Monday, Jan. 19, 1976
Israel's Allon: 'We Protest'
Israel's Foreign Minister Yigal Allon spent two days in Washington last week coordinating strategy for the United Nations Security Council debate on the Middle East with Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Before returning to Jerusalem, Allon talked with TIME Diplomatic Editor Jerrold Schecter. Excerpts from the interview:
BOYCOTTING OF THE DEBATE. First, we wanted to protest the practice of using the Security Council for adopting unnecessary and damaging resolutions which could only serve to undermine an already weakened United Nations and which we felt were designed to undermine the momentum which began as a result of the interim agreement with Egypt. Second, [we reject] the invitation of the P.L.O., as if it were a legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. We will not reconcile ourselves to any recognition of the P.L.O.
ON THE P.L.O. AS A PALESTINIAN SPOKESMAN. The P.L.O. hardly controls 10% of the Palestinian Arab community. It is the representative only of an international terrorist organization. Why should we give them semirecog-nition that will frighten to death all the moderate Arabs in the West Bank? Once [the moderate Arabs] realize there is even the theoretical possibility of handing over power to the P.L.O., they will go to the P.L.O. right away, instead of remaining a moderate, constructive element, as most of them are today. The Rabat Conference [which recognized the P.L.O. as the sole representative of the Palestinian people] is not binding as far as we are concerned. We are not a party to those conferences.
ON THE P.L.O. AS A LIBERATION MOVEMENT. Any comparison between the P.L.O. and movements for national liberation is misleading. Take the Mau Mau of Kenya, the F.L.N. in Algeria, the Haganah in Palestine or the Congress Party in India: the common denominator of all of us was to get rid of a foreign ruler. None of us wanted to destroy a country, while the P.L.O. wants to destroy our state. To the extent they are gaining recognition it is a very ugly expression of appeasement. Those who recognize the legitimacy of the P.L.O. will hardly be able to complain against terrorism in The Hague, at La Guardia Airport, in Paris, Vienna or elsewhere. Either you rule it out, or you do not.
ON A PALESTINIAN SOLUTION. We took the West Bank from the Kingdom of Jordan in 1967 as the result of a successful counterattack against the Jordanian forces. What is now known as the Kingdom of Jordan is part and parcel of the historic land of Israel, or Palestine, and the British mandate applied to both banks [of the Jordan River]. It is more than two-thirds of the whole territory of historic Palestine. The ethnic group known today as Palestinian Arabs is divided between the East and West Banks. All the inhabitants of Jordan are Palestinians. If Jordan is courageous enough, and wants to resolve the interests of the Kingdom of Jordan and the question of the Palestinians, then the key is Jordan. We are ready to negotiate. I don't exclude the possibility that sooner or later the wiser of the Arab leaders will back negotiations between Jordan and Israel. I wouldn't exclude the possibility that some time in the future consultations between Jordan, Israel and the leaders of the West Bank can take place in order to find out in which way the self-identity of the Palestinians can be expressed.
ON NEGOTIATIONS WITH SYRIA.
The negotiations should be conducted according to Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 without preconditions. The Syrians can bring forward any questions they want to discuss. But what the Syrians are trying to do is to diminish the importance of the Geneva Peace Conference and impose the terms of any settlement in the Middle East by commanding a majority in the Security Council. The Arab regimes are using the Palestinian question as a pawn on their chessboard of rivalry and intrigue.
ON CHANGING THE U.N. MIDDLE EAST RESOLUTIONS. I know what those who suggest this have in mind, and we shall reject any attempt to modify the text or the meaning of Resolutions 242 and 338. If such a development takes place I shall recommend to the Israeli government to reconsider its commitments undertaken when we accepted 242 and 338. Instead of achieving progress, I'm afraid of a new stagnation.
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