The Fight over Fighters

After weeks of fierce lobbying, Carter's plane sale looked ready to fly

Congressional victories never seem to come easy for Jimmy Carter --when they come at all. So there was reason for quiet euphoria mixed with continuing wariness at the White House last week when the Administration moved a major step forward in its uphill battle to sell $4.8 billion worth of U.S. jet fighters to Israel, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. In an 8-to-8 tie vote, following days of intensive and bipartisan lobbying, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee declined to reject the three-part arms deal. White House Press Secretary Jody Powell declared Carter to be "extremely gratified" with the result.

Actually, the President's victory was costly, incomplete and less convincing than he had originally hoped, but it successfully cleared the way for a more decisive verdict by the whole Senate, possibly on Monday. There, too, Carter was outwardly confident that he could win. So was Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd. Said he late last week: "As of now the votes are there."

If so--and there was no guarantee of what effects a weekend of fierce lobbying might produce--it would be an impressive victory for Carter, given the energy and passion that have been expended on the plane deal. Or. rather, on one aspect of it: the sale of 60 F-15 fighters, considered to be among the world's most advanced interceptors, to Saudi Arabia. Carter's original proposal also included the sale of 15 F-15s and 75 F-16s to Israel, and 50 less sophisticated F-5Es to Egypt. In the eyes of the country's vocal and powerful Jewish lobby, the Saudi sale is a direct threat to Israel's security. But to the Administration and its backers, the offer is not a threat to peace but a means of supporting moderate Arab political forces and preserving U.S. influence in the Middle East.

By law. the House and Senate have 30 days after the President gives notice of an arms sale in which to block the arrangement by a joint resolution. If either chamber declines to object to the President's initiative, the sale goes through. (The deadline for the latest deal is May 28.) Both House and Senate rely heavily on committee recommendations in making their decisions: a recommendation for or against a sale would be difficult to reverse. In carrying out its pro-sale campaign, the Administration therefore concentrated on two main fronts: the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the 37-member House International Relations Commit tee. Those bodies received anti-Administration resolutions brought forward by Delaware Senator Joseph Biden and Florida Representative Dante Fascell.

Three weeks ago Administration officials thought they had the battle won in the House committee. They were wrong. Fascell pulled together a substantial (22 to 15) majority behind his resolution, but then committee members decided to delay any decision until this week. Suddenly the action shifted to the Senate committee, chaired by Alabama Democrat John Sparkman.

The odds there looked bleak for Carter. Originally, by the Administration's count, Chairman Sparkman had been the only one of the 16 committee members who actually supported the package. Carter's advisers then looked hard for ways to rally more support.

One was found--with some nudging by former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Testifying before the Senate committee, Kissinger called the 90-plane allotment for Israel "the very lowest end of the spectrum." In armament discussions between Israel and the Ford Administration, he said, the number of fighters being considered was "several orders of magnitude above this."

Carter and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, who were already considering an increased Israeli allotment as a "sweetener," apparently took the cue. On Tuesday Vance offered to allot 20 more F-15s (worth $16 million each) to Israel, in exchange for approval of the Saudi deal. This moved New York Senator Jacob Javits, a key Jewish spokesman, to remark, "I believe we're on a road which could lead to a settlement." Senate Minority Leader Howard Baker and Illinois Republican Charles Percy switched to Carter's side. The same day, Vance and Defense Secretary Harold Brown iterated to the House International Relations Committee that Saudi Arabia had agreed it would use the warplanes only for defensive purposes.

Following up, the next day Brown wrote to Senate Foreign Relations Committee members of more guarantees. The Saudis, he said, would not transfer the aircraft to any third country--as the Israelis fear--and would not allow foreign nationals access to the planes without U.S. authorization. Moreover, the Saudis would not purchase any other combat aircraft while receiving the F-15s. This was most important, because the Saudis could buy and receive France's commendable Mirage F-1 by the end of the year without any restraints on its use.

One of the most vocal proponents of the White House concessions was Idaho Senator Frank Church, heir apparent to Sparkman as Foreign Relations Committee chairman. Carter aides said last week that Church personally made a commitment to deliver the necessary votes; Church insisted that he had promised only to press his colleagues for fair and open-minded consideration of the Administration proposals. At any rate, Church persuaded John Glenn of Ohio to back the sales. On the Republican side, lobbying help came from none other than Gerald Ford, who persuaded Michigan's Robert Griffin to fall into line.

But suddenly, on Wednesday afternoon, Chairman-to-Be Church seemed to lose his nerve. Apparently he believed that the White House moves would bring a sizable majority of the committee around to endorsing the sales. They did not; despite his favorable comments earlier, New York's Javits, for example, decided not to budge. Adding up the votes, Church realized that seven legislators, including such unchanging anti-sale Senators as New Jersey's Clifford Case, still opposed the deal. He decided to join them. Said one committee member: "He was frightened by the passion of the pro-Israel speeches." Said an angry Carter to staff members: "The next time you get a commitment, let's get some earnest money."

The most hotly pursued vote belonged to Minnesota's Muriel Humphrey. Vice President Mondale telephoned from Hawaii to make a personal appeal to the widow of his political mentor. On the other side, Humphrey's Minnesota colleague, Senator Wendell Anderson, argued strenuously that she block the sales. On Thursday morning, with the vote less than two hours away, Jimmy Carter himself called Humphrey to make a brief telephone pitch while the committee was in session. She told the President she had already decided to back the Administration.

After deadlocking on the motion to reject the F-15 sales, the committee unanimously agreed to send the resolution to the Senate floor without recommendation. This action made a bruising floor fight a virtual certainty, even if Majority Leader Byrd had done his head counting carefully. One doubter was Minority Leader Baker. Said he: "I think it's pretty close.''

If the White House was sticking to its public optimism on the Middle East controversy, it had grounds for serious concern in other fields. Immediately after the F-15 vote, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee torpedoed another presidential policy proposal. By an 8-to-4 vote, members upheld the 1975 U.S. arms embargo against Turkey that resulted from its invasion of Cyprus. Carter wants that embargo lifted to prevent the Turks from loosening their ties with NATO. One presidential victory at a time, it seems, is about all that Congress can bring itself to permit.

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