Sadat's Plan: Nationalist and Sober

How does Egypt see the cease-fire and the peace negotiations that lie ahead? TIME Diplomatic Editor Jerrold Schecter, who spent much of the past four weeks in Cairo, wrote this analysis of the attitude of President Anwar Sadat and his countrymen:

"Israel is like a man balancing on one foot. The other foot must come down soon because Israel cannot remain in a state of full mobilization forever." So says Ashraf Ghorbal, Egypt's newly named ambassador to Washington. Ghorbal, who was Sadat's press adviser, speaks with some authority. Egypt feels that the Arab world has purged itself of the shame and humiliation of June 1967. Yet the Egyptians have not become arrogant. There is still self-doubt, expressed in mercurial shifts of public mood that ranges from a grim belief that war must resume to soaring projections about the potentials of peace. Through it all, the Egyptians have retained their traditional tolerance, indolence and humor. Until the cease-fire checkpoints were turned over to UNEF, a favorite Cairo joke was that all the food going to the city of Suez was being prepared under kosher conditions because it had to pass Israeli inspection.

Egypt First. President Sadat and the men around him are nationalists, not Nasserists. Their revolution is over. "Unlike Nasser, Sadat does not lead us to the brink and then abandon us. He has a plan about where he wants to take us, and it is realizable," says an Egyptian editor. Above all, the Egyptians are proud that Sadat is following an Egypt-first policy and that he has defined Egypt's national interest. In contrast to Nasser, who was dedicated to a vague ideal of Arab unity, Sadat is trying to lead the Arab world by pursuing specific economic policies that meet his country's pressing needs.

The Egyptians are prepared to develop step-by-step progress in peace talks with Israel that could break the complex Middle East stalemate. The phased pattern: first solve Sinai and the Suez Canal, then Sharm el Sheikh, Gaza, the Palestinian question, the Golan Heights and, finally, Jerusalem. Egypt will not settle for less than the return of all its territories, but Sadat is willing to provide the kind of guarantees that Israel has long demanded. Free navigation in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aqaba, a nonrevocable international force at Sharm el Sheikh and even Israeli purchase of Sinai oil--all are possible once Egyptian sovereignty over its Israeli-occupied territories is recognized.

The Egyptians privately agree that their problems are easier to solve than those of the Syrians and Palestinians. The Egyptians are prepared to negotiate with Israel because they have their own design for the region, growing out of the need for economic development and accommodation of a population explosion. If its present birth rate continues, Egypt, which now has a population of 36 million, will be a nation of 50 million in 1980. The men around Sadat see Egypt as the natural leader of the emerging Middle East; they are willing to accept Israel as a member state in this emerging supernation--if Israel is willing to be part of the Middle East, rather than continue as an armed outsider oriented toward Western Europe and the U.S.

Another of Sadat's problems is to reconcile the Moslem extremism of Saudi Arabia's King Feisal and Libya's Muammar Gaddafi--who last week bitterly attacked his erstwhile Egyptian ally for agreeing to a cease-fire--with the revolutionary ardor of Marxist Arab leaders like Houari Boumedienne of Algeria. In fact, Egypt's leadership hopes that an Arab summit meeting prior to the start of the peace talks in December can be postponed.

By keeping channels open to the U.S., despite American military aid to Israel, Sadat has developed a strong position for the forthcoming peace talks. He has committed the U.S. and cornered the Russians. Although Sadat hails Soviet Party Leader Leonid Brezhnev as a friend, many Egyptians privately indicate that their long-range problem is to find a role in the Middle East for the Soviet Union. The Russian relationship with Egypt is one based on necessity. The Egyptians need Russian weapons but spurn the Soviet political system and lust for economic domination.

In short, Moscow's role has become that of a spurned suitor who continues courting in order to save face. "How can the U.S. say it is defending the Middle East against Communism when we told the Russians to get out in 1972?" asks a high-ranking Egyptian official. The main thrust of Egyptian policy is toward improving relations with the U.S.--in return for American pressure on Israel.

The policy is not based merely on oil blackmail. Egypt is desperate for economic development. Even during the war, representatives of American oil companies and hotel chains were in Cairo working on projects for oil exploration and tourism. The Egyptians know American technology, and the Egyptian elite has largely been educated at American universities. The men around Sadat are pro-American, in the sense that they see improved ties with the U.S. as Egypt's best hope for the future. There is a sense that American foreign policy will prevail, despite Nixon's domestic crisis, and that the U.S. will remain strong enough to deal with the Russians and Western Europe. At the same time, it is hoped that the U.S. will reduce its support of Israel.

Sadat has bought time--at least six months to a year--for himself and his policies. But during this period he will have to show progress toward achieving the return of Egypt's territories. Reopening the Suez Canal would be a vital first step in increasing his personal stature. A strong Sadat, many Egyptians believe, is Israel's best assurance of a politically guaranteed peace. "We are sober and collected. We are not hysterical but we cannot return to a frozen situation. We cannot play hide-and-seek any longer," says Ghorbal. "We must go to peace or all will go to pieces."

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