Carter and the Russians: Semi-Tough

Veteran diplomats in Washington could not recall anything quite like it. There was a new President, not even three weeks in office, casually spinning off specific proposals on complex matters of arms control and criticizing the Soviet Union on such sensitive issues as its dealings with dissidents. He did it all in that most public of forums: a televised press conference. Could he possibly know what he was doing?

Handling 15 questions in 32 minutes with relaxed assurance, Jimmy Carter used his first presidential press conference to advance his favorable initial image as an open, informal but take-charge President (see following story). Carter even displayed humor on the solemn subject of engaging the Russians --and the press. "When the A.P. reporter was expelled from Moscow," the President said with a smile, "I had a first thought to retaliate by expelling the A.P. reporter from Washington."

Carter continued to emit somewhat conflicting signals, sounding semi-tough on human rights but also urging mutual accommodation on arms. He said he would "speak out strongly and forcefully whenever human rights are threatened--not every instance, but when I think it's advisable." Moreover, he added that such statements, directed at the Soviet Union, need not impair mutual efforts at arms control. He thus rejected former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's theory of "linkage" in diplomacy, according to which different issues between the two superpowers are inevitably intertwined. Still, chances are that some linkage will remain a fact of life, no matter what the atmosphere may be. In the disarmament area, Carter insisted that both sides must make concessions. His major points:

> He would be willing to complete a quick SALT II agreement with the Soviet Union, basically confirming the limitation on nuclear weapons agreed upon by President Ford and Leonid Brezhnev in 1974, without resolving the continuing controversy over whether the Soviet Union's Backfire bomber and the U.S. cruise missile should come under the set ceilings. Carter would allow that question to be decided later. This idea had also been proposed by Ford and rejected by the Russians, who, however, may be more receptive now.

> He would be inclined to forgo continued development of a mobile U.S. nuclear missile launcher (the MX) if the Soviet Union will abandon deployment of its track-mounted launcher (the SS-20). Such mobile launchers greatly complicate the job of detecting and destroying each other's missiles and are considered a destabilizing element in a policy of mutual deterrence.

>He urged that both powers cease all nuclear testing for two or more years. If the Soviet Union insists on using nu clear explosives to divert a river in northern Russia as planned, Carter asked that U.S. experts be permitted to observe the project. The U.S., in turn, would allow Russians to watch any peaceful use of nuclear power for similar projects in the U.S., although none is planned. Apart from nuclear tests, Carter suggested that each side should notify the other in advance of any experimental missile launching. This would eliminate the danger that such a launching could be mistaken for an attack.

At the State Department, there was concern that Carter's pressure to help the Soviet dissidents (see THE WORLD) might have two adverse effects: 1) push the Kremlin to bear down even harder on its restive citizens to show that it is not influenced by outside "interference in its internal affairs" and 2) so sour the atmosphere between the two countries that any arms agreement would be scuttled. Whether by coincidence or design, the Russians arrested Yuri Orlov, a dissident physicist, within 24 hours after the Carter press conference.

On arms control, Princeton's Robert G. Gilpin, a professor of international politics, worried that Carter was "exposing his hands too early and encouraging the Russians to probe how far they can go in extracting further concessions." Other experts noted that the Russians do not relish negotiating so openly and almost certainly will insist that their own positions be stated only in secrecy across the bargaining tables.

In fact. Carter's proposals were far less casual than they appeared to be. Before going public with them, he had outlined them in greater detail to Soviet -Ambassador Anatoli Dobrynin. An unusually nervous and perspiring Dobrynin had discussed a wide range of Soviet-American issues with Carter in the Oval Office for nearly an hour on Feb. 1.

While obviously irritated by the initial U.S. reaction, the Kremlin to date shows no evidence of being so offended by Carter's declarations on human rights as to endanger an arms agreement. There are some Western diplomats in Moscow who are convinced that the Russian leadership fears the U.S. technological superiority in weaponry and thus may be just as eager as Carter to avoid a new race in arms development. At week's end, TIME Moscow Correspondent Marsh Clark reported that Moscow's U.S.A. Institute was working overtime in an attempt to fathom this puzzling new U.S. leader, but that relations between the two powers have generally improved since Carter's election. The flap over the Soviet dissidents, however, was seen by TIME Diplomatic Correspondent Strobe Talbott in Washington as portending a possible new chill in U.S. and U.S.S.R. relations.

No Joke. One Soviet official made light of Carter's human rights talk, jokingly threatening that "the Foreign Ministry in Moscow may start issuing statements in defense of Larry Flynt [the Hustler publisher; see THE PRESS] as a victim of repression and harassment." Trouble is, to most Americans direct repression is no joke. In the end, as usual among superpowers, each side will probably work in a hardheaded fashion to further its own basic interests. If both sides see advantages in a new arms agreement, the clashing rhetoric on human rights is not likely to stand in the way--provided it is not pushed too far.

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