From Geneva Up to Geneva Down

Why were these men smiling?

Israeli Premier Menachem Begin was burbling with good humor at the end of his three-day official visit to Washington last week. His talks, he said, had produced a chance to establish "real peace" after "the delay of almost a generation." President Carter seemed almost equally optimistic. "I believe we have laid the groundwork now," he said, "and barring some unforeseen difficulties, that will lead to the Geneva Conference in October." He also suggested that such a conference could well lead to eventual compromise. "We've not found any of them to be so adamant in their positions that they are not eager for accommodation."

But some senior Administration officials failed to see any sound reason for such optimism--except public relations. A Geneva Conference by October is far from certain, and even if it does convene, it is virtually inconceivable that it would lead to a settlement in the foreseeable future. Privately, Carter and his aides conceded that they were discouraged by the gulf that exists between the Israeli position and the Arabs'--though they should hardly have been surprised.

New Assistance. On balance. Begin had a lot more to smile about than Carter. He proved himself a charming, highly skillful diplomat--personally far more appealing than his stiff predecessor Yitzhak Rabin and perhaps even Earth Mother Golda Meir. He engaged in a sort of love feast with the President and returned to Israel with new military assistance. Only a few weeks ago, Washington was issuing stern warnings to Begin that he must be flexible. What had happened?

Ever since his meeting with U.S. Jewish leaders (TIME, July 18), Carter had softened his attitude toward Israel without technically changing his position. Example: lately there has not been any mention of a "homeland" for Palestinians but instead reference to a Palestinian region tied to Jordan. He obviously wanted to avoid a meeting with Begin that ended in open disagreement. Besides, recalling Carter's earlier disastrous encounter with Rabin, one official explained, "Carter must have realized that his tough attitude toward Rabin did not pay off. Instead of movement, he got Israel to dig in its heels. Carter must have seen that to get the best results, he must play the pussycat--and he was the pussycat."

But what results Carter got, apart from a friendly atmosphere that might prove to be useful later, is not clear. As far as is known, Carter simply did not choose to press his earlier prescriptions for Israeli concessions, including the Palestinian homeland and substantial withdrawal from occupied territories to pre-1967 boundaries. Begin in turn sidestepped the thornier issues. He took the position that unlike his predecessor, he did not want to negotiate an agreement with the U.S. but simply wanted to get started negotiating directly with the Arabs. He talked lyrically of peace, without giving any sign that he was prepared for territorial concessions other than those his predecessors were prepared to make in Sinai and the Golan Heights. The push toward Geneva might buy him time, and, should the Arabs refuse the conference, it would place the onus of intransigence on them.

After listening to Begin, Administration aides had to rethink the kind of Geneva Conference that could be held. Before the Washington summit. National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski had drawn up alternatives that were described at the White House as "Geneva Up" and "Geneva Down." Geneva Up would be a conference at which the parties would go in with the procedural details worked out in advance and a relatively clear idea of the substantive matters to be discussed. At a Geneva Down conference, even the procedural issues--who should attend and how to approach the substantive issues--would have to be first discussed. Despite the President's earlier warning that a poorly organized conference would be worse than no conference at all, White House aides are now resigned to preparing for Geneva Down. Said a senior official:

"The question is not what you want but what you can get."

Like Carter, the Arabs would prefer Geneva Up as a working model. But Begin made it plain that he would rather bargain face-to-face with Israel's enemies. Everything is, negotiable, he insisted, although it is clear that certain things are not--namely, any substantive Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank or restoration of Arab sovereignty to East Jerusalem. Begin also told Carter he was opposed to a single Arab delegation at Geneva and insisted that under no circumstances could known members of the Palestine Liberation Organization be present there, even as members of a Jordanian delegation. Explained Begin to a Washington press conference: "The P.L.O. cannot participate. To put it bluntly and simply, their design is to destroy our country and our people."

But for all the toughness of his position, the Premier was cordial, low-keyed and even deferential in his presentation to Carter, often beginning sentences with an apologetic "I hope you will allow me." In a schoolmasterly way, Begin started his first session by offering the President a 30-minute history lesson on Israel's role in the Middle East. He illustrated his text by having an aide set up three maps. One showed how vulnerable Israel would be to Arab surprise attacks if it withdrew from the occupied territories. A second showed the relative size of Israel and the Arab world. The third illustrated the military situation in southern Lebanon, where Israelis have actively supported a beleaguered Lebanese Christian minority against Moslem--actually Palestinian--attackers.

