End of a Chapter

Ian Smith wins big, but a new settlement plan is in trouble

"No one can deny that Rhodesians are united," said jubilant Prime Minister Ian Smith. Presumably he meant white Rhodesians only--and if so, his victory statement was right on. In what may be the last election under Rhodesia's present constitution, Smith's ruling Rhodesian Front Party won all 50 parliamentary seats reserved for the country's 268,000 whites (the 6.4 million blacks have 16) and 86% of the popular vote. The right-wing Rhodesian Action Party, which had accused Smith of preparing a "capitulation" to some sort of black participation in government, drew only 9% of the vote, while the moderate National Unifying Force received 4.5%.

There was good news and bad news in Smith's unexpectedly sweeping triumph. The good news is that the vast majority of whites now seem to agree that only a settlement, and not an intensification of the five-year-old guerrilla war, can solve the crisis. The bad news is that, with his impressive mandate, Smith will be free to seek the kind of settlement he wants--a settlement that Britain and the U.S. are convinced cannot work because it ignores the nationalist factions that are waging war against the white regime.

Alarmed as never before (see box next page), the whites closed ranks behind the man they call "good old Smithy." "Let's face it," says Asbestos Mineworker Henry O'Hara, who emigrated from Ireland 31 years ago at the age of seven, "Smith's done a damn good job for twelve years. I don't see why he shouldn't have another twelve--long enough for my kids to grow up." O'Hara approves of Smith's concept of "power sharing" between whites and moderate blacks. But who would be in the driver's seat? "Those with brains, of course." He winks.

Of course. But heads of the "frontline" African states that support the guerrillas have made it clear that 1) no settlement in Rhodesia is possible with Smith in charge, and 2) the war will go on if leaders of the militant Patriotic Front are excluded from the transition process. Another, and more immediate problem is whether any moderate black leaders will agree to discuss Smith's plan. Already both Bishop Abel Muzorewa and the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole, the most important nationalist leaders inside the country, have said that they will refuse to join the "broader based" Cabinet that Smith has proposed as a first step.

That gloomy prospect was clearly in the minds of two roving envoys who landed in Salisbury the morning after the ballots were counted: Britain's Foreign Secretary, Dr. David Owen, and Washington's Ambassador to the United Nations, Andrew Young. Their mission was to present Smith with a new Anglo-American proposal for a Rhodesian settlement--and from the beginning they had little hope that he would heed it.

The plan, whose broad outline had previously been leaked to the press, calls for transition from white to black majority rule during 1978, with a British administrator supervising elections in which adults of all races would have the right to vote. During this period, both the Rhodesian army and the guerrilla armies would be replaced by a U.N. military force, and eventually by a new army for independent Zimbabwe, the African name for Rhodesia. The U.S., Britain and other nations would provide a development fund of between $1 billion and $1.5 billion to help revive the country's battered economy.

During an earlier stop in Lusaka, Zambia, Owen and Young discussed the plan with Patriotic Front Leaders Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe. In Pretoria, they underwent what one observer described as a six-hour "interrogation" by South African Prime Minister John Vorster. The proposal that most troubled Vorster: the disbanding of the Rhodesian army and establishment of a U.N. peace-keeping force. Vorster declared: "The Rhodesian question is a matter for whites and blacks in Rhodesia to solve"--apparently meaning that as far as Vorster is concerned, Smith is free to pursue his own kind of settlement and that South Africa will not put pressure on him to end minority rule.

In Salisbury, the talks lasted four hours, with Smith questioning Owen and Young closely on the security provisions. Afterward, Smith told reporters ambiguously, "There were some pleasant and some unpleasant surprises." He also noted that the plan contained some "crazy suggestions," but did not reject it out of hand. Leaving Salisbury, Owen admitted that he was "not full of optimism."

Did London and Washington really think their proposals had a chance of being accepted? The grim alternative, in the British view, would be to let Rhodesia drift toward military dictatorship under a divided guerrilla army. Smith's own plan is wishful thinking, they believe, because it seeks to preserve white power with a semblance of black participation but excludes the radical factions whose guerrilla armies have brought Rhodesia to the point of crisis.

British officials emphasized that according to the Anglo-American security proposals, the new army would comprise not only the guerrillas but also "acceptable elements" of the Rhodesian forces. Moreover, they pointed out, the Rhodesian police would remain in place under the transitional leadership. Overseeing this delicate grouping of white-led police and black-controlled army units would be U.N. forces, perhaps composed of contingents from Nigeria, Kenya and Finland. British and American officials argue that once a transitional government embracing moderate African elements was in place in Salisbury, the guerrilla armies would be under increasing pressure not to fight on for total control.

All this, however, presupposes that Smith will go along with the new proposals--and so far there is no indication that he will do so. One Whitehall official described the conclusion of the Owen-Young mission as "the end of a chapter, not the close of the book." Perhaps so. But to judge by the evidence last week, the close of the book on Rhodesia is likely to be both prolonged and bloody.

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