In Search of Identity

By ANWAR SADAT

Egyptian civilization, Anwar Sadat has often observed, is 7,000 years old, but the country's modern history as a sovereign state dates only from 1922. Sadat is both a witness to many of the major events in Egypt's recent history and one of the primary figures who shaped them. Born on Christmas Day, 1918, in the Nile village of Mit Abu el Kom, he was inspired as a youth by the exploits of Kemal Atatuerk, the father of modern Turkey. Sadat was twice imprisoned for his revolutionary activities--the second time, in 1946, for complicity in the murder of a former minister in King Farouk's government. As the founder of the Free Officers' Organization within the Egyptian army, Sadat was intimately involved in planning the military coup that overthrew the monarchy in the July Revolution of 1952. He served the new government in a variety of posts and succeeded his long time colleague Gamal Abdel Nasser as president of Egypt after Nasser's death in 1970.

Although it is rare for a politician to publish an autobiography while still in power, Sadat began his memoirs in 1975, in part to correct what he felt were false accounts of Egypt's history written by disciples of Nasser. The result is In Search of Identity: An Autobiography, which will be published in the U.S. next month by Harper & Row ($15). One part of the work appeared in TIME's Jan. 2 issue naming Sadat Man of the Year. In the excerpts that follow, Sadat gives his views of his mercurial relationship with Nasser, how the Kremlin treats its friends, how the threat of U.S. intervention kept him from winning a war he thinks he won and what led to his sacred mission to Jerusalem.

Reflections on Nasser

Sadat and Nasser were leading members of the Revolutionary Command Council, which replaced the monarchy in 1952 and established first General Mohammed Naguib and later Nasser himself as Presidents of an Egyptian republic. Sadat writes about his ambivalent attitude toward his fellow revolutionary:

There were times, during the eighteen years of our collaboration, when I could not understand [Nasser] or accept his actions; but the love I bore him never diminished. He, on the other hand, had been in the grip of "complexes" since childhood and was often motivated by them; and he, as well as many of his entourage, suffered as a result.

Sometimes we differed over one thing or another, and occasionally we had an estrangement that would go on for a couple of months or more. Sometimes it was caused by a difference of opinion, sometimes by the intrigues of his entourage, who had a remarkable influence on him. Nasser believed in "reports," and was by nature inclined to listen to gossip.

It is not in my nature at all to be on the defensive, whether against Nasser or anybody else. However long, our estrangement would end when he rang me up and asked where I had been all those days and why I hadn't got in touch. I usually answered that I thought he had been too busy and so didn't wish to take him away from his engagements, whereupon we would meet and carry on again as though nothing had happened.

The revolution took place in 1952, and I played a part in it. My participation was not in itself important to me. What was important to me was that the revolution actually took place and that the dream I had had from early childhood was realized. It was this that made me live with Nasser for eighteen years without ever clashing with him. I was happy to work in any capacity simply because I looked for no personal gain, and never made any demands at all. Whether as a member of the Revolutionary Command Council, as secretary-general for the Islamic Congress, as editor-in-chief of al-Gomhouriya, or as Speaker of the National Assembly, I stood by [Nasser] alike in victory or defeat. And this was, perhaps, what made Nasser look around him seventeen years later to realize that there was indeed one man with whom he never quarreled.

Nasser died without ever experiencing joie de vivre. Anxiety gnawed continually at his heart, as he regarded everybody with suspicion, whatever a man's real position was. It was only natural, therefore, that Nasser should bequeath a legacy of suspicion and alertness. It wasn't easy for Nasser to have anybody for his friend, in the full sense of the term, because of his tendency to be wary, suspicious, extremely bitter, and highly strung. By this I do not mean, however, that Nasser lacked all sense of loyalty; on the contrary, I mean to point out his sharpness of mind. From my record in the armed forces, and from his experience since we first met early in life, he gathered I was a man of principles and lofty values.

