No Doubts About Who's in Charge

The remarkable jet shuttle between Aswan and Jerusalem that Secretary of State Henry Kissinger employed to achieve an Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement was distinctively different at either end. At the Israeli terminus, Kissinger often had to await a consensus on issues in the talks among the members of Premier Golda Meir's Cabinet. On the Egyptian end, in contrast, he essentially dealt only with President Anwar Sadat. The Egyptian President has so improved his stature since taking uncertain control of the government on the death of Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1970 that he was able to accept or turn down every decision himself.

Heikal's Fall. Any doubts about the scope of Sadat's power were settled last week when al Ahram, Egypt's most prestigious newspaper, appeared without the familiar column of Editor Mohammed Hassanein Heikal, 50. Heikal's "Frankly Speaking" column customarily appeared on Friday-the equivalent of a Western paper's Sunday issue -when al Ahram's circulation soared to 772,000. That increase was at least in part due to the column, since the Arab world read Heikal as the semiofficial spokesman of Cairo's government. Sadat not only fired Heikal from the chairman-editor post he had held for almost 20 years, but offered him as an alternative no more than a post as presidential press adviser.

Heikal's fall from the top of the 100-year-old al Ahram (The Pyramids in Arabic) had important political overtones. The granite-faced Heikal rose to power because of an early friendship with President Gamal Abdel Nasser. He was the spokesman and interpreter of Nasser and the Arab socialism that the late President introduced into Egypt; even after Nasser's death and Sadat's succession, Heikal and al Ahram retained a special status and authority. But in recent months Heikal's foreign policy pronouncements began to differ from Sadat's apparent aims. For instance, while Sadat has been making overtures to reestablish Egyptian friendship with the U.S., Heikal's last column on Feb. 1 accused Washington of undermining Egypt's political role and disrupting Arab unity. The voice of al Ahram obviously was no longer speaking for the government. After Heikal was fired, government spokesmen explained that he had tried to build "a state within a state" and turn "the Ahram Building into a new center of power."

Heikal, in an interview with TIME last week at the editor's Nileside apartment, blamed his disagreement with Sadat on Watergate. Chewing his inevitable cigar, he said: "Nixon is busy defending himself, and I doubt that he has the strength to force Israel to give up enough for an acceptable peace settlement. I greatly admire the abilities and intentions of Henry Kissinger, but even a man as brilliant as the Secretary of State cannot rise above a country's institutions." Because of his doubts over Nixon, said Heikal, "I began to differ with Sadat about the pace with which we were putting all our trust in Nixon. I believe we should retain our options, making concessions only bit by bit, but never putting all our eggs into one basket. I was afraid we were moving too fast. I know many thought my editorials were part of a maneuver. But rightly or wrongly, it was a genuine position that I took."

He was not surprised by his abrupt removal from al Ahram. "I knew it was inevitable. But I felt that if I didn't speak out, I would be betraying my profession. Now I have expressed my viewpoint, and I have taken the consequences."

As surprising as Heikal's discharge was Sadat's choice of a successor. The job went to Ali Amin, 59, former co-publisher with his twin brother Mustafa of the rival al Akhbar, who only last month returned to Egypt from a nine-year self-imposed exile I in London. Amin, often attacked as too pro-Western, had refused to come home as a protest against the imprisonment of his brother by Nasser on charges of handing over state secrets to the CIA. Mustafa Amin was recently freed on Sadat's orders, together with a number of political prisoners. Among them was former War Minister Mohammed Fawzi, jailed in 1971 for allegedly attempting to overthrow Sadat.

The ease with which Sadat could topple Heikal or free old conspirators indicates how much popularity Egypt's placid President now enjoys. Sadat has skillfully neutralized all of the political opponents who challenged him for power in the hiatus that followed Nasser's death. But what finally propelled him to his current eminence was Egypt's successful prosecution of the October War with Israel. Sadat has now begun to utilize that power both at home and outside Egypt.

Broad Mover. Domestically, Sadat intends to alter Egypt's economic stance in order to help a population that stands at 36 million and increases by 750,000 more every year. For the past year, he has been both President and Premier, but he is now ready to relinquish the premiership as part of a broad move to a peacetime economy. His aim is to temper Arab socialism with more Western-style free enterprise.

Sadat wants to attract not only Western capital but also the oil money flowing into the Arab world in rapidly increasing amounts. Foreign capital is being enticed by such moves as Sadat's recent decision to sign a World Bank agreement that protects foreign investors against losses from nationalization. Plans have been drawn up to turn Port Said into a free-trade zone and make it "the Hong Kong of the West." Cairenes, accustomed to seeing photographs of their President posing with visiting Arab and Soviet politicians, were astonished last week to see him greeting Chase Manhattan Bank Chairman David Rockefeller, in Cairo to execute an $80 million loan for Egypt's proposed Sumed pipeline and also to arrange for new offices there.

The revamping of socialism at home is already having rippling effects elsewhere. Sadat's moves, for instance, are making it easier for Syrian President Hafez Assad to convince his Baathist regime to relax restrictions on the private investment that Damascus also needs. More significantly, Sadat is finally reclaiming the Arab leadership that Egyptians had traditionally enjoyed and Nasser once held. Nasser's charisma, however, worked mainly on the masses, many of whom still listen to broadcasts of his old speeches (some of them insist that he is well and living in the Soviet Union and that he will one day return). Sadat's approach is more to the Arab leaders with whom Nasser constantly quarreled. Unlike Socialist Nasser, Sadat is willing to deal with any form of government, and he goes out of his way to create unity and avoid arguments. When Libya's Muammar Gaddafi pulled his representatives out of Cairo to protest Sadat's cease-fire with Israel, Sadat's aides pleaded with the President to respond. "We could cut Gaddafi to pieces with propaganda," insisted one. Sadat refused, however, and so far has publicly ignored Gaddafi's attacks. Nasser's picture still hangs beside that of Sadat in most government offices, and Sadat and other government officials continue to praise Nasser in public. But in private many officials say: "But of course Nasser made many mistakes. Things are different now."

Sadat still faces hazards. One is that by relaxing state controls he may transform Egyptian life more than he intends. Says one critic: "How can you have freedom for foreign capital without freedom for local capital? How can you give freedom to the capitalist without giving freedom to the trade unions?" Regionally, Sadat's new friendship with Washington is fine as long as Israel continues to withdraw from Egyptian territory. But if the Israelis balk, Sadat at future Arab councils is likely to find himself the target rather than the central force.

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