Toward a Just Peace

A formula that offers attainable goals

Suddenly, in the wake of Anwar Sadat's stunning trip to Israel, a Middle East peace settlement is conceivable. New initiatives and attitudes have broken through encrusted layers of inflexible positions, rhetoric and wars. The first steps toward a settlement will presumably be taken at a reconvened Geneva Conference, one that would be conducted in a new spirit of optimism. Even as diplomats who may take part in Geneva begin to worry about the initial, prickly procedural obstacles, others are --once again--starting to formulate what a fair, just and lasting Middle East peace would involve.

TIME herewith offers a formula for a just settlement. The detailed plan described below almost certainly would not be agreed upon by either side in its present form or at the present time. But it offers realistic answers and attainable goals. TIME'S plan assumes that both the Israelis and the confrontation Arab states are, at long last, willing to end all hostile acts, including armed attack, economic boycotts and blockades; and that the antagonists are ready for a peace that would be followed by the beginning of normal, neighborly relations--trade, tourism, the exchange of diplomats. It assumes further that both sides will see the need for international guarantees, in some form, as a way of making sure that the onetime antagonists will abide by their pledges.

The Sinai. Egypt would regain sovereignty over this huge (23,440 sq. mi.) desert peninsula, and Israel would withdraw its forces to the pre-1967 lines and remove its 16 Sinai settlements. Israel regards the area primarily as a strategic buffer zone. To ensure Israel's security, Egypt's armed forces would not move beyond the twelve or so mile-wide strip it now occupies east of the Suez Canal. The rest of Sinai would be demilitarized and policed by a U.N. peace-keeping force. Although American monitoring 8 technicians now in the Sinai should be recalled, the U.S. could help keep the peace by continuing to supply both Cairo and Jerusalem with aerial reconnaissance photographs of the region.

Israeli diplomats have insisted on maintaining a military presence at Sharm el Sheikh as a way of guaranteeing that ships will have unhindered access through the Gulf of Aqaba to the port of Eilat. Egypt would lease to Israel Sharm el Sheikh and an access road along the western shore of the Gulf of Aqaba for a stated period--perhaps 20 years. An alternative is to place a U.N. force at Sharm el Sheikh and give Israel inspection rights. Most experts agree that Israel's stated strategic concern about the Aqaba Gulf is irrelevant. Whether cargoes get through to Eilat depends on who controls 1) the Suez Canal, which must remain open to Israeli shipping, or 2) the Strait of Bab el Mandeb at the mouth of the Red Sea between Djibouti and South Yemen.

The Golan Heights. Israel has no legal claim to this occupied area. It would withdraw its troops, dismantle the 26 settlements erected in the territory since 1967 and restore sovereignty to Syria. The Israelis rightfully protest that before the Six-Day War, Syrian forces on the Heights bombarded civilian kibbutzim in the Hula Valley and along the shores of the Sea of Galilee. Thus, in exchange for Israeli withdrawal, the Heights must be declared a demilitarized zone subject to inspection by international patrols reinforced by Israeli and Syrian inspection teams.

The West Bank. Israel would withdraw its troops and abandon the 51 settlements established since the Six-Day War. Where the pre-1967 lines arbitrarily divided villages and farms, there should be minor territorial adjustments. At least temporarily, Israel should be allowed to maintain security outposts along the Jordan River.

The West Bank itself becomes a Palestinian entity. To ease Israel's legitimate fears about the creation of a new Arab realm whose western frontier would be 8.5 miles from Tel Aviv, the Palestinian entity would not possess all the attributes of a sovereign state--at least for a transition period that could last as long as 25 years. It would, however, have its own flag, a parliament and executive and judicial bodies. It could issue passports to all Palestinians living anywhere in the world--an act of enormous symbolic importance to these 3.4 million people without a homeland.

The Palestinian entity would have three limits on its sovereignty: 1) it would be allowed to have only police and limited self-defense forces, subject to international inspection; 2) it would be prohibited from making any international agreements directed against Israel; 3) it would have to tolerate the presence within its borders of an international peace-keeping force, presumably under United Nations auspices.

Precedents exist for such limitations on sovereignty. In 1955 Austria agreed to remain neutral and to limit the strength of its military in order to gain independence from the occupying powers (U.S., Britain, France and the Soviet Union). Japan's constitution allows only for self-defense forces that cannot be used in aggressive acts.

