Moscow's Geopolitics

A Kissinger answer to a global challenge

The Soviet presence on the Horn of Africa, says former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, was not an "unselfish" response to an appeal from Ethiopia involving its quarrel with Somalia. Moscow's purpose was geopolitical: "To outflank the Middle East, to demonstrate that the U.S. cannot protect its friends, to raise doubts in Saudi Arabia right across the Red Sea, in Egypt, in the Sudan, in Iran. " Speaking in Manhattan last week to the International Radio and Television Society, Kissinger suggested that four basic principles should be kept in mind -perhaps by the Carter Administration -as the Russians, with their Cuban consorts, now threaten to intervene in southern Africa as well:

The first is, I hope that our Secretary of State will be successful in the negotiations he is now undertaking with the Soviet Union on the limitation of strategic arms. The control of nuclear weapons is one of the pre-eminent problems of our period, and it should not be lightly linked with other issues. But it is important that the Soviet Union understand that another move of the kind we have seen in Angola and Ethiopia will raise the presumption that we are facing a global geopolitical challenge incompatible with any definition of detente. Under those circumstances I do not see how any agreement could possibly be ratified and how detente could survive. I hope that that will be made clear to the Soviet Union.

The second is, it is time that one overcomes the ridiculous myth of the invincible Cubans. Who has ever heard of Cubans conducting a global foreign policy? We cannot conduct our foreign policy under the threat of the possible intervention of Cuban troops. It is a sign of the decline of our world position that we have inflicted on ourselves through Viet Nam, the collapse of Executive authority produced by Watergate, and our own internal disputes. Twenty years ago this would have been considered absurd, and it is a proposition that is bound to undermine our position around the world.

Third, let us justify our foreign policy by arguments other than the fear of Cuban military intervention. We must make clear to other countries that we will not be blackmailed by Cuban troops or by Soviet arms. Whatever arguments can be advanced for conducting our foreign policy, we will not accept the proposition that if we do not accede to the arguments of individual countries they will then call in the Cubans, or the Soviets will then send arms.

Fourth, we have an obligation to try to remove the legitimate causes of unrest and instability in Africa. Of course the U.S. must stand for majority rule. This we did when I was in office, and I support the efforts of the Administration in this direction. But majority rule must be given a concrete content. What exactly is the basis for our opposition to the so-called internal solution in Rhodesia? I favor the attempt to enable all leaders and factions to participate in the proposed elections. At the same time let us take care not to turn majority rule into a device by which those who could not win an election try to force their way into office by the threat of force. Majority rule must not become the slogan of those who have already rejected a multiparty system and already announced that they want to create a one-party state. And majority rule must include protection for minority rights. If the black and white communities cannot live together under the rule of law, we will see a race war of tremendous proportions develop. We cannot want to encourage this. qed

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