Europe: The Search for Solutions

While the U.S. and China are engaged in a sudden flurry of diplomatic initiatives, Europe is preoccupied with its own negotiations. Though the European talks lack the drama of Peking's gestures, their outcome will have a profound effect on the future shape of the Continent. One of the negotiations tests whether Western Europe can gather the necessary resolve to make the decision for the expansion of the Common Market. The other centers on the basic question of whether or not the Soviet Union is genuinely prepared to help bring about an accommodation in Central Europe, which in turn could ease the Continent's semipermanent division into hostile blocs.

Stalled Ostpolitik

When West German Chancellor Willy Brandt signed the Treaty of Moscow last August, he tied its ratification to a successful resolution of the problem of West Berlin, which depends on tenuous lifelines that stretch 110 miles through hostile East German territory. Last week, as the ambassadors of the Big Four completed their 18th meeting in Berlin, it was disappointingly clear that no solution was in sight.

Brandt had hoped that the Soviets were so eager for West German trade and technology that they would be willing to guarantee the economic viability of the city and improve the lot of West Berliners by safeguarding the access routes between West Berlin and West Germany. Otherwise, Western firms will leave, and their exodus would cause an economic and psychological crisis in the isolated city.

Brandt's reasoning was buttressed by the Soviets themselves, who gave private assurances that they were prepared to be reasonable. But last December's consumer riots in Poland seem to have made them less flexible. East Germany's Walter Ulbricht, who at 77 is the self-proclaimed dean of Soviet-style Communism, warned Moscow that accommodation with the West over Berlin without diplomatic recognition of East Germany would undermine his position, and that what happened in Poland could be repeated in East Germany.

Some Western diplomats still insist that a West Berlin accord will be reached --some day. But the fact is that the Soviets and the West are at present so far apart that no agreement can be hoped for within the foreseeable future unless one side or the other drastically alters its stand. After last week's session ended, TIME'S Bonn Bureau Chief Benjamin Gate managed to obtain a picture of the Western and Soviet positions. The major issues:

ACCESS. West Berlin is linked to its markets in West Germany by three autobahn routes, four rail lines and four waterways. The Allied powers insist that the Soviet Union must ensure the right of free passage between West Germany and West Berlin. The Western powers, for example, have proposed sealed trains that would roll untouched through East Germany. The Soviets refuse. They maintain that since the routes pass through the German Democratic Republic, it is up to the West Germans and West Berliners to negotiate with the East Germans. Such an agreement would mean that the West recognizes East German sovereignty over land access routes to West Berlin, which the West refuses to do without a Soviet guarantee of a free flow of traffic. Without such assurances, East Germany would have complete veto rights over the traffic.

VISITING RIGHTS. Of West Berlin's 2,100,000 citizens, 500,000 have relatives among East Berlin's 1,100,000 residents. Although West Germans have almost free access to the Communist sector of the divided former capital, West Berliners are not allowed to pass through the Wall except in emergencies. The Allies claim this is unfair discrimination. Moscow's position is that West Berlin's senate should enter into direct negotiations with East Germany.

WEST GERMAN PRESENCE IN WEST BERLIN.

West Berlin could not maintain a decent standard of living without Bonn's assistance, which includes a direct annual subsidy of $500 million. As an other means of economic support, the West German government maintains 85 offices in the city, which employ 20,000 workers. Bundestag committees frequently meet there, as do caucuses of political parties. All that bothers the Soviets, who regard West Berlin as a separate political entity on East German soil. They do not object to West Berlin's cultural, economic and monetary ties to Bonn, but they insist that no West German political activity should take place in the city. The Western powers concede that West Berlin is not part of West Germany. After consulting with Brandt, the Allies have proposed reducing the federal presence in West Berlin by eliminating so-called "constitutional acts" by West German political officials. This has intentionally been left vague for bargaining purposes.

REPRESENTATION ABROAD. Presently, West Berliners carry West German passports and special West Berlin identity cards, but the city's trade contacts are handled by Bonn's embassies and consulates. The Soviet position reflects the view that West Berlin is "the third Germany." Consequently, Moscow insists that it should be allowed to establish a consulate general there, and implies that West Berlin should issue passports.

The impasse on West Berlin reduced the hopes for a relaxation of tensions in Central Europe. It also acts as a barrier to convening the Soviet-sponsored Conference on European Security that Moscow would like to hold as a means of gaining full Western acceptance of Eastern Europe's present borders, which were redrawn by the victorious Soviet army during World War II. The Western nations refuse to attend until there is a solution to West Berlin. Despite mounting frustration, neither side has shown any inclination to break off the talks.

The Berlin stalemate is a serious setback for Willy Brandt and his bold Ostpolitik, which aims at overcoming Europe's division by accepting present political realities. Unless the Soviets soften their attitude on Berlin soon, internal political pressures may prevent the Chancellor from gaining ratification of the treaties he signed last year with Warsaw and Moscow. Indeed, he may not even dare submit them to the Bundestag for approval. Should that happen, Brandt's hopeful initiatives for peaceful relations with his Communist neighbors would only have made matters worse. The Soviets have made it clear that Bonn's failure to accept the Brandt treaties would chill the political climate of Central Europe.

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