The Pros and Cons of Recognition

CHINA'S foreign relations are daily developing," said Defense Minister Lin Piao at this year's National Day celebrations. "We have friends all over the world." That was not an idle boast. Picking up the pieces of its shattered foreign relations in the wake of Mao Tse-tung's convulsive Cultural Revolution, Peking has mounted a skillful diplomatic offensive. Last week, after nearly two years of secret negotiations, Italy and China recognized each other and agreed to establish diplomatic relations. Only three weeks earlier, Peking had reached a similar agreement with Canada.

Both deals were based on a compromise. Initially, China told both Ottawa and Rome that they would have to recognize Communist sovereignty over Taiwan. Headquarters for the Nationalist Chinese since 1949, the island has become an increasingly prosperous and militarily potent entity, with a greater population (14 million) than nearly three quarters of the United Nations' 127 members. In the end, Peking settled for vague statements from the two that they "take note" of the Communist claim. As soon as Canada and Italy recognized the Communists, Taiwan broke off relations with them.

Italy was the seventh of NATO's 15 members to recognize Peking*, thus placing half of Washington's closest allies in direct opposition to U.S. policy on China. Belgium, another NATO member, is expected to recognize Mao's regime shortly, as are Austria and Chile. Altogether, 50 countries now recognize the Peking regime as China's legitimate government.

Next week the annual census on Peking's legitimacy will be taken, as delegates to the United Nations General Assembly vote on China's admission to the U.N. Because that admission has always been treated as an "important question" requiring a two-thirds assenting vote, there is almost no chance that Peking will gain membership. Even so, if a majority of the members voting approve, the U.S. will find itself in an awkward position as chief lobbyist against China's admission.

Whatever the vote, it will increase pressure on Washington to modify its China policy. The first step could be a negative one--simply to stop campaigning against Peking's admission to the U.N. The ultimate change in U.S. policy would be full recognition of China.

Recognition can mean one of two things. It can simply acknowledge a de facto situation, without making any moral judgments about it. As Canada's Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau has put it: "To recognize the Peking government does not mean that we approve of what it is doing." In some instances, however, governments withhold recognition from a country because it endangers the peace or harasses its neighbors. Many African nations refuse to recognize South Africa because it denies equal rights to blacks and mixed-blood "coloreds." At the same time, many of them do not protest Peking's use of terror against its citizens. The U.S., which recognizes South Africa but not Peking, is often accused of maintaining precisely the opposite double standard. Because of such moral v. practical dilemmas, most nations try to avoid using recognition as a form of judgment.

The U.S. officially maintains that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists remain the rightful rulers of mainland China, and for 21 years has refused to recognize Mao's regime. Aside from formally acknowledging reality, a change in U.S. policy would have a number of other advantages, as well as some disadvantages.

The pros:

> The presence of ambassadors in each other's capitals might lead to serious negotiations--though British and French envoys in Peking have not found this to be true.

> Big-league recognition might encourage China to assume more responsibility. Nuclear disarmament and Viet Nam are the most obvious problems that will be difficult to solve without China's cooperation.

> More cordial relations might provide both countries with leverage against Soviet power. Just as the specter of U.S.-Soviet collusion worries the Chinese, closer relations between Washington and Peking just might persuade the Soviets to pursue a more cautious policy.

> U.S. recognition of China would improve Washington's standing, especially among Third World nations which resent its campaigning to consign China to a kind of outcast status.

The cons:

> U.S. recognition would give China's diplomatic offensive a tremendous lift, particularly in Asia, and would probably lead to a stepup in Peking's attempt at subversion throughout the area.

> The U.S. would probably be forced to abandon an ally to which it is bound by tradition as well as treaty. Since the Nationalist government has existed on Taiwan as long as Mao's in Peking, a move that would estrange it from Washington and isolate it from other countries offers no more justice than current U.S. policy.

> The most logical course would seem to be unilateral U.S. recognition of both Peking and Taipei. The "two Chinas" plan, however, would infuriate both Chinas. Taiwan would condemn the policy, though it would probably not break with the U.S. Peking would probably repudiate the move, convinced that the U.S. was trying to deny them Taiwan. The U.S. would thus be left with an alienated ally and an enemy even more antagonistic than before. Nevertheless, virtually all State Department Sinologists feel that a slow conversion to a "two Chinas" policy is the only worthwhile course open to Washington. They have been advocating such a course for three years, and now the Nixon Administration is quietly moving in that direction.

* The others: Britain, France, Canada, The Netherlands, Denmark and Norway.

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