The Angola Summit: Fight and Talk

"The situation there today is better than yesterday." So said President Ford last week during a visit to St. Louis when he was asked about the bloody civil war in Angola. The question was, better for whom? Militarily and diplomatically, the Soviet-backed Luanda government of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Angola (M.P.L.A.) appeared to be on the verge of some notable victories in what may very well be the turning point in the war. On the ground, it delivered a series of telling blows to one rival faction involved in the war, the U.S.-supported National Front for the Liberation of Angola (F.N.L.A.). Meanwhile, there was a strong chance that the M.P.L.A. might be recognized as the country's legitimate government by a majority of the 46 member states of the Organization of African Unity, which at week's end began an emergency summit in Addis Ababa to discuss Angola.

Warring Factions. At the session, Africa's leaders faced the most serious crisis of unity in the O.A.U.'s troubled twelve-year history. Last week Chad, Libya and Niger recognized the M.P.L.A. government; 22 African states--only two short of a majority--have now endorsed the leftist regime headed by Agostinho Neto. So far, no nation has recognized either the F.N.L.A. or its coalition partner, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), which are actively backed by the U.S., South Africa and Zaire. The current chairman of the O.A.U., Idi Amin of Uganda, as well as such influential African leaders as Kenya's Jomo Kenyatta and Zambia's Kenneth Kaunda, still hope to promote a government of national unity composed of Angola's three warring factions.

At week's end, that prospect seemed increasingly dim as M.P.L.A. forces, equipped by a massive Soviet airlift of arms and equipment and aided by some 7,500 Cuban soldiers, routed the F.N.L.A. in one battle after another on the northern front. The most important town to fall into M.P.L.A. hands was the provincial capital of Uige (formerly Carmona). Once considered impregnable, the F.N.L.A. stronghold was abandoned without a fight after an M.P.L.A. rocket assault. After the fall of Uige, the M.P.L.A. captured the nearby airfield of Ngage, which had been the F.N.L.A.'s major supply point for arms from neighboring Zaire. The M.P.L.A. claimed to have seized a string of towns in northern Angola, including Caracassala, Cangala, Samba and Vista Alegre. M.P.L.A. forces were also reported closing in on the seacoast city of Ambriz, the only port held by the F.N.L.A. If that city falls, some foreign intelligence sources predict, the F.N.L.A. may collapse entirely.

As the fighting grew, so did the toll in human suffering. International Red Cross officials last week said the civilian death toll alone may be as high as 100,000, although most estimates had been less than half that. In addition, the Red Cross said that "unknown thousands" have become refugees.

Against this backdrop, there were hints that Neto might be prepared to offer UNlTA's Joseph Savimbi a share in a two-way coalition government. Neto gets along well with Savimbi, and such a move might avoid further bloodshed, since UNITA commands enough tribal support in the south to deny the M.P.L.A. outright victory for some months and possibly longer.

Cosmetic Diplomacy. Such an offer to Savimbi would simplify matters for the O.A.U., which must decide whether to stick to its 1975 resolution supporting an Angolan government of national unity or go along with the "new realities." For many African leaders, the sticking point is South Africa's active support of the F.N.L.A.-UNITA forces--which, in fact, is the main reason why so many countries have recognized Neto's Luanda government. If South Africa agrees to withdraw its estimated 1,000 regulars and mercenaries from Angola, and if Neto proves willing to form a joint M.P.L.A.-UNITA government, it appears likely that the O.A.U. would overwhelmingly approve a resolution demanding a cease-fire and withdrawal of all foreign troops from Angola. Failing that, however, there were fears that the organization could be fatally split.

In Washington, one State Department official ruefully observed that almost the only bright light of the week was that the leaders of the F.N.L.A. "have yet to flee the country." In fact, Angola may prove to be a diplomatic debacle for the U.S. Its chosen client, Holden Roberto, is widely regarded in Africa and Europe as corrupt and inefficient. By seeming to side with the hated racist regime in Pretoria, Washington risked permanently alienating most Black African states.

President Ford did not help matters much by sending a personal letter to Nigeria's strongman, Brigadier Murtala Muhammad, and other African leaders arguing that the M.P.L.A. "should not be allowed to assume total power by force of Soviet and Cuban arms." At the same time, the letter appeared to justify South African involvement on the grounds of "national interest." Nigeria interpreted the letter, coming as it did on the eve of the O.A.U. summit, as a bullying tactic, and angrily branded the message "an insult to the intelligence of African nations." The Nigerian Herald devoted half of its front page to the headline TO HELL WITH AMERICA, and went on to denounce Ford's "double-quick march to the right wing" and Henry Kissinger's "cosmetic diplomacy."

On Their Own. Soviet and Cuban support for the M.P.L.A. has been on too massive a scale to allow for an F.N.L.A. victory even under the best of circumstances. Since early November, Soviet air force Antonov-22 cargo planes have mounted regular flights via Algeria to Maya-Maya in Congo-Brazzaville and directly to Henrique de Cavalho in northeastern Angola. Other airlifts have gone to Conakry and from there on to Angola. Supplies have included perhaps 300 Czechoslovak-made Tatra armored troop carriers, some 70 T-34 battle tanks, 50 PT-76 amphibious tanks and large quantities of SA-7 missiles, 122-mm. multiple-rocket launchers, wheel-mounted antitank recoilless guns, 3-in. mortars, heavy machine guns and AK-47 assault rifles.

This is by far the largest export of Soviet military equipment in recent years to a foreign area outside the Middle East. Last week the Pentagon was closely watching three Soviet ships--a guided-missile destroyer, a guided-missile cruiser and an amphibious-tank landing ship--which were moving near Angola. They are the first Russian naval vessels reported in the area since 1973.

The acknowledged U.S. effort to support the F.N.L.A.-UNITA alliance, by contrast, has amounted to $32 million, piped mostly through Zaire. Washington insists that it has absolutely no sanctioned plans to train or recruit Americans or foreigners for service in Angola, despite published rumors to the contrary. In fact, American military men have been seen piloting cargo planes and acting as so-called "observers" in Angola, but their official status could not be determined. The Pentagon insists that if Americans are fighting in Angola, they are mercenaries on their own.

In light of the weakening position of the F.N.L.A.-UNITA coalition, it seemed that the West's best hope would be to reduce Moscow's influence in Angola, or, in the words of one British government official, "to help the M.P.L.A. get the Russians off their back." In a recent interview with Paris' Le Monde, Neto declared that he does not want Angola to become a Russian satellite "just because the Soviet Union supplies us with weapons." One helpful first step would be to persuade the South Africans to withdraw their forces from the conflict. Last week there were renewed efforts by the U.S., Britain and Zambia to do just that. Once the Russians' propaganda card has been removed, opinion in the O.A.U. might be mobilized to support the withdrawal of all foreign forces--including the Russians and the Cubans. And although President Ford ruled out withholding American grain shipments as a means of pressuring the Russians, he also served notice to Moscow last week that continued Soviet intervention in Angola would damage "broader relations" with the U.S.

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