The Pros and Cons of NATO Troop Withdrawal

ALTHOUGH the distinctions tend to fade in the heat of debate, the battle over the Mansfield amendment is being waged on three fronts--military, economic and political. According to both opponents and proponents, there is much more at stake than just the withdrawal of half of the 300,000 troops that the U.S. maintains in Western Europe. Some of the more telling arguments on both sides:

The heart of Mansfield's case is the huge cost--$14 billion annually--of the country's NATO commitments and its deleterious effect upon the U.S. balance of payments and the stability of the dollar. He points out that the U.S. annually incurs such NATO expenses as $2.9 million in land taxes on bases in Great Britain and Germany and $265 million for the employment of European nationals by U.S. forces. "In other words," he says, "we are paying them to stay there and defend them."

What happens when the U.S. comes up against a financial crunch while the economy is suffering? "They can give us a run on the dollar," Mansfield says. "They can make it difficult for us by increasing prices on American products exported to Europe. My amendment is designed to bring about an early relief to our pressing payments deficits abroad. If these troops that will be returned are disbanded upon their return to the U.S., it will represent a further gain for our budget as well as our balance of payments. The financial savings in that case could well be as high as $1.5 billion."

Secretary of State William Rogers holds otherwise. In economic terms, he argues, the amendment would have only "minimal benefits." Under present Pentagon plans, the troops would not be disbanded on their return, and the cost of maintaining those forces, Rogers says, would be about the same in the U.S. as in Western Europe. He does concede that bringing the troops home would improve the balance of payments picture, perhaps by as much as $700 million. But he also hints that the U.S. is trying to get West Germany to increase the offset payments that already counterbalance much of the cost of keeping U.S. troops in Europe.

The Pentagon is quick to argue the impact of withdrawal on NATO combat effectiveness. The five-division equivalent force now in Western Europe, says one general, could hold at the beginning of a conventional war for nearly a month, while waiting for reinforcements to mobilize. "But should that force be cut in half," he says, "we would lose that option, and it would be retreat, surrender or nukes." His assessment is presumably based on the near parity in peacetime troop strength--approximately 1,105,000 NATO to 1,270,000 Warsaw Pact--of the opposing European alliances. Should the U.S. withdraw 150,000 men, the Pentagon claims, this balance would be tilted.

Mansfield retorts that "our forces in Europe have been inflated and musclebound, with far more logistical than combat capability." He notes that among U.S. troops with NATO in Europe, there is one general or flag officer for every 2,343 men, whereas when he served in the Army, he says, the average ratio was one colonel for every 3,000 men. Mansfield's point is that the U.S. military in Europe has grown top-heavy. "It is my conviction," he says, "that trimming away the fat in the form of excess supplies and headquarters will result in a leaner, more mobile and more efficient combat force." Besides, Mansfield has persistently argued "that although the deployment of American troops in Europe shows the flag and acts as a trip wire to Warsaw Pact aggression, this could be accomplished just as readily with a greatly reduced force.

The real difficulty, according to Rogers, is the long-run diplomatic consequence of Mansfield's proposal. Any unilateral and massive troop withdrawal, he contends, would lead the Soviets to believe that "we're leaving the world," and create among Western Europeans a tremendous crisis of confidence in the U.S. It would, Rogers says, be a "major disaster for this country to let down NATO, which is as essential to our defense as to Western Europe's." He claims that the one thing forcing the Soviets to settle the

Middle East question through diplomatic means is their knowledge that the U.S. will not pull back. He echoes the argument, made by the President, that any unilateral reduction of forces would "completely eliminate the possibility" of a negotiated mutual-reduction agreement with Russia.

Congress has drawn a bead on the issue of its own prerogatives. "Do you question Congress's right to bring back forces from Europe?" Senator William Fulbright demanded of Rogers at one point last week. "We're opposed to arbitrary limits," Rogers replied. Nixon in turn is opposing withdrawals partly as a matter of presidential pride and power. But the issue goes far beyond that.

Congress has been restive about the size of the U.S. military presence in Europe for at least five years. The general antiwar mood caused by Viet Nam has reinforced that feeling. But the issues are entirely different; far more is at stake in Europe.

The argument that the Western Europeans should pick up more of the burden is valid. It is incongruous for the U.S. to maintain 300,000 troops in Western Europe 25 years after World War II; obviously, there should be a reduction. The Administration, in essence, agrees. But Nixon has a strong case for calling the Mansfield amendment precipitate. The U.S. cutback need not be as abrupt as Mansfield would have it; preferably, the President should be free to execute it at his own pace, winning whatever concessions he can from the East bloc.

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