How to Break the Logjam?

The fresh wave of fighting that rolled across Lebanon last week abruptly shattered any expectations that the election of a new President to succeed embattled Suleiman Franjieh might open the way for a resolution to the country's 13-month civil war. If anything, the selection of Elias Sarkis, 51, by parliamentary deputies who were forced to brave bullets to cast their ballots seemed to lead only to heightened hostilities.

Moslem leftists, who had tried to block the election to protest Syrian pressure in favor of Sarkis and the Christian right, turned their anger on the deputies themselves. The villas of Assembly Speaker Kamal Assad and another legislator were burned down, and some deputies received assassination threats. Skirmishing and shellfire continued in both Beirut and the ravaged countryside. Even as President-elect Sarkis, currently the governor of Lebanon's Central Bank, held a traditional open house for well-wishers at his mountainside home at Hazmieh, the sound of artillery fire rattled through nearby hills.

Improved Prospects. In the broader arena of Middle East politics, however, Sarkis' election helped a diplomatic chain reaction involving decisions in Syria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and perhaps even the U.S. that could improve prospects for peace in Lebanon and a permanent settlement in the Middle East as a whole. The complicated politicking revolves around a so-called Franjieh plan, which the incumbent President developed. Franjieh seeks to make Syria primarily responsible for security in Lebanon; Damascus, under his plan, would bring a halt to the fighting by first employing its own forces as peacemakers, then by rebuilding Lebanon's fractured gendarmerie and army. Saudi Arabia and the U.S., meanwhile, would be responsible for reconstruction of Lebanon's shattered economy.

The reason that the stubborn Franjieh agreed to Sarkis' early election, TIME Correspondent Wilton Wynn reported from Beirut, was to allow these nations, before they committed themselves to Franjieh's plan, to see who would be running Lebanon after him. But that does not mean, Franjieh's associates hasten to add, that he has committed himself to retiring before his own term officially ends on Sept. 23. Convinced that he will not leave office early, Lebanese wits last week were already predicting that Sarkis might resign before Franjieh ever does.

At least one element of the Franjieh plan suddenly appeared to be falling into place last week. Saudi Arabia undertook the role of diplomatic buffer between Syria and Egypt, which have been feuding since last fall over Egypt's acceptance of Israeli disengagement in the Sinai. The Saudis invited prime ministers of both countries to Riyadh this week for discussions that may lead to an Arab summit in June.

Unable to Refuse. Neither Cairo nor Damascus could refuse the offer, in which the Saudis were joined by Kuwait. Egypt has long been dependent on the oil nations for financial aid, and Syria is rapidly becoming so. The Syrian economy has been squeezed by the loss of profitable transit trade to the Persian Gulf via Beirut's strangled port as well as by the influx of 300,000 Lebanese refugees into Syria. Additionally, Iraq recently choked off the flow of pipeline oil to Syria's big refinery at Horns. Part of this costly hassle over oil concerns prices; part is a result of the Lebanese war, in which the Iraqis support the leftist National Movement of Druze Leader Kamal Jumblatt.

Egypt has also been backing Jumblatt, mainly to offset Syrian support for Franjieh and the Christian right. Even a lukewarm Egyptian-Syrian rapprochement, as a result, would have significant repercussions in Lebanon. Jumblatt's fighters may soon hurt from a Syrian blockade of arms and ammunition to the left. The Jumblatt forces will suffer even more if Egyptian aid is withdrawn at Saudi behest. Beyond that the Syrians and the Saudis are now pressuring Palestinian Leader Yasser Arafat, who is backing Jumblatt, to disengage his potent forces from the fighting; Arafat also depends on the oil nations for financial assistance. So far, he has spurned their demands and even has begun publicly denouncing Syria for imposing the arms blockade. If, however, the oil states ultimately force the Palestinians to withdraw, the Lebanese left would be militarily destroyed.

Growing wary of a head-on confrontation with Syrian President Hafez Assad, Jumblatt has thus begun to soften his verbal attacks while still calling for a restructuring of the Lebanese government before the war can end. "Elias Sarkis is our friend," the Druze leader said soothingly last week. Sarkis, meanwhile, indicated he was willing to talk restructuring--but only after security has been restored. That, it now seems, must wait for more elements of the necessarily fragile chain of the Franjieh plan to successfully link together.

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