The Show Goes On After All

A happy ending is still possible for an up-and-down scenario

The ups and downs of the past two months had been like a Hollywood movie, observed Israeli Opposition Leader Shimon Peres. Except, he added, the happy ending had come at the beginning.

And so it seemed, for a while. The Middle East peace initiative that began euphorically with Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's "sacred mission" to Jerusalem appeared to have come to a wrenching halt. First, Sadat abruptly recalled his Foreign Minister, Mohammed Ibrahim Kamel, from negotiations in Jerusalem involving a declaration of principles for a comprehensive settlement. In retaliation, Israel announced that it would not return negotiators to the parallel military talks in Cairo, which dealt with possible Israeli troop withdrawals in the Sinai.

End of the film? Not quite. After several days of behind-the-scenes negotiations, conducted principally by Alfred ("Roy") Atherton, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, it appeared that there were a few more reels to go--and that the action-packed drama might still have a happy ending. Following the breakdown n the political talks, President Carter had urged Sadat not to cancel the military talks, which were then in recess. Sadat agreed not to do so, though Premier Menachem Begin had announced that he would not be sending his delegates back to he Cairo talks. The Egyptian President also said that informal "serious negotiations" with Israel were still going on; Atherton was apparently a key conduit. Begin later declared that he expected his Cabinet to authorize Israeli Defense Minister Ezer Weizman to resume discussions in Cairo this week with his Egyptian counterpart, Mohammed Abdel Ghany Gamassy.

From Washington and Jerusalem, there were also reports that as a result of Atherton's labors, Israel and Egypt were close to agreement on the declaration of principles--the vital, first-stage objective that Sadat hopes will encourage Jordan's King Hussein to join him in further negotiations with the Israelis. From Hussein's words of support for Sadat last week, and from the harsh criticism of Hussein by the Syrians, who oppose the Sadat initiative, it appeared that the Jordanian monarch might be on the verge of doing just that. With the peace initiative again gaining momentum, Sadat accepted a U.S. invitation to visit Washington this weekend for talks with President Carter. Begin is scheduled to visit the U.S. in late March or early April in connection with ceremonies marking Israel's 30th anniversary; the timetable for that trip might be advanced.

What had happened to turn things around once more? In a sense, nothing. Israel and Egypt had made no concessions on key problems. The Israelis were unwilling to discuss dismantling the 20 Jewish settlements in the Sinai and the Egyptians refused to recognize Israeli security problems in the area. But, sensibly, both sides had toned down the angry rhetoric that followed the collapse of the Jerusalem talks and allowed the U.S. to do a little quiet fence mending.

With Secretary of State Cyrus Vance's encouragement, Sadat delivered a fairly moderate address to his parliament explaining why he had called Kamel back from Jerusalem; two days later, Begin accordingly made a reasoned speech before the Knesset in which he insisted that Israel was seeking "an atmosphere in which calm negotiations can be pursued."

Both leaders, though, have a low tolerance for presumed insults. Before recalling Kamel, Sadat had been angered by the ill-advised toast at a Jerusalem banquet during which Begin indirectly compared Palestinian demands for self-determination to Nazi expansionism during the '30s. Begin was outraged by anti-Israeli criticism in the Egyptian press that struck him, and many of his countrymen, as antiSemitic. "Even if the devil, the angel of death, would come to [the Israelis]," said one Cairo paper, "they would bargain with him over every minute detail." In an even uglier charge, another declared that "the dream of Zionism, its ambition and philosophy, is the philosophy of Nazi Hitlerism." Begin was particularly incensed by two columns in al Akhbar, the Arab world's largest paper, in which Editor Mustafa Amin compared the Israeli Premier to Shylock, the unscrupulous moneylender in Shakespeare's The Merchant of Venice.

Amin's answer, in essence, was that Egyptians could hardly be anti-Semitic since they are themselves Semites. One political cartoon in the influential al Ahram pointedly advised Begin: "Don't make excuses. We are not antiSemitic. We are anti-you." The affair became slightly farcical when the Cairo press fell to speculating over whether the Egyptians were not in fact an older and purer strain of the Semitic family than the Israelis. Then Sadat announced that he had no objection to observing "a quiet period" after so much angry rhetoric; the anti-Israeli press campaign ended almost instantly.