The Palestinian entity begins life under United Nations auspices; economically, it would need ties with both Israel and Jordan, and politically, it should be federated in some manner with the Hashemite kingdom. Eventually, the citizens of the new entity should have the right to determine their political status, such as independence with full sovereignty, continued federation with Jordan (53% of whose population is Palestinian) or with Israel. Whatever the choice, Israel --and Jordan--must have assurances that the new entity will not become a threat to the stability of its neighbors.

Gaza. Most of the 406,000 people who live in this narrow strip along the Mediterranean are Palestinians. Since the area has no traditional links to Sinai or Egypt, Gaza should be joined politically to the new Palestinian entity on the West Bank and subjected to similar limitations on its sovereignty. Although no geographic link between Gaza and the West Bank is feasible, Israel must guarantee unobstructed passage of goods and people between the two areas--perhaps via something comparable to the access routes from West Germany to West Berlin.

The Refugees. The 2.3 million Palestinians living in the diaspora would have the right, in principle, to join their 1.1 million brother Arabs who live in the West Bank and Gaza. Many experts predict that no more than 500,000 of these Palestinians-in-exile would do so. One reason is that thousands have established solid roots in Lebanon, Kuwait, Jordan and elsewhere. Another is that for many Palestinians, the "homeland" is not the West Bank but Jaffa, Galilee and other areas of what is now Israel.

The West Bank, with intense economic aid, could theoretically absorb all the Palestinian refugees; nonetheless, the new entity should have the right to impose immigration quotas. Palestinians who fled what is now Israel after 1948 would receive compensation for land they were forced to abandon. So would Jews who quit their Arab homelands and settled in Israel. The size of the payments would be set by an international commission created for this purpose and be financed by a multinational consortium, which would include Israel and the Arab states.

Assuming peace is a reality, some exiled Palestinians could resettle in Israel. Conversely, some Israelis would be allowed to establish communities in the West Bank, where there was a historic Jewish presence--near Hebron for example.

Jerusalem. Israelis have vivid memories of the 1948-67 Jordanian rule, when the city was divided. Jews were illegally denied access to the ancient Temple's Western Wall and the Jewish quarter of the Old City was looted and damaged. Muslims answer that the Old City is, and traditionally has been, mainly Arab in population and that they should have it back.

Israel would abandon its claims to territorial sovereignty over East Jerusalem, including the Old City, and its new suburban settlements. The Old City, with its many holy shrines, would be turned into a self-administered, internationalized community--in effect, a Vatican of the Middle East. Mount Scopus, the site of Hebrew University, would remain Israeli, connected to the Jewish state by a strip of land. The rest of East Jerusalem would be linked to the entity and could even serve as its administrative capital, just as West Jerusalem serves as Israel's capital. In any formula, unhindered access to the holy shrines--which would be administered by the religions to which they are sacred--is guaranteed to all.

In a sense, Jerusalem would again become a divided city, but there should be international guarantees against the erection of barriers to movement of people or goods from one sector of the city to another. Some major civic issues would be dealt with on a citywide basis, while many basic municipal services (recreational facilities, schools, zoning) would be the separate responsibility of each of Jerusalem's quarters. A number of the world's largest cities already operate in this manner; London, for instance, is a confederation of semiautonomous boroughs. Jerusalem's borough governments would be chosen by the various communities; at the city level, responsibility would be vested in a council representing all parts of Jerusalem --East and West.

Guarantees. In return for major territorial concessions, what does Israel get? In exchange for land, Israel would obtain what it has consistently demanded: recognition and acceptance from Arab states, and security--guaranteed not only by its own forces but by U.S. and perhaps other states' as well. There would be international peace-keeping forces under U.N. supervision in Sinai, the West Bank and the Golan Heights--which Israel and the Arabs could monitor. In addition, Israel and the U.S. would negotiate a treaty, comparable to the mutual defense pact with Japan or NATO, that would pledge Washington to move to Israel's defense in case of attack. Arab states, which worry about Israel's military power, might want--and should receive--similar assurances from Washington in case they were subjected to a surprise assault.

The Soviet Union could be made a partner of the U.S. in any treaty granting these assurances. Eventually, both superpowers might be willing to collaborate in a concerted plan to reduce arms shipments to the area--leading to a partial demilitarization of the Middle East and thus vastly increasing the prospects for a permanent peace.

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