The Deal That Haunts Moscow

Moscow's timing was extraordinary.

As Congress was in the final hours of polishing a major trade bill, which the Soviets and the Administration had sought for two years, the Russians proclaimed last week that they had not, after all, agreed to the crucial compromise that had made the deal possible.

That key issue was the demand by Senator Henry Jackson, who had wide bipartisan backing in Congress, that the Soviets liberalize their emigration policy. Though the Jackson Amendment nominally applies to most Communist countries, the principal beneficiaries would be Soviet Jews. In October, after long and delicate bargaining, Jackson announced that a breakthrough had been achieved. The trade bill would grant the Soviets most-favored-nation status and other trade concessions. It was understood that Moscow would reduce impediments to emigration, and Jackson said he regarded 60,000 departures a year as a "benchmark" goal.

Cold Wind. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger originally opposed Jackson's stipulation as an intrusion in another power's internal affairs, which it plainly was. Nonetheless, Kissinger negotiated with Soviet leaders on the subject, since improving commercial relations is part of his policy of detente. He elicited verbal assurances on emigration, though he declined to use figures and pointed out that the Russians had not entered into any formal agreement.

Still, Washington was unprepared for last week's cold wind from Moscow. Tass, the official news agency, announced that "leading circles in the Soviet Union" had flatly rejected American insistence upon easier emigration as an unacceptable meddling in the "internal affairs" of the nation. Tass also released a harshly worded letter that Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko had earlier given to Kissinger. Gromyko charged that the Jackson-Kissinger correspondence on the emigration question, released by the Senator, gave a "distorted picture" of the Soviet position.

The Soviets, however, were careful not to turn down the American trade concessions, which they obviously want badly. In fact, they followed up with a protest against a $300 million limit on credits imposed by Congress.

Nor did the Russians say explicitly that they would retrench on emigration. The real problem for the Russians, U.S. experts decided, was that the Kremlin did not want the two points to appear to be linked, as of course they were.

One likely explanation for the strong statement was that Soviet Party Leader Leonid Brezhnev had to quiet some of his colleagues on the Politburo and the Central Committee who have accused him of giving away too much to the

Americans. Brezhnev may also have been trying to curry favor with the Arabs, who have been alarmed by the emigration of Soviet Jews to Israel during the past few years.

Kissinger had already experienced a preview of Brezhnev's distress. Five days after the Jackson announcement, Kissinger was in Moscow to discuss arms control. The usually cool party leader pounded the table as he accused Kissinger of losing control of Jackson. Kissinger was upset by the scene. At one point, he asked aides who had accompanied him: "What would you do if I started foaming at the mouth?"

After the blast from Tass, Jackson and his allies in Congress calmly suggested that the Soviets were merely engaging in some "face saving." Indeed, the members of the Senate-House conference committee considering the wording of the final bill acted as though nothing had happened. They quickly approved the legislation, which was passed the next day by both houses.

One complicating point in judging the Russians' policy on emigration in the months to come may turn out to be the fact that the number of Soviets applying to leave the country is declining, as Gromyko pointed out. The threat of renewed war in the Middle East, reports of harsh living conditions in Israel and selective harassment of applicants by Soviet officials have discouraged many Soviet Jews. Applications to leave are now running at a rate of about only 1,000 per month, according to the Russians. Even so, there are still 130,000 applications in the pipeline, and the Soviets are obviously reluctant to speed up the processing. This year only 20,000 persons have been allowed to emigrate, compared with 34,000 in 1973.

Predictable Strains. Eighteen months from now, Congress will assess the Soviet handling of emigration and decide whether to continue the trade benefits. That appraisal will fall in the middle of an election year, raising the possibility that it could become an emotional issue in domestic politics--and in any Jackson presidential campaign.

Writing last week in the Washington Post about the realities of detente, George F. Kennan, 70, the distinguished expert on Soviet affairs, urged "restraint, thoughtfulness and forbearance" in dealing with the Russians. He warned that the U.S. should not make the mistake of assuming that the Kremlin had no other place to turn for help in solving its problems. Concluded Kennan: "The predictable strains of the coming year upon ourselves and our European allies are such that we are going to need, and should value at full worth, the best possible background of relations with the Soviet Union as a starting point."

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