An International Natural Resource

Amidst the swirling uncertainties of the White House, one man pursues his remarkable rounds unafraid of the past or the future.

Henry Kissinger in many ways is still more presidential aide than Secretary of State. He seems to fit a little better back in his corner office of the White House West Wing. He is almost too short (5 ft. 8 in.), and his double chin gets out of control too easily (much to his distress) for him to look the part of a bona fide Secretary. Most important, he still relishes the simplified atmosphere of the White House, where he can hang up the gilded epaulets of the State Department, roll up his sleeves, and work in the air of pure power.

Whatever he is in America, Kissinger is more than that abroad. He has become a kind of international natural resource, bits and pieces of him claimed by a global fraternity of presidents, kings, prime ministers and chairmen. His word is accepted by them all, his presence in delicate negotiations demanded, his humor welcomed. Even his girl friends are the objects of muted admiration.

One morning last week he steamed into the White House in the predawn dark to start another day of his three careers: aide, diplomat, personal confidant. He swept through the lobby greeting secretaries and settled at his table in front of the tall windows to address a soft-boiled egg and black coffee.

The old professor in him has abandoned some notions about how the world works. "I tended to think of history run by impersonal forces," he mused. "But when you see it in practice you see the differences that the personalities make. The overtures to China would not have worked without Chou Enlai. There would have been no settlement in the Middle East without Sadat and Golda Meir and Dayan."

Kissinger is convinced that the men and women who run the world are dedicated to improving the lot of their people rather than solely amassing personal power. Of course the two mix in curious ways, but Kissinger has always been able to find what he believes to be the human heart and soul that are often disguised by tough-looking nationalistic exteriors.

In his first two trips to the Middle East, Kissinger tried not to talk specifics, only concepts--the conduct of the war, the general philosophy of the Middle East. He also tried to inject trust. "I always tell them the truth. They know that I will do what I say." He did something else. When either side asked him to advance Proposition A on its behalf and, if rejected, to settle for Proposition B, he refused. "The other side will think I am your lawyer," he told his hosts. "Give me one position. Tell me what you believe."

One of the first questions that he raised with the Egyptians was whether Sadat would insist on a short-range demand --a move back to the Oct. 22 lines--or reach beyond that for a qualitative change. Sadat did not hesitate: reach out.

One luncheon in Syria opened with jokes about his girl friends. What is Jill St. John really like? "I'll tell you what," said Kissinger. ".You lift the oil embargo and I'll give you three phone numbers. [Pause.] On second thought, that is no deal. You can put the embargo back any time you want, but if I give you the phone numbers I can't get them back."

There came the day when Sadat asked that the road to Suez City be opened because it was his daughter's wedding day, a request more personal than official. Kissinger took it to the Israelis, who granted it. Then there was the time when the Israelis wanted to send a party, accompanied by rabbis, to retrieve the bodies of some of their dead soldiers from Egyptian soil. The request might have been laughed at earlier, but found immediate sympathy and was approved.

Not even in the midst of such intensive action as the Middle East negotiations does Kissinger neglect his other obligations. Aware of the Soviet Union's interest, he penned five personal letters to a concerned Premier Aleksei Kosygin, keeping him up to date on developments. Kissinger also added a couple of new items to his developing handbook of international diplomacy:

> When making concessions in a supercharged atmosphere, make them two days before they become inevitable and give 10% more than asked. The response to such unexpected generosity is amazing.

> Travel by jet. Had the trip between Aswan and Tel Aviv been in a prop plane (five hours) instead of a jet (two hours) the chances for misgiving and delay would have risen.

Kissinger failed in one effort in the Middle East. He had wanted to be airborne when the treaty was signed at Kilometer 101 so that he would not be physically in either country and open to charges of favoritism (like the raft in midstream at Tilsit?). But a delay in the signing made it impossible; he was with Sadat. Successful or not, it was the kind of personal touch that has helped Henry Kissinger to stand out in these dark times.

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