Castro: The Pressure Begins to Work

High on the list of Henry Kissinger's geopolitical worries this year has been the continued presence of Cuban troops in Angola. To the Secretary of State, this Soviet-backed force of more than 13,000 well-armed soldiers has been a threat to the stability of southern Africa and a proxy of Moscow, through which the Soviets could extend their influence across the continent. Last week, in the midst of an unusually relaxed and relatively uneventful nine-day diplomatic odyssey through Europe, Kissinger unexpectedly learned that Dictator Fidel Castro's African adventurism might be a fading worry. In Stockholm, he heard from Swedish Premier Olof Palme that Cuban troops were being gradually withdrawn from Angola. Some Western diplomats interpreted the news as a vindication of Kissinger's strategy of rhetorical pressure--his loud and vigorous protests to both Moscow and Havana that the U.S. would not tolerate continued Cuban intervention in African affairs.

Palme learned of Cuba's plans in a personal letter from Castro, which stated that Cuban troops were leaving Angola at the rate of 200 per week. Following Castro's instructions, Palme read Kissinger parts of the letter, but did not then show it to him. The Swedish Premier quoted Castro as writing that Cubans "are not going to be 20th century crusaders," and that they had no plans to send troops anywhere else in Africa or Latin America.

Repeated Warnings. Kissinger guardedly called this "a positive development" and asked the CIA to determine whether the Cubans were, hi fact, withdrawing their soldiers. If they were leaving at the rate set by Castro, their ranks could be halved by the end of this year and down to a handful by mid-1977.

Kissinger speculated that several factors might have been involved in Castro's decision: "Cuba had to recognize that its relationship with the U.S. was deteriorating to a serious point, that we were determined to prevent any further military adventures and also that other African states agreed with our policy that African development should be left to African nations." Zaire and Zambia, for instance, have been urging Luanda's new leaders to begin easing the Cubans out of Angola.

Moscow, which urged the Cubans to enter the Angola civil war, may also have played a role in the announced withdrawal. Many Kremlinologists believe that Soviet Boss Leonid Brezhnev discussed Africa with Castro when the Cuban visited the Kremlin for the Soviet Union's Party Congress last February. Apparently, the Cuban-Russian decision was a response to repeated warnings from Washington that the continued presence of Castro's troops in Angola was giving powerful ammunition to American critics of detente, notably Ronald Reagan.

If the Cubans are really withdrawing, the U.S. is sure to re-examine its stand on Angola; Washington so far has not recognized the regime of Marxist President Agostinho Neto.* U.S. officials, however, warn that it is too early to talk about any reassessment of Washington-Havana relations. Commented a top State Department official: "The Cubans did pretty rough things. You can't give them credit for having stopped doing half of what they shouldn't have done to begin with."

Major Advance. Cuba's gradual military withdrawal from Africa will remove one source of friction in U.S.-Soviet relations. Last week's simultaneous signing of the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (in Washington by Ford and in Moscow by Brezhnev) removed still another one. The Soviets were miffed that Ford postponed the signing of the treaty--originally scheduled to take place on the eve of the May 18 Michigan primary--apparently because of fear that the accord would make his Administration appear too conciliatory to the Soviets. In negotiation for 18 months, last week's treaty bans individual nuclear explosions above the 150-kiloton level and sets detailed ground rules for monitoring underground nuclear detonations for such peaceful purposes as canal digging, earth moving, mining and oil exploration.

For the first time, the Soviets will permit Americans to inspect the sites of some atomic explosions. It was something of a breakthrough. Moscow's opposition to on-site inspection has long been a major obstacle to negotiating a comprehensive nuclear arms control agreement. Under the new treaty, which will run for five years and requires Senate ratification, American engineers will be able to visit the sites of peaceful Soviet explosions and verify that there has been no violation of the treaty's complex guidelines on the force permitted for the blasts. The treaty, and the experience to be gained from on-site inspections, may well be a major advance in international arms control.

*The Luanda regime has been recognized by 97 countries.

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