President Nixon Takes a Democrat

A PRESIDENT is likely to have something political up his sleeve when he takes the rare step of picking a man from the other party for his Cabinet. Dwight Eisenhower installed Martin Durkin, head of the plumbers' union, as Secretary of Labor in 1953 partly as a gesture to his blue-collar backers. John Kennedy brought in Douglas Dillon for the Treasury because Dillon was a pillar of the New York financial community, which habitually mistrusts Democratic hands in the national till. Neither of those appointments, however, was quite the bombshell that Richard Nixon exploded last week when he strode to the lectern in the White House press-briefing room and announced that John Connally--conservative Democrat, Lyndon Johnson protege, former Governor of Texas, and still that state's second most influential politician--would replace David Kennedy as Secretary of the Treasury.

Connally disliked Washington when he was John Kennedy's Secretary of the Navy in the early 1960s; he refused Nixon's offer to head either Defense or Treasury when Nixon was Cabinet building after the 1968 election. Why, then, would John Connally, a proud man and a powerful Democrat, now decide to sit in Richard Nixon's Cabinet--unless there was more in it for him than met the eye? There was speculation that the President is positioning Connally as a possible replacement for Spiro Agnew in 1972. So far, that is nothing more than guesswork. Besides, such a plot would require a party switch by Connally, and Texans generally prefer to fight rather than switch. It would cost Connally dearly back home. "I did not seek this job," Connally told friends. "It's just hard to say no when you're asked to serve your country." Since he had turned Nixon down twice before, that explanation seemed both inadequate and disingenuous, but for the moment, that was the only one Connally was offering.

Dirty Mind. Why Nixon wanted him is more obvious. The most patent reason: with the Democrats already touting the state of the economy as their likeliest issue for 1972, Nixon aimed to defuse that by putting a well-known, if scarcely liberal Democrat into his Administration's economic front office. But Connally personally may have nothing to lose. Says a close friend: "John knows the economy can't get much worse. He has nowhere to go but up. If the situation improves, he can get the lion's share of the credit. It is a situation that appeals both to his political instincts and to his rather roomy ego."

Other reasons why Nixon sought out Connally are rooted in the labyrinth of Texas politics. Texas oilmen, who backed Nixon financially in 1968, are not happy with the reduction in the oil depletion allowance that Nixon supported as President, nor do they like his opening the door to increased oil imports from foreign producers. What is more, Texas--always a key state politically--is vital to Nixon's strategy for 1972. Connally helped Democrat Lloyd Bentsen win a Senate seat this year from Nixon's hand-picked candidate, Representative George Bush. Nixon failed to carry Texas in either 1960 or 1968; the state's 26 electoral votes could be the difference between winning and losing in 1972. By luring Connally to Washington, Nixon could win a strong protagonist or at least neutralize a potential antagonist in Texas Democratic politics. Said one Washington Democrat: "To my dirty mind, this appointment means only one thing: the start of 'Democrats for Nixon' in 1972."

I'm in Trouble. The President has been courting Connally throughout his term. Connally served on the Ash commission on White House organization, which led to the creation of an Office of Management and Budget. Nixon also named him to the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. Connally has found himself on the receiving end of numerous presidential summonses to stop by and chat. Mainly, Nixon used Connally as a sounding board on economic policy. The big Nixon pitch to Connally, ten days before the appointment was announced, came during a White House tete-`a-tete. "I recognize I'm in trouble the way the country is now," Nixon reportedly told Connally. "My problem is the economy . . . I don't have anyone in this area I can rely on who has elective political experience. I need someone whose political judgment I can respect, who understands economic forces, who understands how it all works. I need you." On another occasion, he assured Connally: "Don't worry about Shultz. You report to me directly, not through any intermediaries."

Nixon's estimate of Connally as an economics expert struck some professionals as odd; the man is simply not known in New York financial circles. Bradbury K. Thurlow, an investment analyst with Wall Street's Hoppin, Watson & Co., said of Connally: "I never knew that he knew how to add and subtract." Several of Connally's predecessors however agreed privately that financial expertise is not a primary prerequisite, so long as Connally retains the Treasury's skillful top technicians or picks other equally competent experts to guide him.

What Nixon wants Connally to do in Washington is probably not to make economic policy anyway, especially at this notably difficult time for the economy (see BUSINESS). Instead, Connally should serve him well as a far more forceful defender of that policy before Congress than was David Kennedy, a guileless Mormon who will move to a Cabinet-level job in international finance at the State Department. In terms of economic ideology, Connally is an enigma: he recently observed that the Administration's attack on inflation could not succeed without wage and price controls, but he has not said what he would do instead. Democratic liberals in Congress feel his appointment spells doom for serious tax reform and for any real commitment by the Administration to the goal of full employment. But to Wilbur Mills of Arkansas, chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee and the single most important power on the Hill in economic matters, Connally "is a very able man. I think it is a good appointment." That will help, for it is Mills whom Connally will have to sell on Nixon's forthcoming proposals to store federal revenues with the states.

Pique at the Ranch. Before Nixon announced the Connally appointment, he informed Lyndon Johnson by telephone of his choice. Nixon thought that Johnson would be pleased. Not likely. Johnson, still no slouch as a Democratic politician, was furious. Part of it was pique that Connally had not consulted him about taking the job. More important, like many other Democrats, Johnson felt that the last thing any Democrat should do right now is identify the party with Nixon's economics. Says one Texan who knows both Johnson and Connally well: "The President [Johnson] feels that Nixon could be had on the economic issue." Nixon, announcing the appointment, pleaded for a bipartisan approach to the nation's problems. If that is what he really wants, he might have chosen instead to install a more liberal Democrat where it really counts--as Attorney General, say, or as Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare.

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