Americans on the War Divided, Glum, Unwilling to uit

Americans on the War Divided, Glum, Unwilling to Quit

NEARLY five years after the 1965 buildup, Americans are increasingly impatient for a way out of Viet Nam, skeptical about the outcome of the fighting and ambivalent about the means of ending it. More than a third of the public want immediate, unconditional withdrawal of U.S. forces--a sizable figure in support of a policy that until recently was overwhelmingly held to be unthinkable and disastrous.

Yet, considering the outpouring of antiwar feeling on Moratorium Day, it is remarkable how much support remains for the policy of ending the war in honorable fashion, short of complete abandonment of South Viet Nam. The President enjoys considerable support; a majority backs him on the rate of troop withdrawal and on the matter of self-determination for South Viet Nam.

Seeming contradictions abound in the American mood. Four-fifths of the nation profess to be "fed up and tired of the war"; yet half do not want to see the U.S. "cut and run" from Southeast Asia, and more than half believe the present pace of troop withdrawals is about right or too fast. Nearly half of the public would favor continued withdrawal even if it meant collapse of the Saigon government, and more than 40% feel that the country will probably go Communist despite U.S. efforts. Yet a majority still hope to preserve a non-Communist regime in Saigon.

These are findings of a new TIME-Louis Harris poll to determine how much support exists among Americans for the war and for alternatives in pursuing or ending it. In order to identify the differences between the general public and those expected to be better informed on the war's complexities, the TIME-Harris interviewers polled two samples--1,650 members of a cross section of the entire population and 1,118 national and community leaders. The second group included only public officials, chiefs of minority and dissident organizations, business executives, editors, leaders of educational and voluntary institutions--those whose collective voice registers loudest in public debate.

The results suggest that growing impatience with the war especially among the leaders--could undermine President Nixon's efforts to carry out a program of controlled disengagement. But they also show that Nixon has managed to win broad support for two crucial points of his Viet Nam policy--withdrawal of American troops pegged to "Vietnamization" of the war, and holding out for the right of South Vietnamese self-determination. Fully three-quarters of the public polled favor the President's program of troop withdrawals. But half of the general public would be willing to back Nixon in one last attempt to escalate and win.

Still, reports Harris, a mood of pessimism--not unlike that of France following its 1954 debacle in Indo-China --pervades the country. "The irony," says Harris, "is that the American mood is as pessimistic as it is without a Dienbienphu."

The results of the poll demonstrate the extent to which the war has divided the American people. The country's leadership group, for the most part, is far more impatient about the war, far more cynical about the prospects of peace, than the general public. Antiwar sentiment is higher among blacks than whites, more pronounced among the young than the old, stronger in the East and West than the South and Midwest.

Support for the President

Overall, Nixon has gained rather than lost ground recently. Nixon's positive rating on the conduct of the war jumped ten points from a low of 35% in September to 45% on Oct. 14, the last day of interviewing for the poll and the day before the Viet Nam moratorium. Yet 50% of the general public and 53% of the leaders gave him a negative rating, proving that he is still highly vulnerable on the war issue. Nixon's handling of the negotiations to end the war won him no more kudos. Only 45% of the general public and 43% of the leaders approved his handling of the negotiations, while 49% of the public and 53% of the leaders gave him negative marks.

Is Nixon following the policies of the Johnson Administration in Viet Nam?

The people say no. Sixty percent of the total public and 53% of the leadership group believe that Nixon has broken with his predecessor to follow his own policy in Southeast Asia.

The President's plan to bring home the troops has strong support throughout the country. When asked directly, 76% of both the public and the leaders agreed, at least in principle, with the Nixon policy on troop withdrawals. But pressure to step up their pace seems likely to intensify. Only 6% of the public thought the withdrawals were proceeding too quickly, while 49% found the pace "about right"; 29%, however, felt the pace too slow. Among leaders, the pressure is even stronger. Although 39% were satisfied with the rate at which American manpower was being pulled out of Viet Nam, only 4% thought things were moving too rapidly, while 38% felt they were going too slowly.

How quickly should the troops be withdrawn?

Thirty-six percent of the public and 32% of the leaders favored immediate, total withdrawal of U.S. troops from Viet Nam. Of several hypothetical situations that might justify an immediate U.S. pullout, only a seizure of the Vietnamese government by hard-line generals determined to fight indefinitely found a majority willing to back an instant U.S. withdrawal.

The majority of Americans and their leaders favored phased withdrawals. "It's too late to suddenly just drop it," said Mrs. James A. Deines of Bird City, Kans. "The only alternative we've got left is to end it as honorably and as quickly as possible." Sixty-one percent of the public and 58% of the leaders believed that an American pull-out should be timed according to increasing South Vietnamese strength -- though patience with the Vietnamization effort is strictly limited.

How strong is the commitment to withdrawal?

Forty-seven percent of the public would follow a prearranged withdrawal timetable, even if the Saigon government were to collapse as a result; only 38% would alter the schedule to save the Thieu regime. Among leaders, the commitment is even firmer: 56% opted to pull out in the face of a government disaster; only 31% agreed to stay.

As the poll makes clear, Nixon could buy more time and support for his program of troop withdrawal by turning the fighting over to volunteers. Fifty-two percent of the public favored a voluntary force for Viet Nam; 46% of the leaders were willing to go along. Most would be willing to leave a volunteer army in Viet Nam for another year.

