Monday, Jan. 23, 1978
At the Beginning of a Long Tunnel
What to do about all those Israeli settlements
Throughout the frenzied two months of Anwar Sadat's peace initiative, the Egyptian President has been unfailingly optimistic. But late last week, at the close of the first round of meetings between the Israeli and Egyptian Defense Ministers in Cairo, Sadat's spirits seemed to falter. In an interview in the authoritative October magazine, Sadat said he had "absolutely no hope" that Egypt and Israel can agree on a declaration of principles that Cairo seeks as a basis for a comprehensive settlement. The peace process was in danger, he explained later, because of two important unresolved issues: the question of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories and the future status of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza.
Privately, close aides of Sadat insisted that such negative statements were basically a tactical attempt designed to put pressure on Israel. They said Sadat remained hopeful that this week's meeting of Foreign Ministers in Jerusalem would prove more fruitful. U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, who was due to take part in the meeting, abruptly delayed his departure to Jerusalem by 24 hours while Egypt and Israel haggled over the agenda. Then, just as abruptly, Vance rescheduled his trip for Sunday night, reassured that progress could be made. State officials hinted that the postponement was intended as a signal to both sides that they should try harder to settle their differences.
One such issue: Israeli settlements in the Sinai, which was the focus of discussion between Israel's Ezer Weizman and Egypt's General Mohammed Abdel Gha-ny Gamassy who met in the Tahra Palace on the outskirts of Cairo. Privately, both sides insisted that the Sinai settlements were not a fundamental problem. In fact, one leading Egyptian official told TIME Cairo Bureau Chief Wilton Wynn: "We suspect the Israelis are making so much of the Sinai settlements in order to establish the principle of settlements in the occupied territories--and later to apply that principle to the West Bank and Golan Heights. Their interest in the Sinai settlements is mainly symbolic." Dismissing the Sinai settlements as a minor issue, another well-informed Egyptian asked: "Why not just run the Egyptian flag up over them and forget about them?"
In fact, Israel's insistence on keeping its mainly agricultural settlements in the occupied territories is based neither on security requirements nor historical parallels but on economic and political considerations. The approximately 90 settlements (20 of them in the Sinai) have cost about $1 billion to build. They are inhabited today by only about 11,000 Israelis: 3,000 in Sinai, 4,500 in the West Bank and 3,500 on the Golan Heights. In addition, about 50,000 Israelis have settled in the formerly Arab-held suburbs of Jerusalem. Altogether, their numbers are not great, but the settlers have attained a sizable degree of political power and strongly oppose territorial withdrawal. The question last week was whether Israel has launched a new settlement program in the northern Sinai. For two weeks there were repeated news leaks to that effect, followed by official denials. Eventually, most observers concluded that the leaks were part of a bid by hawkish Agriculture Minister (and former general) Ariel Sharon to try to force the government to approve the concept of new settlements. On his own initiative, Sharon dispatched eight bulldozers to start work on ground clearing in the northern Sinai. The affair did not amuse Premier Menachem Begin, who told colleagues: "Sharon is disloyal. His days in the Cabinet are numbered." Still, to pacify Israelis who are upset about the prospect of withdrawal, Begin's government approved three new settlements in the West Bank and legalized another that had already been built without authorization.
Apart from the question of settlements, the Defense Ministers discussed such Sinai issues as a timetable for Israeli withdrawal (Egypt favors an 18-month deadline, Israel three to five years); the size and location of demilitarized zones; the status of two airfields (which Israel hopes to keep); security arrangements (both sides agree in principle to early-warning stations); and free access to adjacent waterways. The Egyptians are ready to proclaim the Strait of Tiran an international passage and to place a police force at nearby Sharm el Sheikh to assure freedom of navigation.
The Cairo talks opened in a mood of camaraderie, with both Weizman and Ga-massy expressing measured optimism about the outcome. "It's a long tunnel," Weizman remarked, "and for the moment we are only at the very beginning of it."
Another Israeli negotiator told TIME Correspondent David Halevy: "We're entering the minefield, but we have so far managed to avoid stepping on the mines." During lunch and dinner breaks, the soldiers compared notes on their respective military academies and swapped war stories. "The Egyptians talk mostly about the October War, and we talk about the Six-Day War," noted an Israeli wryly. When somebody raised the question of what kind of work old soldiers should go into after they retire, an Israeli and an Egyptian shouted almost simultaneously, "Export-import!" and the group broke into laughter.
The first objective of the Foreign Ministers' meeting in Jerusalem this week will be to find a formula for the West Bank and Gaza Strip that both Israel and Egypt can accept, and one, moreover, that would tempt Jordan's King Hussein into joining the negotiations. Sadat's proposals, which he discussed with President Carter at Aswan two weeks ago, still envision self-determination (though not specifically statehood); in the declaration of principles, the Egyptians are ready to accept a phrase such as "a solution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects." Cairo is also prepared to accept a lengthy transition period (probably five years) for the West Bank, hoping that the region would gradually develop permanent links with Jordan. During that period, Israeli forces would be withdrawn and replaced by U.N. and Jordanian forces. An agreement on the complex question of Jerusalem must also be reached; at the Vatican last week, Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan discussed the matter with Pope Paul VI, who advocates a "special statute" assuring free access to Jerusalem's holy places.
In the meantime, the Shah of Iran visited Sadat in an effort to find a way to invite King Hussein's participation. The Shah also favors the creation of an autonomous West Bank-Gaza region under Jordanian sovereignty. He then flew to Riyadh for talks with Saudi Arabian leaders. The Saudis share the Shah's desire for a settlement, though they have a longstanding suspicion of the Iranians and are privately uneasy about the possibility of an Iranian-Israeli-Egyptian axis emerging after an eventual peace settlement.
Thus far, the Saudis have carefully refrained from openly endorsing Sadat's peace initiative, partly because they fear he will fail. Now, apparently, they are having second thoughts. In Beirut last week, a former Lebanese Premier, Saeb Salam, strongly supported Sadat. Since Salam is widely regarded as Riyadh's man in Lebanon, the Arab world interpreted his words as an indirect sign that Saudi Arabia, with its enormous economic powers of persuasion, was moving toward an open endorsement of Egypt's position. That possibility alone should serve to bolster Anwar Sadat's sagging spirits.
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