Can Henry Fire Nixon?

The relationship between President Nixon and his Secretary of State is currently one of the more fascinating force fields in the world. In a witty, acerbic speech to the Women's National Democratic Club in Washington, Thomas Hughes, a former Assistant Secretary of State and currently the president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, last week gave a rather special and caustic view of Kissinger and Nixon --and their present dilemmas.

"Both were incurably covert, but Kissinger was charming about it," Hughes said, beginning a litany of yes-buts. "Both abhorred bureaucracy, but Nixon was reclusive about it. Both engaged in double talk, but Kissinger was often convincing. Both were inveterate manipulators, but Nixon was more transparent. Both were deeply suspicious, but Kissinger was irrepressibly gregarious. Neither was widely admired for truthfulness, but Kissinger excelled at articulation. Neither worshiped the First Amendment, but Kissinger mesmerized the press."

Noting Kissinger's admiration for Bismarck, Hughes observed that the two men shared three characteristics: "their similar personal attributes, their special sense of sincerity, and their addiction for compensatory politics," that is, persuading liberals to carry out conservative policies and conservatives to adopt liberal stances. As for sincerity, Hughes used the term somewhat sarcastically: "In his study on Bismarck, Kissinger is full of intuitive insight: 'Sincerity has meaning only in reference to a standard of truth of conduct. The root fact of Bismarck's personality, however, was his incapacity to comprehend any such standard outside his will. It was not that Bismarck lied ... this is much too self-conscious an act-but that he was finely attuned to the subtlest currents of any environment and produced measures precisely adjusted to the need to prevail. The key to Bismarck's success was that he was always sincere.' "

Tarnished President. Hughes, who made it clear that he was speaking only for himself and not for his foundation, summed up many of the criticisms of Kissinger's diplomacy. He accused the Secretary of State of mishandling relations with Japan and Europe. "As for Southeast Asia, we, like the Romans of Tacitus, seem to have made a desert and called it peace. Considering all this, maybe half the Nobel Peace Prize [which Kissinger shared with Le Due Tho, the North Vietnamese negotiator] was about right." Hughes went on: "As long as Nixon continues in office, we can expect him to do what comes naturally-overreact in all directions ... There is nothing further that Nixon can add to the formulation and conduct of American foreign policy for the next three years that can't be done better without him. For his remaining time in the White House, he has to be regarded as a foreign policy problem, not a foreign policy asset."

The President has the constitutional power to hire and fire his subordinates. But Kissinger, argues Hughes, because of Watergate and his personal stature, can, in effect, fire the President. "Nixon's fate is to some extent in Kissinger's hands. If Kissinger should resign or be relieved, Nixon would almost certainly follow."

Sooner or later, Hughes concludes, Kissinger will have to do something about his relationship with a tarnished President, and "consciously determine the degree to which he will remain the day-to-day legitimatizer of a regime that would be conclusively recognized as illegitimate without his continuing endorsement." He will have to decide "when to stop being used. His choices cannot much longer remain hidden. At the end of the day he will almost certainly have to choose between Nixon and the country."

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