Peeking at the Chinese Card

A timely get-acquainted mission to Peking

The start of another round of border bloodletting between China and the Soviet Union? It seemed ominous--for a while. As Peking told it, one day last week a Soviet helicopter flew across the Ussuri River frontier and 2 1/2 miles into Heilungkiang, China's easternmost province, while boats landed 30 Soviet troops on Chinese soil. There, Peking charged, the Russians "tried to round up Chinese inhabitants, shooting continually and wounding a number of them." Some captives were dragged back to the river and given "kicks and blows" before they were finally let go.

In a sharp protest, the Chinese accused Moscow of taking "a grave, calculated step" aimed at further worsening relations between the two countries and demanded both a Kremlin apology and punishment of the troops involved. "Otherwise," it added, there would be "consequences." Thereupon Moscow expressed "regrets" and claimed that its border guards "had inadvertently" entered China while "pursuing a dangerous armed criminal."

Only a couple of weeks earlier, Soviet negotiators had arrived in Peking to resume the long-suspended border talks that were begun after the violent frontier clashes between the two hostile Communist leviathans in 1969. But China's tough-talking reaction to last week's incident indicated that Peking-Moscow relations remain very chilly at best. That probably portends a warm welcome in Peking for U.S. National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, who was due in Peking late this week for a three-day get-acquainted visit; after all, he is the Carter Administration's leading advocate of a hard-line approach to the Soviet Union.

While the status of Sino-Soviet relations will not be explicitly raised by Brzezinski during his trip, China's deep fear of the U.S.S.R. has been a crucial element in the development of closer U.S.-Chinese ties. But the very slow pace of normalizing the links between Washington and Peking has clearly displeased Chinese leaders. One of Brzezinski's main tasks will be to assure China's leaders of the U.S. commitment to closer ties with their country.

Peking would probably prefer complete normalization of Sino-American relations. The main obstacle to this, however, seems to be the Chinese. Their price for full diplomatic ties with Washington is that the U.S. sever its diplomatic and defense links with Taiwan. This the Administration is not likely to consider so long as Peking refuses to pledge that any reunification of Taiwan and the mainland will occur only by peaceful means.

The U.S. backing of Taiwan is not the only complaint Brzezinski will be hearing. The Chinese apparently want more consultation with Washington on matters of mutual strategic concern, such as events in Africa, the Middle East and the Asian subcontinent. Brzezinski may accommodate them by requesting that they use their influence in Africa to mobilize support for the Anglo-American plan on Rhodesia.

What probably concerns Chinese leaders most is their reluctant conclusion that the U.S. has not been taking a hard enough line toward the U.S.S.R. State Department Sinologists believe that Peking regards Washington as having been weak in responding to Soviet gains in Africa; the Chinese surely see events in Afghanistan, where a closet Communist regime seized power last month, as another Soviet success. And this is on China's own western flank. Peking is also thought to feel that Carter has been too eager to accommodate the Russians in the slow-moving SALT talks and to abandon or defer development of modern weapons such as the B-1 bomber and the neutron warhead.

Brzezinski is clearly prepared to discuss all these matters. Accompanying him are top Asia experts from his National Security Council staff and the State Department, plus the NSC's security planning coordinator, Samuel Huntington; its science and technology specialist, Benjamin Huberman; and the Pentagon's Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs, Morton Abramowitz. Despite the size of his entourage, which is certain to flatter his hosts, Brzezinski is not expecting concrete results. He told TIME: "This is not a tactical trip. It is designed to emphasize that our relationship with China is continuing and longterm, based on common interests. It's not a negotiating trip per se, although if it serves the goal of normalization, so much the better." By cozying up to Peking, Brzezinski is also sending a clear signal to the Kremlin: There is a price to be paid for continued Soviet adventurism.

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