Nasser's attitude changed, however, after the revolution broke out and he took his place at the helm. In 1953, when conflicts rocked the Revolutionary Command Council (to the extent of actually posing a danger to the revolution and the entire future of Egypt), I called on him at home and said:

"A revolution, Gamal, can consume itself as well as its revolutionaries. Surely we don't want this to happen to us. Shouldn't you put an end to all this? Simply say to our colleagues, Let's act as a team; those who share our views may carry on with us. Those who seek to dictate to us (whatever their individual stands) are free to go."

Nasser was listening very attentively. I went on, "It's only natural for changes to take place once we come to power, but this should never be at the expense of Egypt. We have unanimously elected you chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council. Therefore, we cannot possibly differ from you. So it should be made clear to all that anyone who can cooperate with you may stay with us, and anyone who cannot may resign ..." But Nasser wouldn't let me finish. Livid with rage, he suddenly interrupted me to object, and burst into an attack as though I was against him rather than being on his side. The vituperation poured forth in all directions, almost as if a volcano had erupted in his chest. God knows I had no other end in view but to spare Egypt the consequences of an internal conflict between the rulers of the land that was becoming increasingly intensified. It was this that made the July Revolution, for all its achievements, steer Egypt on a disastrous course culminating in the 1967 defeat [in the Six-Day War with Israel] which very nearly blotted out all our earlier achievements.

Dealing with the Russians

By 1956 the Soviet Union had become Egypt's principal source of arms. According to Sadat, dealing with the Russians was often an exercise in frustration: promises were made and not kept, messages from Cairo went unanswered, and arms deliveries were invariably far behind schedule. As Sadat acidly observes: "It was as though one was communicating with imaginary people. " In the following passage, Sadat explains his surprising decision, in July 1972, to oust all Soviet advisers from Egypt.

In July 1971 a Communist coup d'etat took place in Sudan. My attitude was firm. I said we condemned it because we would not accept a Communist regime established on our doorstep--in a country sharing our borders. A few days later, however, the coup was foiled and President [Jaafar] Numeiry, having got rid of his enemies, was back in power.

My attitude to the Sudan coup caused the gap between me and the Soviet leaders to widen. Throughout July, August, and September, all I could receive in answer to my messages [inquiring about arms deliveries] was that [the leaders] were away in their Crimean summer resort.

Toward the end of September, they sent me a message saying that they would be willing to see me in Moscow on Oct. 11. Although I had had enough (anyone in my position would have lost his patience as a result of their deliberate failure to respond for almost half a year), I didn't show that I was upset in the least and did leave for Moscow. At the talks I repeated the words I had said to them in March: "I don't mind, my friends, if you keep me one step behind Israel [in armaments] but I find it a bit too much to be twenty steps behind her!"

As usual, the Soviet leaders would let me say what I liked, occasionally voicing opposition which developed at times into sharp exchanges. Except for Brezhnev--he always appeared to be understanding and never opposed me. This time, however, they promised to send me the missile-equipped aircraft, together with experts to train Egyptian crews to use them. This time, too, they waived their original condition, namely, that to operate those aircraft in particular, prior permission had to be granted by Moscow. At the end of the meeting I said: "It's Oct. 12 today. I hope these weapons will be sent us as soon as possible so that we can be in a position, before the year is out, to break the deadlock of the present situation." I had, in fact, declared that 1971 would be the year of decision, that we would have to decide then whether to have a peaceful solution or go to war.

I went back to Egypt, this time fully confident that the promised weapons would soon be on their way to us. There was no sign of anything throughout October and November. On Dec. 121 summoned the Soviet ambassador and told him I had so far received no weapons whatsoever; I wanted him therefore to tell the Soviet leaders that I must see them to find a means of dealing with a situation in which I felt exposed for having failed to make 1971 truly a year of decision. It was the end of December when the Soviet ambassador called to tell me that the Soviet leaders were very busy at the moment but that they'd willingly see me in Moscow [in] February.

