Trading Territory for Security?

If achieving a cease-fire in the Middle East seemed difficult, the task of creating a permanent peace can only be described as herculean. After a quarter-century of hostility, the hatreds on both sides seem to be the region's most permanent landmarks.

Yet, paradoxically, the Yom Kippur War may have left in its wake more possibilities for peace than existed before.

For one thing, the rest of the world--particularly the U.S. and the Soviet Union--seemed more determined than ever before that hostilities finally be ended. In his press conference last week President Nixon said that both superpowers had agreed to use their influence to bring the two sides together. Such a show of old-fashioned muscle might well be decisive. If nothing else, 18 days of fighting demonstrated that neither Israel nor the Arab states can fight without modern arms in vast quantities and that there are only two places, Moscow and Washington, where they can go for such help. Adding to the pressure from the superpowers is the need of the rest of the industrialized world for Arab oil.

Beyond that, diplomats were pointing out that there exists a theoretical basis for a peace settlement: U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, proposed by Britain and adopted unanimously in November 1967. To satisfy the Arabs, the resolution calls for "withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict." At the same time--and this is of prime importance to the Israelis--it also acknowledges the territorial integrity of every nation in the area, all of which have the "right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries."

The resolution has never been acted on because both sides interpret it differently. The Arabs want each of 242's principles to be honored separately--and withdrawal, they say, must come first. The Israelis say that they are bound only to withdraw to "secure and recognized boundaries," which are to be fixed during direct negotiations.

Despite six years of squabbling over the meaning of 242, the basic goals of Arabs and Israelis are not altogether in compatible. Essentially, the Israelis want secure borders and an admission by the Arabs that they have a right to exist. The Arabs want Israel to think and act as a Middle Eastern state rather than what they consider it to be--an isolated, Western-oriented outpost of expansionist Zionism. For all the Israeli fear of Arabs wanting to annihilate the Jews, the fact is that Israel, if the occupied territories are included, controls six times more territory than it did in 1948. "Who's done the most pushing so far?" asks a ranking Western diplomat in Cairo. "It's not been the Arabs pushing Israel into the sea, but Israel pushing the Arabs into the desert."

If there ever is to be a true peace settlement, both sides must realize that security is only to be found in mutually acceptable borders--and mutual acceptance of one another. The unenviable task of the negotiators will be to try to give the Arabs back their lands while guaranteeing Israel its security. The ma jor problems:

THE SINAI PENINSULA. There is no real reason why this 23,440-sq. mi. expanse of desert should be a major issue of dispute. Israel says it makes no claim on the land itself, except as a military buffer. One plausible solution would be to return sovereignty to Egypt, but at the same time to demilitarize the Egyptian side of the border between the Sinai and Israel. This border could be perhaps 20 to 30 miles deep, enough territory to keep each side out of artillery or short-range rocket attack from the other.

The demilitarization could be guaranteed by a permanent United Nations force--one that could be withdrawn only by the Security Council. With its veto power, the U.S. could thus assure Israel that the force could never be taken away without American assent. A similar U.N. force could be established at Sharm el Sheikh, a strategic point overlooking the Straits of Tiran, so that Egypt could never again threaten Israeli access to the Red Sea, as it did in 1967.

THE GOLAN HEIGHTS. The barren Golan Heights are useful only as a strategic barrier. Israel might retain a part of this disputed rocky terrain. A U.N. peace-keeping force, with similar guarantees against withdrawal, could keep the armies apart--and protect Israeli settlements from the Syrian guns that periodically fired on them before 1967.

THE WEST BANK OF THE JORDAN. This disputed area is also strategically important, since it intrudes into the very center of Israel. One compromise solution might be the creation of a semiautonomous, demilitarized Palestinian state on the West Bank, as King Hussein suggested in 1972. As an added assurance of Arab good intentions, the territory, which would be federated to Jordan, could also have U.N. observers, as well as open borders for Israeli inspection. A plan proposed in 1968 by Israel's Deputy Premier Yigal Allon parallels Hussein's proposal in important respects.

JERUSALEM. Israel has vowed never to give up an inch of Jerusalem, and the Holy City may cause more trouble than the thousands of square miles disputed elsewhere. Both Moslems and Jews, not to mention Christians, have powerful emotional and religious attachments to Jerusalem.

Though the Israelis have allowed Moslems free access to holy places like the Al Aqsa Mosque, Israeli occupation of the Old City, site of most of the religious shrines, remains unacceptable to proud Arabs. Logic would suggest that Israel retain Jewish sections of the city, but that an Arab administration run the Arab quarters, with a joint planning board and joint administration of common services. The U.N. could guarantee all religious faiths access to sacred shrines in this very special city. A compromise on this emotional issue, however, might well lead to the collapse of any Israeli government that was forced to make it, and the U.S. would have to use every bit of its influence to extract a compromise from Israel.

THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEES. These 1.5 million people, uprooted from their homeland by the Israelis 25 years ago, remain one of the biggest obstacles to peace. They refuse to be assimilated into Arab countries, and Israel just as adamantly refuses to let them return to their original land, where they would forever remain a potential fifth column. There is no conceivable solution that will satisfy them, but a start could be made by offering them financial recompense for their loss and by allowing a symbolic number to return to Israel. British Expert John Reddaway suggests that Israel could take as many as 200,000, with 20,000 being allowed in every year for the next decade. The remainder could be resettled, with financial backing from the world community, in a new Arab state on the West Bank or in other Arab countries. The refugees might well reject such a proposal out-of-hand, but at least Israel could say that it had made an attempt at resettlement.

The superpowers, and the U.N., could do much to soften suspicions on both sides by giving ironclad guarantees that any agreements reached would be faithfully observed. There is every indication that such guarantees could be given. At the Security Council last week Soviet Ambassador Yakov Malik declared: "We are firmly in favor of all --I repeat all--states and peoples in the Near East being ensured peace, security and the inviolability of their borders. The Soviet Union is ready to take part in the correspondent guarantees." If the Soviet offer is sincere--and the next few weeks will show if it is--it marks an important change in Moscow's policy. The U.S. is prepared to offer an equally firm commitment. In the long run, Israel and the Arab nations might find the promises of Moscow and Washington a better basis for security than either 1,000 Phantoms or 1,000 SA-6 missiles.

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