Although few people seem to be thinking in terms of a specific time limit for an end to U.S. involvement in Viet Nam, well under a majority of either the public or the leaders were willing to let the President maintain existing troop strength for more than a year. No more than 23% of the public and 18% of the leaders agreed to leave troops at the present 500,000 level for more than a year, although 10% were willing to keep them there for as long as five years. Nor are many more willing to tolerate what is reported to be the President's fallback position on troop reductions. Only 27% of the public and 25% of the leaders agreed to keeping a substantially lower 200,000-troop level in Viet Nam beyond next fall. By much the same proportions, Americans rejected the long-term use of a mixed force of volunteers and draftees. Just 28% of the public and 27% of the leaders agreed to keep a mixture of 125,000 volunteers and 75,000 draftees in Southeast Asia for more than a year. However, 37% of the public and 33% of the leaders were willing to leave a 200,000-man all-volunteer force in Viet Nam for at least two more years, and 16% were agreeable to letting them stay for five.

Changing Attitudes on the War

Fully 80% of the public and 81% of the leadership group are simply tired of the war. They feel that it was a mistake to begin with, and has been a needless waste of lives. Said Harris: "The basic rationale and justification for the Vietnamese war are rapidly fading from the consciousness of the people." Where two years ago 83% of the public agreed that the war was necessary to resist Communist aggression in Asia, today only 55% of the general public and 49% of the leadership accept this explanation. Even fewer said that Viet Nam is crucial to U.S. interests. Only 41% of the public and 32% of the leadership agreed with the proposition that the war is necessary to guarantee national security.

The public and the leaders held divergent views on both the necessity for "saving face" and the firmness of the U.S. commitment to remain in Southeast Asia. Half of the public accepted the idea that the U.S. has placed its reputation on the line in Viet Nam and could not leave until it had assured South Vietnamese independence; 54% of the leaders disagreed. Nearly half (48%) of the public went along with the proposition that the U.S. presence in Viet Nam was a commitment not just to the Vietnamese, but to the world; 54% of the leaders rejected this, too.

Has this new mood helped the antiwar movement?

Skepticism about the reasons for the war has created a climate of tolerance for the dissenters whom Vice President Spiro Agnew attacked last week. Seventy percent of the leaders refused to buy the argument that opposition to the war is led by radicals who do not care what happens to the U.S. Forty-nine percent of the public went along with them.

The leadership also rejected, by a margin of 72% to 20%, the idea that antiwar sentiment is playing too large a part in Nixon's war decisions. The public agreed with the leaders by a margin of 49% to 35%. Majorities of both the public and the leaders felt that the tragedy of the war was that it had divided the American people and agreed that it should be ended because it has kept the country from doing more about its domestic problems. "It's drained too many resources from this country--its manpower, its leadership, its resources," said Isaac Young, mayor of Olivette, Mo. "It's set this country back many years in solving its own problems."

No Illusions About Saigon

Angered by the intransigence of South Viet Nam's leaders and shocked by tales of graft and corruption, Americans seem to be losing the good will they once felt for their ally. By 42% to 21%, respondents said that the South Vietnamese government has hindered rather than helped the U.S. in its search for peace. The leadership group went the same way, 55% to 20%. Neither the leaders nor the public expressed any illusions about freedom in North Viet Nam, and both agreed that the Hanoi government commands more loyalty from its citizens than the Saigon regime. Said Ralph Comfortes of Los Angeles: "We are supporting a government that has no support from the Buddhists. We don't have the support of the Viet peasant."

Sixty-four percent of the public and 74% of the leaders favored replacing the Thieu government with one more representative of the South Vietnamese people. However, the public found itself nearly evenly divided when asked if it thought that the South Vietnamese army would fight better under a new government, while only a small plurality of the leaders felt it would.

What are acceptable settlement terms?

American attitudes toward the South Vietnamese government have had a profound influence on the type of settlement the country is willing to accept to end the war. While 55% of the leaders and 58% of the public voiced support of the President in maintaining that South Viet Nam's right of self-determination is not negotiable, those polled showed great flexibility on the meaning of the term.

The public would accept a neutralist government, committed neither to the U.S. nor the Communists, by a 71% to 12% margin. However, the public is willing, by 47% to 26%, to sacrifice the present Saigon government if that is the only way to peace, while the leaders, 62% to 22%, are even more agreeable to the idea. The partitioning of South Viet Nam, under which the Viet Cong would rule those parts of the country it controlled and the Saigon government the rest, is supported by a 42% to 29% margin among the people and 53% to 33% among the leaders.

But on the question of whether Communists should be allowed into a new South Vietnamese government, the public and the leaders parted ways decisively. The public opposed letting the Communists into the government 49% to 33%; the leaders favored such a compromise 62% to 28%. The public also rejected a government with a Communist majority 62% to 21%. The leaders split, 44% in favor, 45% opposed.

Nixon's Dilemma

Embroiled in a war they cannot win under the rules of engagement and do not wish to lose, Americans find themselves confused as they look to the future. Although most have abandoned hope for a military victory, only a minority expect the Paris negotiations to produce an "honorable settlement."

This contradiction confronts Nixon with riddles as he looks toward 1972. Ninety-four percent of the public and 91% of the leaders say they would support Nixon if he ends the war this year on honorable terms, a condition that seems impossible to meet. Sixty percent of the public and leaders are willing to support him whether he ends the war or not as long as he gets American troops out of Viet Nam. A surprising 52% of the public would be willing to support him in one last-ditch attempt to gain a military victory; 53% of the leaders would oppose such a move. Sixty percent of the leaders and 67% of the public said that they would oppose him if the Communists took over the South Vietnamese government. The fact that a plurality of both public and leaders believe that South Viet Nam will ultimately go Communist anyway only underscores the U.S.'s dilemma --and Nixon's.

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