I was in Moscow as requested on Feb. 1 and 2,1972, and asked for the reason for the delay in sending the weapons which the Soviet leaders had promised me. Brezhnev said he was personally to blame. It was due, he said, to the necessary paperwork, the inevitable red tape, and similar things. "I am not convinced of that," I said, "and if this is repeated I will have to act--a decision will have to be taken." I was beside myself with rage. I reiterated what I had told them on my previous visits, particularly that we didn't want Soviet soldiers to fight our battle for us and that we sought no confrontation between them and the United States. The meeting ended with them reading out a list of weapons which they promised would be shipped "forthwith." They were not the essential weapons I wanted but they were better than nothing.

Back in Egypt, I realized my patience had run out.

The Soviet ambassador suddenly called late in April 1972, to convey an "urgent" message from the Soviet leaders. They wanted me to pay a visit to Moscow. We--the Soviet leaders and I--agreed at our Moscow talks on the need for them to send us a detailed analysis of the situation after [President Richard] Nixon's visit to Moscow in May, preparatory to the shipment to Egypt of all those weapons included in the old contracts. November 1972, when the U.S. presidential campaign would be held, was the agreed deadline. The idea was that we should be adequately prepared by November, when a new American President would have been elected, to resort to military action if all avenues to peace continued to be blocked. They agreed to this and I returned to Cairo.

Nixon made his first visit to the Soviet Union in May 1972 as planned. The first statement on detente was issued jointly by Moscow and Washington, advocating military relaxation in the Middle East. It was a violent shock to us because, as I have previously explained, we lagged at least twenty steps behind Israel and so "military relaxation" in this context could mean nothing but giving in to Israel.

The Soviet "analysis," following from the Moscow Nixon meeting, reached me on July 6--in other words, more than a month late. This analysis explained that no progress had been achieved on the Middle East question in the Soviet-American talks--just as I had predicted during my Moscow visit late in April--in view of the fact that it was the U.S. election year. What was even more odd, the Soviet analysis conveyed to me by the Soviet ambassador said nothing at all about the failure to ship the requested weapons.

I asked the Soviet ambassador: "Is this the message?"

"Yes," he said.

"You were, weren't you, with us in Moscow last April," I said, "and you did hear us agree that the weapons should be sent to us before the U.S. elections took place?"

"Yes," he replied.

"Well," I continued, "this message doesn't mention that."

"This is the message I have received."

"Well," I said, "I cannot accept it, and indeed reject the Soviet leaders' method in dealing with us. Please convey all I am going to tell you to the Soviet leaders as an official message.

"One. I reject this message you've transmitted to me from the Soviet leaders, both in form and content. It is unacceptable. I reject, too, this method in dealing with us.

"Two. I have decided to dispense with the services of all Soviet military experts (about 15,000) and that they must go back to the Soviet Union within one week from today. I shall convey this order to the War Minister.

"Three. There is Soviet equipment in Egypt--four MiG-25s, and a Soviet manned station for electronic warfare. You should either sell these to us or take them back to the Soviet Union.

"Four. No Soviet-owned equipment should stay in Egypt. Either you sell it to us or withdraw it within the fixed date.

"Five. All this should be carried out in a week from now."

The Soviet ambassador didn't believe it. He thought it was an attempt at blackmail.

I summoned the War Minister the following morning and ordered him to carry out the decisions I had taken. By July 16, 1972, all my decisions had been implemented. As the Soviet Union refused to sell us the MiG-25 aircraft and jamming equipment, they were withdrawn along with the experts.

One of the reasons behind my decision was the Soviet attitude to me; but another important reason was that within the strategy I had laid down, no war could be fought while Soviet experts worked in Egypt. The Soviet Union, the West, and Israel misinterpreted my decision to expel the military experts and reached an erroneous conclusion which in fact served my strategy, as I had expected--that it was an indication that I had finally decided not to fight my own battle. That interpretation made me happy; it was precisely what I wanted them to think. A further reason for the expulsion of the Soviet experts was that the Soviet Union had begun to feel that it enjoyed a privileged position in Egypt--so much so that the Soviet ambassador had assumed a position comparable to that of the British High Commissioner in the days of British occupation of Egypt.