Carter, for his part, began the first session by explaining that the only U.S. goal was to achieve a comprehensive settlement, no plans would be imposed on the negotiating parties by outsiders, and talks should be within the framework of United Nations Resolutions 242 and 338. Carter probed Begin for clarifications of the Israeli position, but on the few occasions when the President expressed demurs, the Premier either ignored them or changed the subject. When Carter voiced his concern about new Israeli settlements on the West

Bank, for instance, Begin responded with the irrelevant comment that there were eight Hebrons and four Bethlehems in the U.S.,* and "I could scarcely refuse to let Jews settle there."

Begin did display flexibility on procedural matters. He suggested that at Geneva, after opening statements the parties might split into "mixed commissions"--that is, Israeli groups meeting separately with teams from Egypt, Syria and Jordan. The Premier also said Israel was prepared to negotiate on such mixed commissions even if the Arabs refused to go to Geneva. He even agreed, as a last resort, to "proximity talks" like those held at Rhodes, where the late Ralph Bunche moved between two groups in different rooms of the same hotel to work out the 1949 Israeli-Arab armistices.

Although the two leaders never reached the "Menachem" and "Jimmy" stage, they got along well after the first meeting. Carter broke the tension at that session. When Begin said he wanted to talk about the Palestinians, the President smilingly interjected, "Now you've got a chance to make some really big news." The two men lavished praise on each other at a White House working dinner. Carter called Begin "a man of truth and quiet dignity." The Premier answered that his host was "a great friend of humanity" and later said he had a "good heart"--the highest of praises, according to the teaching of post-Talmudic sages in the Pirkei Avot (Sayings of the Fathers).

As he has done with other guests from the Middle East, Carter invited Begin upstairs to the family quarters for a 90-minute private chat. Ritualistically, the Premier was invited to look at a sleeping Amy. He also met Miz Lillian and gallantly kissed her hand. Miz Lillian, Begin observed, reminded him of his own mother, a Polish Jew who was killed by German storm troopers near Cracow in 1942.

Begin impressed White House and State Department aides as witty, bright, shrewd--and tough as nails. The only top member of Carter's entourage who had met him before was Brzezinski. From the Israeli Holocaust memorial, Yad Vashem, the Premier had brought copies of letters written in 1933 by Brzezinski's father Tadeusz, at the time Polish consul in Leipzig. The elder Brzezinski in those stern memos to German authorities had protested their discrimination against Jews. It was a well-meant but pointed gift, indeed, to the younger Brzezinski, whom the Israelis have tabbed as pro-Arab.

Carter ended the summit with an open invitation to Begin to "call any time, any day." The next step in getting the parties to Geneva is up to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. He will start a ten-day trip to the Middle East on Aug. 1, stopping in five Arab states before visiting Begin and Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan in Jerusalem. Vance's aides are worried about what kind of reception he will get in the Arab world. Said one U.S. official: "The problem with all this is how the Arabs will feel about it. Frankly, I think they will have a tough time accepting it." Although Egyptian sources expressed satisfaction that both the U.S. and Israel favor a Geneva Conference in October, a P.L.O. spokesman in Beirut rather ominously warned that Begin's plan was a program for war, not peace.

Unpleasant Surprise. The Arabs were undoubtedly not too pleased that Begin was able to do a bit of concrete planning against another possible war while in Washington. In response to an earlier request, Washington agreed to provide $106 million for the production of a new Israeli tank called the Merkava (chariot) and to supply Israel with 18 attack helicopters and an undetermined number of F-16 fighters. As proof that the country was prepared to do a bit of belt tightening before making new requests, Begin's government last week sprang an unpleasant surprise on Israeli consumers. Finance Minister Simcha Ehrlich announced wide-ranging anti-inflation measures to reduce a $130 million budget deficit. By cutting subsidies on basic commodities, the government forced a 25% rise in the price of such staples as bread, cheese, milk and chicken; gasoline rose from $1.87 per gal. to $2.40. Although opposition politicians warned that some cuts in the defense budget threatened Israel's security and the big labor combine Histadrut called a desultory one-hour strike, the majority took the bad news in stride. What annoyed many people most of all was that there had not been, as usual, any advance leaks of the measures, so housewives were unable to go on a last minute bargain-buying spree.

In a sense, it could be argued that Begin's visit ended the first phase of Carter's Middle East peace offensive. He has now met, and easily charmed, all the key leaders on both sides--except, of course, P.L.O. Leader Yasser Arafat. Now the President must run the risk of souring some of those good relations by applying pressure to win a compromise. The Arab leaders clearly expect the U.S. to nudge its client, Israel, to the bargaining table and make what Cairo and Damascus regard as a reasonable peace settlement. If Carter cannot fulfill those expectations, the result could well be a Geneva--Up or Down--that collapses in frustration and anger. If Geneva collapses, as all parties concerned are aware, one terrible alternative is a fifth Middle East war.

* There are at least twelve Hebrons and six Bethlehems in the U.S.

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