As tempers cooled, both sides prepared to resume negotiations in a somewhat more realistic atmosphere. Atherton, after a week's hard work with the Israelis, flew to Amman to meet Hussein, and was then scheduled to proceed to Cairo to discuss with the Egyptians some suggestions for improving the text of the declaration of principles. In fact, Kamel, Vance and Israel's Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan had considerably narrowed the language gap before the Egyptian delegation was ordered home two weeks ago. Still to be resolved, however, was the phrasing of the item involving the nature of a West Bank-Gaza Palestinian entity. The Egyptians favor the words used by Carter at his meeting with Sadat in Aswan last month: recognition of "the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people." The Israelis have accepted the phrase that the Palestinians have the right to "participate in the determination of their own future." Begin has proposed "self-rule," meaning a form of local autonomy that still allows for Israeli control of the West Bank. Whatever the eventual wording, it is clearly in the interests of both sides that the language be 1) rigid enough to preclude the Palestine Liberation Organization from taking control of the new entity; and 2) flexible enough to permit some kind of legitimate Palestinian rule, as well as a political and economic link between the West Bank and neighboring Jordan.

The latter option is essential if King Hussein is to be enticed into the talks--a move that would weaken the thrust of criticism from Arab rejectionists that Sadat is bargaining only for himself. But Hussein faces a problem in joining the negotiations if the political talks are resumed in Jerusalem. To other Arabs it may appear that the King has tacitly recognized Israeli sovereignty over the predominantly Arab old city, which was controlled by

Jordan from 1948 to 1967. For this reason, expanded talks may be shifted to a more neutral site, where the glare of publicity will be less intense.

Meanwhile, at the military committee, Weizman and Gamassy will again take up the problem of Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai. While there is hope for the settlement of this issue, the committee may not be able to solve a problem that has profound emotional overtones for Begin as well as for Sadat: the Jewish settlements in Sinai. In his early talks with Begin, the Egyptian President thought he could ultimately persuade Israel to dismantle them as part of an overall peace settlement; thus he was shocked by Begin's subsequent vow that they would be maintained no matter what. The Israeli public apparently approves of Begin's firmness, because he remains the most popular leader that the country has had in years; a recent poll gave him a 68% rating, down from 80% in November but still higher than anything enjoyed by his predecessor, Yitzhak Rabin. He commands his Cabinet like an authoritarian godfather, and internal opposition is all but stilled. But Begin seems unable to contemplate surrendering any inch of land in the occupied territories where Israelis have settled, even when these footholds are clearly illegal. Last week his government stood by in silence as zealous Israeli nationalists of Gush Emunim (Band of the Faithful), under the protection of Israeli soldiers, established the cornerstone for a new settlement at Shiloh, 30 miles north of Jerusalem on the West Bank. Some Knesset members of Begin's own Likud coalition even took part in the ceremonies.

Like Begin, Sadat is secure in power at home--unless, possibly, negotiations totally collapse. Last week he sent Egyptian diplomats to a number of foreign capitals (London, Paris, Bonn, Belgrade and Tehran) to round up support for his initiative. As part of that strategy, Sadat has also requested military aid from the U.S. that would be equivalent to what is being given Israel. The Administration is considering a variety of options, one of which involves the sale of anywhere from 50 to 120 F-5E jet fighters over a period of up to three years; the F-5E is a supersonic aircraft, but is slower and less sophisticated than the F-15s the U.S. sold to Israel. For the moment, Washington is not inclined to make a decision until it can see whether the negotiations are getting anywhere. The U.S. is mindful of the fact that Syria, which has bitterly criticized Sadat ever since his trip to Jerusalem, is being well supplied with new arms by the Soviet Union.

Today Israel has a clear military superiority over any or all of its Arab neighbors. But any large-scale U.S. aid to Egypt would inevitably affect the current negotiations and reinforce the Israelis' concern about their future security. The poll that measured Begin's popularity also reported that 78% of all Israelis think that Sadat genuinely wants peace. But more than 60% believe that whatever Sadat's intentions, Israel will be obliged to fight another war within the next ten years.

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