Yet another reason for my decision was that I wanted to put the Soviet Union in its place--in its natural position as a friendly country, no more, no less. The Soviets had thought at one time that they had Egypt in their pocket, and the world had come to think that the Soviet Union was our guardian. I wanted to tell the Russians that the will of Egypt was entirely Egyptian; I wanted to tell the whole world that we are always our own masters. Whoever wished to talk to us should come over and do it, rather than approach the Soviet Union.

The October War

Although many historians would argue otherwise, Sadat claims that his forces defeated the Israelis in the October War of 1973. Why, then, did he agree to a U.S.-Soviet cease-fire proposal? Sadat writes that he was motivated by fear that the U.S. might interfere militarily to "save Israel "from annihilation.

Henry Kissinger was jolted into reality on the fourth day of the war when the distress signal, "Save Israel," reached him. For the first three days the Israeli propaganda machine had spoken of "crushing the bones of the Egyptians"--and the world mass media simply echoed this. Kissinger had no doubt that we would be defeated until he was woken up by the "Save Israel" message--which was an urgent request for 400 tanks to replace those lost on the Egyptian front --and by a Pentagon report to the effect that the war on the Egyptian front was not proceeding in favor of Israel. He must have heard too that Dayan had collapsed and wept, in front of all the foreign press correspondents, saying that the road to Tel-Aviv was open.

From the moment he knew this, Kissinger worked persistently for a cease-fire with the Soviet Union. He began by calling for a cease-fire providing for a return by the belligerents to the lines of Oct. 6 (see map); but then he changed his cease-fire terms to save Israel after the famous plea and the Pentagon reports to demand a cease-fire on the existing lines of Oct. 13. We actually turned down both requests. When, however, the Soviet Union informed him that Egypt would agree to a cease-fire on the existing lines of Oct. 13, Kissinger was very pleased and contacted the U.S. delegation at the UN to prepare for this. He now wanted to make quite sure that it was so. He wanted to hear it from me. Kissinger had been told by the Egyptian National Security adviser in Paris early in 1972 that the Soviet Union had no power to speak for Egypt--and this fact was officially transmitted to the United States. Kissinger had therefore been shocked when I conveyed my reply: Please tell Kissinger that this never took place. I haven't agreed to a ceasefire proposed by the Soviet Union or any other party. He should contact Cairo, not Moscow, in respect of anything concerning Egypt. Furthermore, I shall not agree to a cease-fire until the tasks included in the plan have been accomplished.

Immediately afterwards I received a note from the Soviet Union to the effect that Premier Kosygin would like to come over to see me. I said he would be welcome. Kosygin arrived swiftly. His main request was that we should have a cessation of hostilities on the. existing lines. "I am not prepared," I said, "to have a repeat of the 1948 'truce' which was behind our loss of the war." "We'll come in here and guarantee nothing of the sort would happen," he said. "With Israel," I replied, "you can't guarantee anything! Besides, where are the tanks I asked for on the second day of the war?"

Kosygin then resorted to his more vicious side. Kosygin is aggressive and a bureaucrat. He is noted in the Soviet Union for having served for thirteen years in government posts under Stalin without being liquidated by Beria--the Stalin Minister of the Interior--or sent to Siberia, as was the fate of all those who worked under Stalin. Not one of them except Kosygin was spared--as Khrushchev told us when he visited Egypt in 1964.

"Well," I said, "let us go over what you're saying. The equipment you have supplied us with is not up to date; you made us lag behind Israel in armament by a long way, and still I proceeded to fight, and--here we are. I am winning! What sort of friendly relations would you call this? Isn't it high time we buried the past and opened a new chapter?"

"Mr. President," he replied, "I hadn't thought you'd be so excited." On this note our first meeting ended. During his four-day visit to Egypt, Kosygin would spend the whole of each day at the Soviet Embassy, then call to see me in the evening. The Israeli counterattack (alternatively referred to as the capturing of the Deversoir Bulge) took place while he was in Egypt. He came to see me, with gloom written all over his face, and said: "With all this counterattacking you have finally been checked ... A threat is now posed to Cairo."

