EUROPE: A TIME OF TESTING FOR THE POWER BLOCS

WARILY, yet with a trace of hope, the two opposing power blocs in Europe probed each other last week, seeking out possible areas of cooperation. In Brussels, the foreign and defense ministers of the 15 NATO members were gathered for their annual review. In Moscow, the political leaders of the seven Warsaw Pact nations were holding a meeting of their own. In each capital, the conferees followed their rivals' proceedings with lively interest.

Unlike the situation in years past, the prime order of business at the two meetings was not to raise more divisions or discuss new weaponry. The conferences were held against a backdrop of recent improvements in East-West relations, caused chiefly by the start of the U.S.-Soviet arms-limitation talks in Helsinki and West Germany's signing of the nuclear-nonproliferation treaty. Also, memories have dimmed of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, which dashed earlier hopes for detente. The two rival blocs are now testing each other with initiatives that could lead to a further lowering of international tension.

Pax Sovietica. Moscow's major overture was to invite the Western European countries to join the East Bloc in a European Security Conference, which the Russians hope to convene in Helsinki during the first half of 1970. The Soviets say somewhat grudgingly that they have "no objection" to the U.S. and Canada attending. For Moscow, the primary purpose of the conference would be to formalize the status quo in Europe by guaranteeing existing borders. The long-range Soviet goal may well be to convince the Europeans that an American military presence is no longer needed on the Continent and thereby isolate the U.S. from Europe.

Some Western critics fear that the Russian plan would replace the Pax Americana that was established in Western Europe after World War II with a Pax Sovietica maintained by the Red Army. Even so, many Western Europeans, including some NATO foreign ministers, see nothing wrong in at least gauging Soviet intentions by attending the conference.

The U.S., however, is extremely wary. NATO's acceptance of the invitation, said U.S. Secretary of State William P. Rogers, would put public pressure on the member nations to attend even if there were no prospect for concrete results. "What does the Soviet Union want to achieve by proposing such a conference?" demanded Rogers. "Does it want to deal realistically with the issues that divide Europe or does it seek to ratify the existing division of Europe? Does it intend to draw a veil over the subjugation of Czechoslovakia?"

As a test of Soviet sincerity, Rogers suggested that the Russians might respond to forthcoming proposals by the Western allies concerning improved land and canal access to West Berlin. He also urged the Soviets to prove that they genuinely want to ease tensions by agreeing to discuss NATO's year-old suggestion for mutual troop reductions in Europe (see chart). The Soviets, however, have shown no interest in such a move. The Red Army forces in Eastern Europe accomplish two major objectives of Soviet foreign policy: they provide perimeter defense of the motherland, and they help to keep the Warsaw Pact countries in line.

Several of the foreign ministers, including West Germany's Walter Scheel, remained convinced that the West nonetheless should display a readiness to negotiate with the Soviets. The final communique, though weighted in favor of the American position, was a compromise. While the NATO ministers welcomed the Warsaw Pact's call for talks, they stressed that careful preparations would have to be made beforehand.

One reason for the willingness of many Western European officials to go along with the Soviet-proposed conference was the hope of detente with Eastern Europe. Some Western Europeans also fear that the U.S., preoccupied with Viet Nam and domestic difficulties, may one day cease to serve as an effective protector of Western Europe.

To allay Western Europe's concern on that point, Rogers assured his continental colleagues that Washington would honor its commitments abroad. So did Defense Secretary Melvin Laird. Despite Senator Mike Mansfield's renewed call for the withdrawal of substantial numbers of the 300,000 American servicemen now in Europe, Laird pledged to maintain U.S. forces at their present level until at least mid-1971. To offset the departure of 6,000 Canadian troops, the British agreed to assign six additional combat brigades to Germany. Because NATO forces are outnumbered 2 to 1 on the crucial central front and would be quickly overrun in the event of an all-out ground attack, the NATO defense ministers also agreed to new guidelines that provide for quicker use of tactical nuclear weapons.

Isolation Anxiety. In Moscow, the Warsaw Pact officials spent much of their two-day meeting debating West German Chancellor Willy Brandt's offer of improved trade and political relations. Since fear of the West Germans has been one of the East bloc's unifying forces, a reconciliation with Bonn could slowly erode the Warsaw Pact. The prospect of a rapprochement particularly alarms East German Boss Walter Ulbricht, who fears that his half of Germany might lose considerable East bloc business in the event of a deal between Bonn and the Warsaw Pact countries.

Ulbricht reportedly arrived in Moscow two days before the meetings began. His mission was to urge the Soviet leaders to insist on full diplomatic recognition of his German Democratic Republic by Bonn before the Communist countries enter into any dealings with West Germany. But he was overruled by his Warsaw Pact comrades, who badly need trade and industrial credits from prospering West Germany.

In the end, Ulbricht apparently had no choice but to subscribe to a communique that was surprisingly conciliatory toward West Germany. Though it repeated the familiar warnings against neo-Nazism and German "revenge-seeking," the communique hailed the signing of the nonproliferation treaty and cited the formation of the Brandt government as evidence of healthy tendencies in West Germany. Most important, without posing any preconditions, the communique gave the green light for Eastern Europe to enter into bilateral trade and diplomatic relations with the country that ever since World War II has been castigated as the haven of unrepentant Nazis.

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