Technopolitics in the Air

Europeans call it the arms deal of the century--and they may well be right. Some time this year, Belgium, Denmark, The Netherlands and Norway--four NATO nations acting as a consortium --will buy more than 350 new jet fighters to replace warplanes bought in the 1960s. France and the U.S. are battling fiercely for this sale because the eventual stakes are enormous. The consortium's purchase, involving an investment of at least $1.7 billion, is only the tip of a lucrative iceberg: a worldwide market for thousands of jets, spare parts and maintenance contracts worth more than $20 billion over the next decade.

The NATO consortium has been looking for a supersonic fighter capable of several missions: high-flying interception, close-in ground support and the interdiction of small warships near coasts. Above all, the purchasers want a plane they can afford to buy in quantity.

Pressures and Intrigue. Initially, five planes were competing for the consortium's order. They were SEPECAT's (a British-French joint company) Jaguar, Saab-Scania's Viggen from Sweden, France's Mirage F1/M53 made by Dassault-Brequet, and two U.S. products: General Dynamics' single-engine YF-16 and Northrop's twin-engine YF-17, nicknamed the Cobra.

The Jaguar was quickly eliminated because it is not fast enough (1.5 Mach). The Viggen stands little chance of being chosen because the NATO purchasers do not want to rely on the neutral Swedes for so important a component of their national arsenals. This left the French and Americans, whose planes are comparable in size, speed and cost. All three compete favorably with the Soviet Union's new MIG-23 Flogger and even with the MIG-25 Foxbat at altitudes up to 50,000 ft. Still, there are major differences (see chart).

The merits of the French and American planes, however, will not be the major consideration when the consortium decides. Instead, the four nations will be swayed by what one Pentagon official calls "technopolitics"--a combination of economics, political pressure and diplomatic intrigue. Both Paris and Washington appear willing to make lucrative concessions to the purchasers. They have promised, for example, that much of the fabrication and assembly of the fighters would be in the factories of the consortium nations. The French, who now trail only the Americans and the Russians as a purveyor of the military hardware to the world, have been imploring the Belgians to consider their historical links with France. They reportedly have assured the Dutch that if they buy the Mirage, Paris will help clean the polluted Rhine and increase purchases of food products from The Netherlands. As in the past, the French have been raising the bogey of American dominance, arguing that if the YF-16 or YF-17 is chosen, Europe's aerospace industry may die. Certainly France's aircraft industry (employing 107,000 workers) and balance of payments will suffer if it loses the sale.

The U.S., admits a Commerce Department official, has also "been pushing like hell." Washington has hinted that it may have to reduce the number of U.S. forces based in Europe (currently 300,000) if the NATO countries decide not to buy American. U.S. officials also point out that, since France withdrew from NATO's integrated command eight years ago, it has shown little interest in the alliance's affairs.

As a further inducement, the Defense Department recently demonstrated its own faith in the quality of the U.S. fighters, announcing that it would incorporate either the YF-16 or YF-17 into the U.S. Air Force inventory for the '80s. Officially, at least, the Pentagon is neutral in the sales battle between General Dynamics and Northrop, but Washington experts concede that the latter company seems to be doing the harder sales job. Northrop has picked up considerable expertise in selling its planes abroad, notably the widely popular F5. While developing the YF-17, the Los Angeles-based firm has worked closely with some of its potential customers, asking them what they wanted included in the final product. It also understands the highly competitive nature of the arms-sale business. "Northrop pulls an awful lot of dirty tricks," observes an Air Force officer dryly.

Sales Battle. Last week Defense Ministers from the consortium's nations visited Washington to talk with Defense Secretary James Schlesinger. Earlier they had been flown to Edwards Air Force Base in California where they watched test flights of the YF-16 and YF-17. A fortnight ago the ministers met with French officials. The chances are good that their choice, eventually, will be American. As a Dassault executive observes: "France does not exert the same political pressure as the U.S. or wield its economic influence." It is possible, however, that the consortium could split, with Belgium buying the Mirage and the three others choosing either the YF-16 or YF-17, depending on which plane the U.S. Air Force buys. That would be a blow to NATO'S efforts at standardizing its armaments. But it would mean that the lucky winner of the sales battle could produce enough of the jets to lower unit costs further, thus making it likely that America will garner most of the potential market for new warplanes in Western Europe, the Middle East and Latin America.

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