South Viet Nam: No Longer a Choice

SOUTH Viet Nam's President Nguyen Van Thieu had remained conspicuously silent for a month. Now, accompanied by his bodyguards, he made his way to Saigon's television studios to defend before a fretful nation his decision to proceed with the presidential election next month. The election will be unusual even by Vietnamese standards: only Thieu's name will be on the ballot. Dismissing any notion of resigning to assure a fair race among equal contestants as "the act of a deserter," Thieu proposed to make, the election a referendum on his popularity. The terms: "I would like to use this election to ask the people whether they still have confidence in me and my policies. If they do, I will accept another four-year term. If not, I will resign."

It was not, of course, all that simple. Thieu carefully refrained from saying just how large or small a vote would constitute an expression of confidence. And though voters could conceivably cast blank ballots as a way of showing disapproval, the President's supporters have ways of assuring desired election results (see following story). By ridding himself of all potential challengers-most notably Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky and retired General Duong Van ("Big") Minh-Thieu had placed himself in a position of power unparalleled in South Viet Nam since the days of the late Ngo Dinh Diem.

If Thieu had no opponents at the top, however, he did not lack for opposition, as last week's elections to the Lower House of South Viet Nam's National Assembly abundantly demonstrated. The Assembly has been corrupt-a vote cost $ 180 and ardent support of a bill brought up to $1,800-and virtually powerless, and so many candidates ran this time that the election was a cross between a popularity contest and a lottery. But the voting did reveal Thieu's growing unpopularity. Thieu had hoped to win a solid two-thirds majority in the 159-seat house, but not even his supporters ran openly under his banner. When the returns were in, it was clear that he could only count on a majority.

Ominous Preview. The largest gains were made by the militantly antigovernment, antiwar An Quang Buddhists, whose street riots back in 1963 were a major factor in the downfall of Diem. The Buddhists, who were strong in the northern provinces, emerged from the election with 31 seats, the second biggest bloc in the House, though by no means a united one. The opposition counted 58 members in all, more than the total of Thieu's known supporters. A more ominous preview of the sort of opposition that could be mounted in the absence of a genuine presidential election came last week when Buddhists and students demonstrated in Saigon after three of their number fell ill and died during military training. Outside the National Assembly, defeated Deputy Nguyen Dae Dan tried to protest what he said was a rigged election by setting himself ablaze, and might have succeeded had his friends not intervened in time. South Viet Nam's Disabled Veterans Association claimed that 39 of its members had offered to lead a revival of protest self-immolations, which were a feature of the last, fiery days of the Diem regime.

Thieu had virtually assured that he would hold power uneasily by the tactics he used in easing his opponents out of the race-starting with his pushing through a stringent election law that eliminated his old enemy, Vice President Ky. That move in turn persuaded Big Minh to withdraw, since he had no hope of winning unless Ky drew off some of Thieu's military support. Faced with the prospect of an uncontested election and Washington's certain displeasure, Thieu blinked once. South Viet Nam's Supreme Court obligingly ruled that Ky's name would be on the ballot whether or not the Vice President ran.

Last week Thieu brusquely dropped even the appearance of a contested election, and in the process moved along the thin edge of South Vietnamese constitutional law. In a letter to the Chief Justice of South Viet Nam's Supreme Court, Tran Van Linh, Thieu noted that Ky had refused to run and demanded a ruling on whether there was now one candidate or two. Seven of the nine Justices (two were abroad) met informally in Saigon, and agreed six to one that Ky had in effect withdrawn. Since the law had not provided for a one-man race, Chief Justice Linh gave as his "consultative opinion" that it was up to Thieu to decide on procedures. Thieu took that as authority enough to rule Ky's name off the ballot.

Slipping Strength. Why did Thieu suddenly decide to do without Ky as even a nominal opponent on the ballot? One reason could be found in the Lower House election returns. Thieu's obviously slipping strength might have encouraged Ky, whose general political stature is on the rise these days, to change his mind and mount an active campaign after all.

Thieu had an even more immediate reason for wanting to make certain that Ky would not be a candidate. Mostly because they feared that the military might eventually split along Thieu-Ky lines-with disastrous results for the countrya number of South Viet Nam's leading generals had been shaping a plan to force Ky back into the race, whether he wanted to run or not. The generals intended to put an ultimatum to Thieu and Ky: Unless Ky rejoined the campaign as an active candidate, they would halt all offensive operations against the Communists and retire their forces to defensive positions. If Thieu and Ky agreed to the generals' terms, the plan went, Thieu would be re-elected and Ky would be named Prime Minister with expanded powers, thus saving face for all concerned, including the U.S.

Slander and Insolence. None of the principals seemed to appreciate Bunker's efforts to salvage the wrecked election. The ambassador reportedly complained to newsmen that both Ky and Big Minh had told him that they would run only if the U.S. stepped in and bent the election in their favor; Minh noisily denied the story, accusing Bunker of "slander and insolence." For their part, Ky's aides said that the Vice President would go all out to destroy Thieu and "all his clique."

As for the once and future President Thieu, he moved apparently to forestall what the CIA-whose field reports have been consistently accurate in the past-at this stage estimated to be a 40% chance of a coup attempt in the coming months. He handed out promotions to 29 generals and admirals. He also decided to appoint Colonel Nguyen Khac Binh, head of South Viet Nam's CIA-like Central Intelligence Organization, to oversee the national police. Binh will thus have at his command 200,000 armed men, including, besides patrolmen and traffic cops, the much-feared secret police.

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