Learning to Live with Russia

As world diplomats thumb and plumb President Nixon's book-length outline of U.S. foreign policy, the most dog-eared section is likely to be that covering U.S. attitudes toward the Soviet Union. It is an unusually frank appraisal of Russia's rise as a world power and suggests ways in which both superpowers should accommodate their differences through a realistic assessment of mutual self-interest. As such, it could have an influence on Kremlin decisions now being readied for unveiling at the Soviet Party Congress that begins later this month. Some excerpts:

THE last two decades witnessed the transformation of the Soviet Union from a Eurasian power to an intercontinental one. The U.S.S.R. now possesses military capabilities far beyond those at the command of previous Soviet leaders. In earlier periods our strategic superiority gave us a margin of safety. Now, however, the growth of Soviet power could tempt Soviet leaders into bolder challenges. It could lead them to underestimate the risks of certain policies. The existing military balance does not permit us to judge the significance of Soviet actions only by what they say--or even what we believe--are their intentions. We must measure their actions, at least in part, against their capabilities.

Confrontation may arise from a mistaken perception of the posture of an adversary. Such a mistake can lead to a failure to appreciate the risks and consequences of probing for advantages or testing the limits of toleration. We believe that this was involved to some degree in the events which led up to the Middle East crisis last year. It may also have been a factor in Soviet naval actions in the Caribbean in the fall of 1970. There the Soviet Union took new steps to again operate offensive weapons systems from this hemisphere. Only after a period of discussion did we reaffirm our understanding and amplify it to make clear that the agreement included activities related to the sea-based systems.

Historically, international adversaries have demonstrated a compulsion to seek every gain, however marginal, at the expense of their competitors. In this classical conception, the accumulation of gains over a period of time could alter the balance of power. This may have been realistic in the past. But it is folly for the great nuclear powers to conduct their policies in this manner. For if they succeed, it can only result in confrontation and potential catastrophe.

The nature of nuclear power requires that both the Soviet Union and we be willing to practice self-restraint in the pursuit of national interests. We are prepared to apply this principle to all legitimate Soviet interests. The U.S.S.R. has traditionally had important security interests in Europe and East Asia. But the natural expansion of Soviet influence in the world must not distort itself into ambitions for exclusive or predominant positions. For such a course ignores the interests of others, including ourselves. It must and will be resisted.

We do not suggest that the starting point--or, indeed, the culmination--of our negotiations with the U.S.S.R. be the acceptance of our views and positions. Nor do we expect to resolve issues by cajoling the Soviet leaders into solutions damaging to their national interests. We cannot be expected, however, to accept the Soviet definition of every issue, to agree automatically to the Soviet order of priorities, or to accept every aggrandizement of Soviet positions abroad as a "new reality" no longer open to challenge. The principle of mutual accommodation must be that both of us seek compromises, mutual concessions and new solutions to old problems. Durable solutions will be those which both sides have an interest in maintaining.

This country is not withdrawing into isolation. With the Soviet Union, we want a relationship in which the interests of both are respected. When interests conflict, we prefer negotiation and restraint as the methods to adjust differences. But, when challenged, the U.S. will defend its interests and those of its allies.

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