians will begin to enjoy a period of limited self-rule. Begin, however, insisted that he had pledged to maintain the moratorium on the settlements for only three months. In tacit agreement that it was far better to get on with the peace process, neither Washington nor Jerusalem last week tried to trumpet the differences in viewpoint.

In an emotional, 47-minute speech that closed the Knesset debate, Begin painfully sought to explain why he, an advocate of settlements in Judea and Samaria, was prepared to surrender other such communities in the Sinai. "The settlements are dear to me," Begin pleaded. "Everybody knows that I love every settler." He had done everything he could at Camp David to hold onto the sites in the Sinai. "We tried to convince Sadat on the matter of the settlements, but without success." In the end it became a decision of statesmanship, of striving for what was best for Israel: "As Premier, I have to think that a peace agreement is possible. This is the price of peace with Egypt. I have no choice, I must decide."

So explosive was the issue politically that Begin initially intended to split the resolution into two parts--one dealing with the overall framework of the peace accords, the other with Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai (including the settlements). Since Begin had announced that all Knesset members would have a free vote on the issue, that led to the risk that they would approve the first item and vote down the other. The Premier changed his mind, however, after reading criticism on his way home from the U.S. that separating the issues was a cowardly scheme to avoid responsibility. At its regular Sunday meeting, the Cabinet voted to present a single, 48-word (in Hebrew) resolution to the Knesset. As the debate opened, Begin used all the considerable parliamentary skills he had learned in 30 years in the Knesset. He threatened at one point to "report to the President" unless he got more supporters from his own Likud bloc than from Labor; reporting to the President is an Israeli euphemism for resigning. Over tea and rolls in the Knesset dining room, Begin persuaded four white-bearded rabbis from the Orthodox Agudat Israel Party to ignore their religious feelings about the Sinai and vote his way for peace. When National Religious Party Member Yehuda Ben-Meir tried to explain his on-the-one-hand, on-the-other-hand reasons for abstaining, Begin cut him down with a withering ad hominem attack. Sarcastically describing Ben-Meir as "a real Demosthenes," Begin asked: "What's the purpose of this abstention, Mr. Ben-Meir? You want Begin, Weizman and Dayan to do the dirty work to get rid of the settlements while all those who abstained can say 'I didn't lend my support to this'?"

The issue ceased to be in serious doubt when Opposition Leader Shimon Peres indicated that his Labor Party, which in fact had no other realistic option, would support the Premier. Significantly, most of the nays and abstentions came from conservatives in Begin's Likud coalition, who refused to surrender the Sinai for religious and security reasons. In Begin's own Herut Party, for example, nine of the 21 Knesset members defected. The National Religious Party, a necessary ally of the Likud coalition, cast seven of its twelve votes against Begin.

The split could cause Begin trouble at home, although the Premier now has strong support from Israelis, 82% of whom, according to one poll, "absolutely believe" that peace with Egypt will occur within a year. Apart from a small number of dissidents who oppose any dealings with Israel, Sadat also has popular backing at home. Even conservative Muslims, reported TIME Cairo Bureau Chief Wilton Wynn, consider that "it is right to have peace with people of the book," as Jews and Christians are also considered by Islamic scholars. Cairo's strategy, as a result, will be to proceed unilaterally with peace talks, which are likely to end up in the U.S. as a neutral site. Sadat could then present fellow Arabs with a fait accompli. An Egyptian diplomat told Wynn last week: "Once the Israelis begin withdrawing and handing over land to us, we simply will ask the other Arabs a question: 'Do you want us to give Sinai back to the Israelis?' "

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