The ABCs of the Arms Controversy

You start with MIRVs, MARVs, SLBMs, ALCMs and ICBMs. Then add "counterforce," "mutual assured destruction" and "first-strike capability." All this is part of the mind-numbing, acronymic jargon used in the U.S.-Soviet Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (known for short as SALT). Although the vocabulary is impenetrable, except to think-tank experts, and the concepts are often Strangelovean, the complex SALT negotiations may yet turn out to be the most important of the century. Herewith a primer of key questions and answers.

What is the goal of the SALT talks?

Primarily, to prevent a nuclear war between the two superpowers. Most Western strategic analysts believe that neither American nor Soviet leaders --assuming they are of sound mind --would order a surprise attack unless they were certain that the other side's capacity for a devastating nuclear counterstrike could be destroyed) By limiting the development and deployment of certain weapons, SALT negotiators have tried to preserve the strategic balance so that both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. could launch an atomic retaliation even after suffering a massive, surprise "first strike." In a sense, SALT aims at keeping the American and Soviet societies hostage to each other in order to make such a nuclear exchange unthinkable. This theory of deterrence is known, rather grimly, as mutual assured destruction. A secondary aim of SALT is the eventual reduction of costly nuclear arsenals so that the U.S. and the Soviet Union will have more resources available for nonmilitary purposes.

What has SALT accomplished?

After more than two years of tough negotiations, a first-stage agreement was signed in Moscow by President Richard Nixon and Soviet Boss Leonid Brezhnev on May 26, 1972. One section of SALT I--as this agreement is called --sharply limited the deployment of defensive anti-ballistic missiles. The purpose: to prevent ABMs, which can destroy offensive missiles, from disrupting--or, as the experts put it, "destabilizing" --the mutual-assured-destruction balance. A second part of SALT I, dealing with offensive weapons, froze the U.S. strategic arsenal at 1,710 land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched missiles (SLBMS); the Soviet arsenal was set at 2,358 ICBMS and SLBMS. The Russians were allowed a quantitative superiority, as well as the right to keep 308 mammoth launchers (unmatched by anything in the U.S. arsenal), as a balance to America's sophisticated technology in missile accuracy and in MIRVs (multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles). These separately targeted war heads can be mounted on a single rocket, thus vastly increasing that launcher's destructive potential. Unlike the limitation agreement on ABMs, the freeze on offensive weapons expires this October, although it can be extended.

What happened next?

For more than two years after the signing of SALT I, U.S. and Soviet negotiators tried unsuccessfully to hammer out SALT n, a treaty that would, among other matters, impose somewhat more permanent restrictions on offensive weapons. The deadlock seemed to be broken at the November 1974 meeting between President Gerald Ford and Leonid Brezhnev in Vladivostok. They agreed that for ten years neither country would deploy more than 2,400 strategic missile launchers, of which no more than 1,320 could be armed with MIRV clusters. Intercontinental bombers, which were exempted from controls in SALT I, would be counted as launchers.

Why has there been further delay?

Although Brezhnev and Ford set specific limits on offensive strategic weapons, they did not adequately define what they meant by such crucial terms as strategic and missile. The U.S. has insisted that the Vladivostok ceilings do not apply to its new cruise missile. Washington's reasoning: this inexpensive, extraordinarily accurate weapon is technically not a missile because it is self-propelled and does not follow a ballistic course. The Russians argue that their new Backfire bomber is not a strategic warplane because it cannot fly to the continental U.S. and return to the Soviet Union without refueling.

Has SALT reduced arms spending?

Not really; in fact, the Soviet defense budget has gone up every year since 1972. Moreover, the SALT I limitations affected only existing weapons and did nothing to halt technological innovation. The U.S. has been able to develop its cruise missile and the M-X (a new, mobile, intercontinental missile), while the Soviets have introduced four new ICBMs. Some experts argue that SALT has merely redirected military investment from weapons covered by the treaty to potentially more lethal arms, such as laser beams and ICBM war heads--called MARVs--that can be steered to target.

Who has gained more from SALT?

The Soviets, according to U.S. and West European experts. SALT I halted development of anti-ballistic missiles, in which the U.S. had had a commanding technological lead; it also provided diplomatic confirmation of the U.S.S.R.'s status as a superpower. The higher ceilings the Soviets were allowed by SALT convinced many countries that the Russians had become militarily more powerful than the U.S. To counter this false impression, the U.S. Senate has required that SALT II establish numerical parity between the superpowers--which the Soviets accepted at Vladivostok.

Have the Soviets been cheating?

A few years ago, there was speculation that Moscow was violating the treaty by substituting "heavy" SS-19 missiles for less powerful SS-11 "light" missiles. After investigation, U.S. officials were satisfied that the Soviets had abided by the letter of SALT. Whether they have been honoring the spirit of the agreement is another matter, since Moscow seems to take advantage of every ambiguity. Says a West German senior diplomat: "SALT I has had enough loopholes for the Russians to walk through." To prevent this in the future, the U.S. is insisting the SALT II treaty be phrased more tightly than SALT I.

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