"I am sorry to disappoint you," I replied, "but no threat will ever be posed to Cairo. However, where are the tanks I asked you for?"

"We've concentrated on Syria because," he said, "she took a thrashing and lost 1,200 tanks in one day."

"I've no objection to that; in fact, you should do all in your power to help Syria. But it doesn't mean you should deny me the tanks I asked for. You send the tanks and I'll deal with the counterattacks."

Four days later he was off to Moscow. I told him on departure: "I won't have a cease-fire until the final stage of my War Plan has been carried out. I hope this is clear enough for you."

I later came to know that the U.S. satellite which had begun to transmit information, hour by hour, to the Israelis since they sent out their "Save Israel" message, now informed them that the Egyptians had taken their Armored Division 21 across to the East Bank of the Canal in an attempt to relieve the pressure on Syria at President [Hafez] Assad's request. I also knew that the Pentagon advised the Israelis to try a counterattack to save their force in Sinai. In his Memoirs, the Israeli Chief of Staff, during the October War, tried to absolve himself by reporting that Golda Meir, after receiving the information gathered by the U.S. satellite, had asked the commanders to try to do anything--anything--because the Israelis on the Egyptian front had reached "the bottom," to quote verbatim.

While the U.S. satellite hourly transmitted information to Israel, we received nothing at all from the Soviet satellite which followed up the fighting. I would like to put this on record as a point of historical significance insofar as the Soviet Union claims to champion the Arab cause. Soviet satellites did keep a watch over the battle from the start, for Syria had informed the Soviet Union of Zero Hour. The recordings made were played to the [Soviet] Central Committee. I asked for a copy of that videotape but have received no reply to this day and won't receive any. Israel, even without demanding it, received hourly information from the Pentagon, provided until this moment by the American satellite. The United States was only too willing to supply her with this because the satellite had shown that the fighting on the Egyptian front was not in Israel's favor, and because Dayan had admitted that the road from Sinai to Tel-Aviv now lay open.

As I followed up the progress of the war from the Operations Room I became conscious of a serious development: the United States was using us for the air-bridge she now established to save Israel. El Arish became an airbase where colossal U.S. transport aircraft landed, loaded with tanks and sophisticated weapons. El Arish is an Egyptian city [90 miles east of the Suez Canal in Sinai, it was captured in the 1967 war].

And I noted, too, another serious development. In the tank battles, which were fierce and which the Egyptians conducted very efficiently, as Israel herself admitted, I noticed that every time I destroyed a dozen tanks, more tanks were to be seen on the battlefield. The United States was taking part in the war to save Israel, following the plea sent out on the fourth day.

Early in the war, the Israeli U.S. Phantoms had fired a dozen rockets at the Egyptian SAM missiles but hit only the aerial of one battery, which was repaired in fifteen minutes. Now two American rockets were fired at two Egyptian missile batteries and put them both out of action completely. I later came to learn that this was a new U.S. rocket called the TV-camera bomb. To save Israel, the U.S.A. used them against Egypt.

So, the United States was now taking part in the fighting by supplying Israel with weapons still being tested, with the Maverick [missile], and many other items--to save Israel. I knew my capabilities. I did not intend to fight the entire United States of America.

On Oct. 19, I wrote a cable to President Assad in his capacity as my partner in the war in which I told him I had decided to accept a ceasefire. I put on record, in that telegram, the substance of my stand on this issue--that I was not afraid of a confrontation with Israel but that I would not confront the United States. I would not allow the Egyptian forces or Egypt's strategical targets to be destroyed once again. And I was willing to be brought to book by my people in Egypt and the Arab world, to answer for this decision.

For the previous ten days I had been fighting--entirely alone --against the Americans with their modern weapons, most of which had not ever been used before. The reality was very different from what the world thought. Everybody believed that the Soviet Union had backed us and established an air-bridge to help us, but that wasn't the situation. I faced the United States and Israel; while the Soviet Union stood behind me, ready to stab me in the back if I lost 85% or 90% of my arms, just as in 1967. It was obvious now that the United States could destroy my entire air defense system with the TV-camera bombs, and thus give the Israelis the "open skies" of Egypt they had enjoyed in 1967.

