Monday, Oct. 06, 1975
'Israel Will Not Be the Party'
After ten days of talks and testimony in Washington, Israeli Defense Minister Shimon Peres returned home last week reasonably confident that the U.S. Congress will approve military aid to Israel totaling $1.8 billion this year. Yet an emotionally charged debate continues in and out of Washington on one item on Israel's shopping list: the Pershing missile, which has a nuclear potential. Although Jerusalem has never confirmed or denied it, U.S. intelligence experts assume that Israeli technicians have built about ten bulky A-bombs using the uranium that is a byproduct of the country's Dimona reactor. In an interview with TIME Diplomatic Editor Jerrold Schecter, Peres explained Israel's views:
ON MISSILES. When it comes to missiles, there are two different emphases. One is a weapon in case of war, and the other is a weapon to deter war. The Pershing is in the second category. The Russians have equipped three Arab nations, Syria, Egypt and Libya, with two types of ground-to-ground missiles: the short-range Frog and the medium-range Scud. The Lance is like the Frog, and the Pershing is like the Scud. In the overall considerations of how to avoid war, a balance of missilery can help. I look at the Pershing as a component of a strategy for deterrence, both psychologically and technologically. Also we are only asking for a token number of Pershings--fewer than 50.
ON NUCLEAR WARHEADS. You can deliver nuclear warheads with planes or ships. It is not important what vehicle carries them. Certainly, Israel will not be the party to introduce them into the Middle East. Quite candidly, our relations with the United States are as important as any weapon. We would not endanger these relations by introducing the sort of weapon that would create problems.
STRATEGIC BALANCES. The scales are even. I believe the Israeli army is still better motivated and trained [than the Arab forces]. If it has the same generation of technology as the Arabs, it will be able both to deter and to cope.
At present, and for the next two to three years, the physical ratio of the number of weapons that can reach the front from the Arab nations bordering on Israel and from the expeditionary forces of other Arab countries is 3 to 1 in favor of the Arabs. If you take into account all the weapons the Arabs have, the ratio is more difficult. While the Israelis are outnumbered by the combined Arab armies in manpower and weaponry, U.S. military experts believe that the generally superior quality of their equipment and training still gives them an edge, especially in the air.
ENDING THE ARMS RACE. I positively believe this may happen in the next ten to 15 years, for a combination of social, economic, technological and political reasons. The social changes in the Middle East are basically toward urbanization. The population centers are growing. People's expectations are forcing Arab governments to shift their orientation from war to the pressing issues of domestic improvement. Economically, the price of arms is becoming prohibitive. A military aircraft that cost $1 million ten years ago costs $20 million today. Even if you produce oil, there is a limit to what you can spend for weapons. Militarily, the destructive power of modern weapons is so great that even the winner will have to pay so heavily for a war that no triumph will ever justify the cost in human terms.
Strategic Line-Up
Manpower Planes Tanks Artillery Egypt 857,500 500 1,975 1,500 Syria 280,000 400 1,470 775 Iraq 385,000 247 1,290 750 Jordan 110,250 42 440 231 Arab 1,632,750 1,189 5,175 2,256 Total Israel 606,000 461 4,865 860 SOURCE: INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STRATEGIC STUDIES
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