Rift Among Friends, Reflection About Foes

Like an earthquake, the fighting in the Middle East has sent tremors round the world and caused diplomatic seismographs to quiver in Washington and Moscow--and most of the capitals in between. Old alliances have been shaken, and new accommodations have proved less durable than they were advertised to be. In the following stories TIME examines the impact of the war on an old alliance, the NATO pact, and on a new understanding, the Soviet-American detente.

A Dogfight in the Atlantic Alliance

One casualty of the Middle East war may be a bystander--the Atlantic Alliance. Driven apart by divergent policies toward the war, the U.S. and its European allies have spoken to one another in words more appropriate to enemies than friends. Although both sides of the Atlantic busily and belatedly tried to patch things up last week, the damage to the 24-year-old NATO alliance, which was already showing signs of wear, may be lasting. "There's a lot of dust floating around," says a ranking Italian official, "and it's going to take a long time to settle."

Bill of Complaints. Most of the dust was kicked up by the Nixon Administration, which felt angered and betrayed by the failure of America's European allies to support the U.S. in backing Israel--and said so. To begin with, Washington was incensed by the fact that Prime Minister Edward Heath declined to let Britain propose an American-initiated cease-fire resolution in the United Nations. When the giant U.S. airlift to Israel began, several European countries pointedly told Washington that American transport planes could neither refuel in their territory, even at American airbases, nor fly over it. Portugal alone cooperated, allowing the U.S. aerial convoy to touch down at Lajes Field in the Azores for refueling.

The flat no from allies was only the beginning of Washington's bill of complaints. Bonn made it clear that it did not much like the U.S.'s supplying Israel through West German ports but it did nothing to stop the flow so long as the fighting was going on. Once the cease-fire was announced, however, Chancellor Willy Brandt's West German government politely asked the U.S. to quit using its ports. Finally, embarrassed by a reporter's inquiry about an Israeli ship that was loading arms at Bremerhaven, West German Foreign Ministry State Secretary Paul Frank told U.S. Minister Frank Cash that the U.S. could no longer use German ports in the resupply effort. In a breach of protocol, Bonn publicly announced its refusal.

The German rebuff, on top of everything else, triggered a viscerally angry response in Washington. State Department Spokesman Robert McCloskey complained that America's friends were "trying to separate themselves from us publicly." Henry Kissinger exploded. "I don't care what happens to NATO, I'm so disgusted," the new Secretary of State reportedly said. The State Department later denied that Kissinger had used the word disgusted to describe his feelings about the Atlantic allies. Whether he did or not, disgust was clearly the official sentiment in Washington.

"There has been a propensity to lean on the U.S.," insisted one Defense official. "The Europeans cannot use the U.S. as a crutch and pretend they don't have a contribution to make. The U.S. cannot tolerate half of an involvement." The allies, he added, should look beyond their own myopic, regional interests and realize that in the long run, American actions in the Middle East will keep Arab oil out of the clutches of the Russians. The allies are mistaken, he noted further, if they think American forces in Europe are committed only to NATO. In fact, he said, they are available to counter threats outside NATO'S geographic area.

Although stunned by the harsh American response, the Europeans were not too stunned to offer angry rebuttal. In the first place, complained the Europeans, Washington was insensitive to the Continent's particular oil crisis. The Arab cutback will mean inconvenience and some discomfort for the U.S., which gets only 11% of its oil from the Middle East. For Europe, which imports 72% of its oil from the area, a cutback may mean mass unemployment and economic catastrophe.

In the second place, they argued, Washington had failed to offer them even minimal consultation on what it was up to, particularly before the worldwide alert of American forces. "To put it crudely, we didn't know what in the hell was going on," says a leading Whitehall official. "The alert may have been sensible, but for all we knew it might have meant that the Russians were about to steamroller across Western Europe."

Zero for Conduct. The Europeans were almost equally upset by Washington's implicit argument that the U.S. somehow knows best. The U.S., said the Frankfurter Rundschau, has a peculiar definition of partnership, "namely, that one side makes the decisions and the other obeys." Added the Sunday Times of London: "It has never been a term of NATO membership that European governments should support the Zionist imperatives weighing upon American Presidents." The paper was referring to the common European belief that because of the Jewish vote, the U.S. has been blindly one-sided in its support of Israel. "It is unthinkable that Europe should say amen to all American initiatives," said Andre Fontaine, editor in chief of Le Monde. "Europe must forge its own unity if it is to make its weight felt." Le Monde itself complained that the U.S. had acted toward Europe like a school child who had scored a zero for conduct.

Even American experts were disturbed by Washington's unprecedented lashing of its allies. "The policy pursued by the U.S. has hurt in the most fundamental sense U.S. relations with Europe," says Columbia University Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski. "It is difficult to imagine a course more calculated to damage alliance relationships than the one followed by the U.S. in recent days."

How deep and how permanent is the rift? Karl Dietrich Bracher, a respected West German political scientist, thinks it can be easily healed. "Many present commentaries seem overpessimistic and overlook reciprocal interests," he says. "A serious showdown between Europe and the U.S. seems to be a purely theoretical issue." From the other side of the Atlantic, there was a feeling that bygones ought to be bygones. "We have made our point," says one State Department official. "We have shown our anger. Now we can go on with business."

Less Friendly. Business no doubt will go on--but perhaps in a somewhat less friendly way. Unquestionably the wrench in the alliance is more severe than at any point since 1956, when Britain and France, along with Israel, invaded Egypt to regain control of the Suez Canal. The U.S., working through the United Nations General Assembly, forced them to retreat. The partnership eventually recovered from that wound, but it took a long time. The convalescence this time may be even longer. The Europeans are far stronger economically than they were in 1956, and the U.S. is, relatively speaking, far weaker. Partly because of President Nixon's initiatives toward detente, the Europeans are less afraid of the Russians. Also partly because of detente, they are less trusting of the U.S., which they feel has gone over their heads to talk to Moscow.

Until now. Western European economic cooperation has not resulted in much political unity. The current dispute with the U.S. may bring that about. Dusting off an old idea of Charles de Gaulle's, French President Georges Pompidou last week called for a summit conference of the nine Common Market members before the end of the year, to be followed by regular consultations between the heads of government.

The initial reaction from other European governments was favorable, and Denmark invited the leaders to meet in Copenhagen next month. Washington has often complained about the lack of a common European voice. But the U.S. may be disappointed when the Europeans do start to speak as one, particularly if they turn against the U.S., as they undoubtedly would have done on the Middle East.

The U.S. has created a situation, says John Tuthill, director of the Paris-based Atlantic Institute of International Affairs, "in which we may be pushing the Europeans to unite, but to unite against us, not with us." Months ago, Kissinger talked of 1973 as "the Year of Europe." He meant that after the war in Viet Nam, the U.S. and Europe would begin a new dialogue. That dialogue is now beginning, although perhaps not quite as Kissinger intended.

This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so reader's discretion is required.