When the Soviet ambassador arrived at al-Tahirah Palace in Cairo, I told him I had accepted a cease-fire on the existing lines. Meanwhile Kissinger was on his way to Moscow for talks in connection with the ceasefire. I turned to the Soviet ambassador and said, "The two superpowers should guarantee the cease-fire and immediate implementation of Security Council Resolution 242."

The two superpowers did reach agreement on this and the Security Council decided that a cease-fire should come into effect at 19:00 hours on Oct. 22. I must put on record here, in fulfillment of my historical responsibility, that our forces fought a remarkable battle in the days from Oct. 19 to 22. I challenge Israel to declare the real losses she sustained in the Deversoir Bulge, or indeed, in Sinai. Our Special Service and air forces inflicted great losses on the Israelis in those few days, particularly at Deversoir on the West Bank [of the Suez Canal]. The Israelis would not admit this until 1976, when they actually described the Deversoir Bulge as "the Valley of Death."

Conversations with Kissinger

Sadat offers his account of several conversations with "my friend Henry"--former Secretary of State Kissinger. Among them were the post-cease-fire talks that led to the first Israeli-Egyptian Sinai accord, which was signed in January 1974.

Kissinger said he wanted to see me. He arrived in Egypt for the first time in November and said: "You've created an international crisis, and that's why I've come to see you. What are your requests?"

We had a three-hour session, during which we agreed on .six points, one of which was that Egyptian-Israeli talks for a disengagement of forces and a return to the lines of Oct. 22 would start at Km. 101 on the Cairo-Suez road. The talks were held --under U.N. supervision. But they were very protracted. I left at the time for Algiers to attend the Arab Summit Conference, and when I came back, the negotiations still hadn't got anywhere. I asked [Chief of Staff Mohammed Abdel] Gamassy to suspend them. "I am not prepared," I said, "to engage in this sort of haggling and bickering."

In December 1973 I was ready to liquidate the Deversoir pocket. Our forces started a war of attrition, and consistently put pressure on the infiltrators. We regained a good deal of ground every day--sometimes advancing a few yards, sometimes a few miles, but always advancing. I was really fully prepared to liquidate the Israelis there, but I had to take one risk into consideration, that of possible U.S. intervention. On Dec. 11, 1973, Kissinger came to see me again. I told him, "I cannot accept this way of conducting the negotiations. I am going to liquidate the Israeli Deversoir pocket. What will be the American attitude?"

"I know you're ready for it; I knew it before I came to see you," Kissinger answered. "I asked the Pentagon for a few aerial photographs of the battlefield and received a full report. Your wall of rockets consists of so many batteries (he specified the number), you have 800 tanks surrounding the Israeli Deversoir pocket, the number of your guns is (again he specified it) and you can actually wipe out that pocket. You must know, however, that if you do this the Pentagon will strike at you."

"Ah!" I said. "That is the question. What would the U.S. attitude be?"

"The Pentagon will strike at you," he reiterated. "The Pentagon will strike you for one reason: Soviet weapons have once before defeated U.S. weapons and, in accordance with our global strategy, we can't allow it to happen again." And Kissinger went on to say: "Do you know, when you created an international crisis, when you asked the two superpowers to come in and get the forces back to the cease-fire lines of Oct. 22, otherwise, you threatened, you'd do it yourself provided the Pentagon didn't stand against you--do you know what sort of plan the Pentagon laid down at the time? We planned to land in your country, in Sinai, if the Russians landed west of the Canal, to finish you off. Our aim was to show you that the Russians were unreliable, and so we'd have dealt you a blow that actually hit the Russians! We're in the same situation today. If you attempt to liquidate the Israeli pocket, the Pentagon will strike at you because this is U.S. policy.* Besides, the Pentagon wants to avenge the defeat of its weapons in October. But do you insist on a military liquidation of the infiltrating forces?"

