Rationale and Rhetoric

The overwhelming reality for the U.S. is still Viet Nam, and it, too, could be affected by Peking's intimations of a latter-day open-door policy. It was unrealistic to expect that a somewhat friendlier China would help bring about a settlement of the war, but part of the original American rationale for the war was undermined. If China was turning into a Ping Pong partner, the containment of its threat could no longer be described in American political rhetoric with quite the same urgency.

President Nixon, who had carefully and intelligently paved the way for better relations with China, won widespread support for this policy. At the same time last week he seemed to turn a few decibels more strident about Viet Nam. He not only reiterated that the U.S. would keep "residual" forces there until the Saigon government was reasonably secure, but he also pledged the continuing use of airpower "against North Viet Nam and its forces" until Hanoi has freed every American prisoner. Freeing the prisoners is a goal all Americans fervently desire, but it is questionable whether Nixon's tone and method can achieve it. The new sense of reality about China does not necessarily extend to Viet Nam.

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