Schlesinger and the Resupply Crisis

Defense Secretary James Schlesinger was asked by TIME Diplomatic Editor Jerrold L. Schecter to recount the Department of Defense's role in the decisions to ship U.S. arms to Israel during the Yom Kippur War. The Defense Secretary's version of that critical week's decisive events:

There were two premises to our initial policy: that Israel would quickly defeat its foes, and that the U.S. should maintain a low profile and avoid visible involvement. While from the outset it was agreed that we would supply munitions and major equipment replacements to Israel, it was specifically directed that the Military Airlift Command (MAC) would not deliver supplies.

Within a few days it became apparent that the Israelis could not win quickly and were having difficulties chartering commercial cargo planes for the resupply operation. On Wednesday, Oct. 10, the Department of Transportation was asked to help the Israelis find air charters. On that same day the Russian airlift to the Arabs began. On Thursday I instructed MAC to make plans for the possible use of large military aircraft such as the C-5A, because I anticipated that there might be a change in national policy. The Defense Department also urged immediate representation to the Portuguese asking permission to use their base on Lajes in the Azores.

On Friday, in a policy change, I was authorized to send military aircraft to Lajes, where the supplies our planes would carry could be transferred to Israeli aircraft flying into a civilian airfield on another island. Logistically, the transshipment would have been a nightmare. We still did not have the permission of Portugal. That night I was in bed when Dr. Kissinger called about midnight. He was highly distressed about the military developments in the Middle East. I got dressed and came to the Pentagon immediately. At 2:30 a.m. I decided that there was no other alternative than to use our military airlift all the way to Israel, and I obtained the approval of the White House. I ordered the aircraft launched immediately--a calculated risk, since we still did not have the approval of Portugal and did not get it until Saturday afternoon. I think that the performance of our people was magnificent. Were it not for the MAC there is some question whether Israel would have survived. Despite problems of logistics and weather, the first of our aircraft touched down in Tel Aviv Sunday afternoon.

Your suggestion that the Department of Defense was seen to be dragging its heels in resupplying Israel is wrong; there is a difference between dragging your heels and having your shoes nailed to the floor by national policy. Also wrong is any suggestion that the Defense Department was slow in implementing the charter policy and that I was admonished by Kissinger for not taking charge of the resupply effort. I don't recall any such thing. It strikes me as preposterous.

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