"Not at all," I said swiftly. "You know I am a man of peace. If you had accepted my 1971 Initiative [when Sadat proposed negotiations with Israel], no war would have broken out at all. I care very much for human life, and am loath to losing one soldier, not to mention an officer. But you didn't take me seriously--and this is the outcome."

"Well, just as we embarked on a Peace Process, let us have a forces disengagement which would peacefully put an end to this counterattacking."

Kissinger asked me on the same day whether I was willing to go to Geneva for talks later in December 1973. I said I was planning to be there.

On Dec. 24 I convened a meeting of the commanders of all corps, armies, and divisions. The plan laid down to liquidate the Deversoir pocket was discussed for over seven hours, and I endorsed it. A commander was appointed to carry it out--General Saad Mamun, who is governor of Cairo at present.

In January 1974 Kissinger arrived [in Aswan] and the first disengagement of forces agreement was signed. The United States had played the role of mediator between us and Israel.

In negotiating the Aswan agreement I had only one thing to focus on. I didn't want more than to maintain the real magnitude of my victory on the ground. I didn't bother about the Israeli Deversoir pocket because I knew that they were my prisoners on the West Bank [of the Canal] and that their presence there meant their death. On the basis of defining and maintaining the real magnitude of my territorial victory, agreement was reached. Yet I was still in great mental anguish, because all the powers wanted to negate my victory. The United States certainly wanted to discount it, and the Soviet Union to put an end to it because Syria had suffered a setback in spite of the presence of Soviet military experts and I had a victory in spite of the expulsion of Soviet military experts. And Israel, of course, wanted to undo our victory.

Such attempts did not in themselves worry me. But I wanted my victory to be maintained because I regarded it as the avenue to the just peace for which I had worked unceasingly.

On Oct. 16,1973, when the war was ten days old and my victory was a fact which stunned the whole world, I made a speech at the People's Assembly in which I declared my willingness to go to Geneva. Let Israel withdraw from the Arab territories occupied in 1967 and let us meet in Geneva to draw up a peace agreement. At the time I could have hit the "depth" of Israel --and Israel knew I had weapons capable of this. Any man in my position would have done this even if merely in retaliation for three previous Israeli wars; but I didn't, because I am all for peace. Proceeding from the same principle I opted for a peaceful liquidation of the "Deversoir pocket."

Kissinger arrived in January 1974, and kept shuttling between Aswan and Tel-Aviv. But at length he came to me and said: "It seems, unfortunately, that we have reached a dead end. In Tel-Aviv they are reluctant to reach an understanding."

"Well," I replied, "it is your--the Americans'--turn now. You should come in and iron out a solution yourselves."

"Would you accept an American proposal?"

"Certainly. I am willing to receive it, study it, and reply to it."

I did receive the American proposal, which Israel received at the same time. Having agreed on the first disengagement of forces on the Egyptian front, we embarked on a new stage--the second stage in the Peace Process. And here I must reiterate that no one else except the United States can play this role, namely that of mediator between two sides that harbor intense hate for one another--a gulf of bad blood, violence, and massacres. The United States did not impose the first disengagement agreement: she intervened to achieve a breakthrough and overcome the apparent impasse. The heading of the first disengagement document reads: American Proposal. Hence my assertion that the United States holds 99% of the cards in this game. And I shall go on saying this, even if it angers the others, namely the Soviet agents and the Soviets themselves.

America and Middle East Peace

Sadat concludes his autobiography with a brief account of his "sacred mission " to Jerusalem last November and his reflections on the U.S. role in bringing peace to the Middle East.

When I went to see Mr. Carter shortly after his election as President of the United States, I reviewed with lim all the stages that had been completed and submitted a definite peace strategy to him. I don't believe Israel is capable of, or willing to, produce a peace strategy similar to, or even faintly resembling, mine.

