Monday, Jan. 09, 1978
Tragedy of Errors
By Strobe Talbott
THE WRONG HORSE
by Laurence Stern
Times Books; 170 pages; $10
Henry Kissinger's triumphs have had one father. His one unmitigated debacle is an orphan. It was the Cyprus crisis of 1974, a chain of coup, invasion, countercoup and embargo that left the southern flank of NATO in chaos and U.S. prestige in the Eastern Mediterranean at an ebb. Laurence Stern, a veteran reporter on national security for the Washington Post, has written a compact and compelling account of the affair. He traces U.S. policy from the Truman Doctrine of 1947 to Clark Clifford's inconclusive mediation mission earlier this year, but he concentrates on the American missteps in the summer and fall of 1974.
In July of that year the junta then in power in Athens conspired with extremist Greek Cypriots to topple Archbishop Makarios, President of Cyprus. Their goal was to unite the island republic with Greece. Makarios barely escaped with his life and fled into exile. His place was usurped by Nikos Sampson, notorious for having committed acts of terrorism against the Turkish minority on Cyprus. After a week of protests and warnings, Ankara moved unilaterally to avert Greek annexation of the island; Turkish paratroops and landing craft invaded. Sampson fell. So, within days, did his mentors in Athens. Makarios returned to Cyprus, and democracy was restored in Greece.
But there was no happy ending. The Turkish invasion force dug in, occupying the northern third of the island. Congress, over the objections of the Ford Administration, responded by cutting off American military supplies to Turkey. So it has continued for three years: Cyprus remains politically divided and economically shattered; Greece and Turkey, Politically divided, economically shattered. ostensible partners in the Atlantic Alliance, are enemies united only by their distaste for the U.S.
With good reason, claims Stern. Kissinger ignored U.S. intelligence predictions of the plot against Makarios, thus missing a chance to head off the crisis. Worse, he allowed the Greek junta to think it had tacit U.S. approval for its plot. In the tense week after Makarios' ouster, while the rest of the world was condemning Sampson and his backers in Athens, the Secretary of State did not disguise his relief at the defeat of Makarios, whom he had long regarded as a mercurial, left-leaning troublemaker. By his refusal to denounce the coup, Kissinger seemed to tilt toward Sampson and the military rulers. Then, when democracy replaced dictatorship in Greece, and Turkey switched from being an aggrieved neighbor to an often brutal occupier of Cyprus, Kissinger shifted his stance in favor of Ankara. Throughout the episode, in the metaphor of Author Stern's title, the U.S. backed "the wrong horse."
The events in the Eastern Mediterranean in 1974 add up to an episode that the former Secretary would rather not remember. Stern's lucid and convincing treatment guarantees that the world will not forget it. --Strobe Talbott
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