The Canal Debate Begins

The military weighs in, but few Senators listen

It was the formal opening of the great national debate over ratification of the Panama Canal treaty. Yet the spectator seats in the Senate's historic Caucus Room were rarely close to being filled.

The members of the committee, weary from the energy bill filibuster, and knowing that the crucial treaty votes will not come until early next year, attended only sporadically. Nonetheless, in this surprisingly subdued setting, the nation's highest ranking military officers last week voiced the Carter Administration's best political argument for the accord: they insisted that ratification would ease their task of guarding the national security.

Only the advocates of relinquishing U.S. ownership and operation of the canal to Panama were heard last week. The committee will turn to opponents this week as the hearings continue. At stake are two treaties: one would give the canal to Panama by the end of the century; the other would enable the U.S. to guarantee the canal's neutrality--keeping it open to all the world's shipping--even after the year 2000. Both agreements require approval by the Senate.

In their testimony, an array of uniformed officers and their civilian boss, Defense Secretary Harold Brown, made a strong case that continued U.S. use of the canal, and American defense of it, would be much better ensured if the treaties are accepted than if they are rejected. Contended General George Brown, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs: "United States military interests in the Panama Canal are in its use, not its ownership. Our capability to defend the Panama Canal will be enhanced through cooperation with the government of Panama."

One by one, the top brass joined in supporting the treaty, including Vice Admiral Robert L.J. Long, deputy chief of naval operations (he also read a supporting statement from his boss, Admiral James Holloway III, who was on an official visit to India, Iran and Pakistan), and Lieut. General D.P. McAuliffe, commander of U.S. forces in the Canal Zone.

Asked by Senators whether they had been under pressure from the Administration to support the treaties, General Brown pointed out that he had been working personally for such agreements with Panama for four years--well before Jimmy Carter became President.

Defense Secretary Brown argued that "the canal was built for shipping, not slogans," and that "theoretical claims of title" to the waterway were irrelevant.

What matters, said Brown, is that the movement of ships be guaranteed. "Efficient operation of the canal in years ahead is more important than nostalgia for a simpler past." Moreover, defense is far more likely in "a cooperative effort with a friendly Panama" than if the treaties were rejected and U.S. forces became "a garrison amid hostile surroundings."

The most pointed questions from the committee, which seemed generally favorable to the agreement, centered on whether the Panamanians and the Administration interpret the treaty provisions in the same way. Several Senators noted that Romulo Escobar Bethancourt, the chief Panamanian treaty negotiator, recently told his countrymen that the U.S. could not unilaterally intervene under the accords to protect the canal after the year 2000. But Brown pointed out that General Omar Torrijos Herrera, the country's military dictator, is the leader who "instructs his negotiator, and not vice versa." Torrijos said approvingly at the treaty signing in Washington last month that the agreement would put the canal "under the Pentagon's defense umbrella."

Sol Linowitz, one of the two U.S. negotiators, observed that Panama is holding a national plebiscite on the agreement Oct. 23; its advocates there doubtless are making the most favorable interpretation possible of the documents to help get them approved. But in practical terms, he told the Senators, differing interpretations cannot block U.S. efforts to protect the canal. Said he: "We are under no obligation to consult with or seek approval from any other nation or international body before acting to maintain the neutrality of the canal." More loftily, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance argued that the treaties should be approved because "the American people want to live in peace with their neighbors, want to be strong but use their strength with restraint."

But opponents argued that the U.S. would be weakened by giving up the canal. The Republican National Committee, dominated by conservatives, passed a resolution last week opposing ratification on the grounds that it would "cede U.S. rights of military security." While praising Gerald Ford's foreign policy, the committee ignored the fact that both Ford and his Secretary of State Henry Kissinger solidly support the treaty. Kissinger once again made that clear last week in a talk to the Economic Club of New York. Failure to ratify the treaty, Kissinger warned, might involve the U.S. in a guerrilla war in Central America.

For the Senate the day of judgment is not expected until next March. In the meantime, many Senators are staying uncommitted and seem to resent the heavy pressures from both sides to make up their minds early. Their mail is overwhelmingly against the treaties, but much of it is in the form of identically worded postcards orchestrated by conservative mail-solicitation experts.

The most formidable early foe of ratification appears to be Alabama's wily Democrat James Allen, a master of parliamentary tactics. He vows to smother the treaties with amendments that would, in effect, force the Administration either to abandon the accord or reopen negotiations with Panama. If this tactic fails, he will try to dilute the treaties with Senate-passed reservations, which would not be legally binding but would commit the U.S. in a moral way, with unpredictable practical effect.

Allen's early mischievous tactics are aimed at embarrassing the Administration. His Senate Judiciary subcommittee has launched an investigation into allegations that unnamed U.S. intelligence agents in 1975 and 1976 intercepted telephone communications among Panamanian officials and that an Army sergeant sold transcripts of them to their government. Although U.S. intelligence officials emphatically deny that treaty negotiations were in any way involved in the intercepted conversations, Allen has subpoenaed eight witnesses to find out just what the murky affair was all about. So far, there is no evidence in Panama of any official concern about the incident.

Supporters and opponents give conflicting preliminary counts of how the Senators are leaning on ratification. In the end, the fate of the treaties may rest with two key Senators: Majority Leader Robert Byrd and Minority Leader Howard Baker. Despite calls from President Carter, both remain uncommitted. Baker told the President: "I have decided not to decide for the moment." Byrd has indicated only that if he makes up his mind to push the treaties, he will do so in an all-out way, directing Senate strategy. If he decides to oppose them, he will cast his negative vote but not lead the opposition. Although their indecision may look like abdication of their roles, the stance of both men may be tactically smart. But before the emotional Panama Canal issue is settled, it is certain to be a severe test of their leadership once the nose counting begins in earnest. -

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