I do not deny the State of Israel's right to be recognized by all countries of the region, provided that the whole situation is normalized. I told President Carter that Israel should be given all the guarantees she wants. If she wanted to have every Israeli citizen armed with a tank and an aircraft, and got such armaments from the United States, we would not object--provided, of course, that those weapons were used within her own, not other people's territory. We would never object to anything Israel wants, whether from the United States, the Soviet Union, or the UN Security Council, and in any form she wants--whether it is a United Nations force to police the borders; demilitarized zones on a reciprocal basis; or a common defense pact with the United States.

I believe it is only right and fair that each guarantee Israel gets, we the Arabs should also get--except one thing. For if Israel chooses to conclude a common defense pact with the United States, I shall not call for a similar one. I shan't call for such a pact to be concluded between me and the United States, the Soviet Union, or any other power. We are a nonaligned country and will continue to be so. Our will is ours, and ours alone.

I spelled it out clearly to Carter and emphasized that today we are as willing for peace as we were when, in 1971,1 first pronounced my Peace Initiative--even more so. I also emphasized that I am willing to comply with all the provisions of Security Council Resolution 242, provided that Israel does the same. We cannot have any bargaining over the rights of the Palestinian people or over one inch of the Arab territories seized in 1967. Only thus can a permanent and just peace be achieved.

What is Israel's reaction to all this?

We are all aware of the Security Theory advocated by [David] Ben-Gurion which constituted a basis for the establishment of the State of Israel. It says openly that peace should be imposed on the Arabs by force of arms. While in the White House I told Carter "Peace cannot be imposed. If imposed, it will cease to be peace inasmuch as one party thus dictates its terms to the other. Israel," I went on, "has not so far succeeded in dictating her terms in spite of our terrible 1967 defeat. And we, in spite of our victory in 1973, have not been able to dictate our terms to Israel. The idea of imposing peace and secure borders should therefore be discarded."

The nature of the peace which Israel today says she wants to secure is nothing in effect but a new attempt to thwart the establishment of peace--a ruse to help her gain time so as to impose a fait accompli, in the short term by having Israeli settlements established on the occupied Arab land (which she does at present) and in the long term by resolving the current conflict between American and Israeli interests when, in the fullness of time, the energy crisis is itself resolved.

Here I would like the reader to compare the Arab and Israeli positions with regard to U.Sjnterests. I'd say 99% of U.S. interests in the Middle East are in Arab countries. We are friends; and we want to continue to be the friends of the United States. We safeguard her interests, and all we ask is that the United States should not support Israeli expansionism and aggression. We do not call on the United States to throw Israel into the sea or even to break her special relations with the State of Israel. Let America give Israel whatever she wants, provided she remains content with her borders. This will never affect our relationship with the United States in any way. We, as her friends, care about her interests. An example to hand is our decision to lift the oil embargo when we realized it began to affect the interests of the American people.

This is the opposite of what Israel does and has done over the years. Although firm and vital--and described as "special" --Israel's relationship with the United States never prevented her from sacrificing American interests to serve her own ambitious and expansionist plans. This is a fact that the whole world has recently realized, and I hope America has adequately realized it too. I believe that the United States has a big responsibility, not only as a superpower that should promote the establishment of peace in this region but also toward herself and her interests in this important part of the world. All we ask of the United States is that she should, in drawing up her policy in that respect, think purely in American terms and endeavor to serve the interests of the American people. I do hope American readers will take no offense at this, for the United States has often allowed her policies to be determined by Israel, especially in Johnson's day. We were then told that the United States could not do anything and that it was up to us to seek an understanding, if we wanted, with Israel. As we knew Israel's line of thinking and her arrogance only too well, we realized that such an attitude meant that America shirked her peace responsibility as a superpower, that she shirked, in effect, her responsibility for peace.

I hope this won't be repeated. Now that I have met President Carter, I feel confident that he will shoulder his responsibility as the President of the greatest country in the world.

I believe that he will continue the Peace Process which we started together and which I hope will be completed in Geneva.

One last thing remains to be said to the American people: We are ready for peace. We want it and welcome it. qed

*Defense Department officials deny that there were contingency plans for direct U.S. military intervention in the October War

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