THE HAYNSWORTH HASSLE

It was a mistake in the first place to submit the nomination, and it's a mistake not to withdraw it. It will not enhance the prestige of the Supreme Court. It will not help the Republican Party. We shouldn't be on the defensive on the Supreme Court.

THOSE anguished words from a Republican Party leader were directed toward Richard Nixon, as the President met privately with dyspeptic party chiefs last week. The subject, of course, was Nixon's candidate for Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, South Carolina Judge Clement Haynsworth Jr., who was suddenly the center of an old-fashioned political donnybrook threatening to divide the Republicans, delight the Democrats and tarnish the President. All week long Washington was roiled by rumors, as Congressmen and Senators conferred with one another and the Administration, counted votes and then counted them again, examined the facts, their consciences, read their constituents' mail and weighed the choices.

Those choices were not easy for many Republican Senate leaders. Haynsworth has turned out to be more than they bargained for as a political problem, and less than they are willing to accept as a Supreme Court Justice. Nixon's nominee has a pedestrian record as a jurist, one that unions view as anti-labor and civil rights workers as ante bellum. Some of his financial dealings raise the specter of Fortas-like improprieties, different though the cases are. All that was known, and seemingly surmounted, during the initial weeks of Senate hearings on his nomination. Then a fresh round of G.O.P. grumblings on Capitol Hill signaled that rancor was turning into revolt. Faced with insurgence, which if combined with Democratic votes could lead eventually to defeat of the Haynsworth nomination, Richard Nixon dug in his heels. Presidential prestige and power faced off against the liberal conscience within the G.O.P.

No Matter the Facts. Less than two weeks ago, it hardly seemed it would come to that. Despite the protests of organized labor and civil rights groups, Haynsworth's confirmation appeared assured. What brought about the sudden shift in Republican ranks against Haynsworth was the disclosure that he once had a tenuous business connection with Bobby Baker, the former Democratic Senate aide who was convicted of larceny and tax evasion in 1967. Both men invested in a South Carolina real estate deal several years ago, although neither apparently knew the other. Indiana's Democratic Senator Birch Bayh, leader of the Senate Judiciary Committee's anti-Haynsworth faction, dispatched an investigator to interview Baker. An amused Baker refused to help, asking: "Do you want to ruin my reputation by associating me with Haynsworth?"

The real estate deal was apparently innocuous and innocent, but Baker's name is enough to frighten most politicians. To some Republicans, Haynsworth's questionable judgment, described by one G.O.P. Senator as not a matter of dishonesty but "ethical opaqueness," combined with Bobby Baker, was too much. No matter what the facts were, they feared that Haynsworth would be condemned by the public.

As the Baker bomb was exploding, anti-Haynsworth mail began flooding Republican offices. Obviously much of it was sponsored by the A.F.L.-C.I.O. and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. But what shocked Republicans was the heavy load of obviously non-organizational mail from constituents concerned about Haynsworth. Arizona's Senator Barry Goldwater admitted that "I had no qualms about Haynsworth at all until I saw a stack of mail on my desk. The usual left-wing mail, you can identify. But it's another matter when you get mail from strict constitutionalists who write: 'Isn't there somebody else?' "

Early in the week Michigan's Senator Robert Griffin, the newly elected Republican whip, discovered a troubling trend among his colleagues. Polling the other 42 G.O.P. Senators, Griffin found a widespread desire to remain loyal to party and President. At the same time, several Senators indicated that they either did not want to vote for Haynsworth or had serious doubts about him. The legislators were angry at being put on the spot because of the negligence of Attorney General John Mitchell. Mitchell had recommended Haynsworth to Nixon. They felt that after the scandal-sodden resignation of Abe Fortas, any Republican nominee for the court must be completely clean. Mitchell had checked on Haynsworth, but not enough.

Loyalty Test. Despite his blunder, Mitchell again proved his clout with Nixon. The President, Mitchell and Presidential Counsel John Ehrlichman went to FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover's house on Washington's Linnean Avenue for dinner at midweek. Mitchell bore down heavily on the point that the Haynsworth affair was being turned into a political attack on the President. Agreed on that premise, Nixon and his Attorney General decided to cast the issue as a test of presidential prerogative and party loyalty. The Senate Republicans who opposed Haynsworth and those who had strong misgivings about him were selected as the targets for the White House counterattack. They will be strongly urged not to oppose the President's nominee. If that does not work, political pressure, such as threats of holding up federally funded projects, will be applied.

In adopting its hard line, the Administration lent credence to those who charge that Haynsworth is the unhappy end result of Nixon's "Southern strategy," a political ploy the President has repeatedly denied. According to this theory, Nixon met with South Carolina's Senator Strom Thurmond and other Southern leaders in Atlanta in May of last year. The Southerners promised Nixon two things. First, they would protect Southern delegates for Nixon in the convention against the poaching of California's Governor Ronald Reagan. Second, they would do their best to hold the line in the general election against Alabama's George Wallace. In return, Nixon supposedly made certain promises, one of them being a guarantee to Strom Thurmond that he could name a Justice to the Supreme Court when the opportunity arose. If a quid pro quo arrangement was in fact agreed upon, to withdraw Haynsworth's name might lose key Southern support for the 1970 congressional elections, and for the presidential race in 1972.

Pyrrhic Victory. While the Republicans stewed, Senate Democrats, for the most part, kept their own counsel on Haynsworth. By not making the confirmation a test of loyalty for Democrats, Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield left maneuvering room for discontented Republicans and increased chances of a negative vote on Haynsworth. If all the Democrats banded against the G.O.P. nominee, Republican dissidents might more easily be persuaded to accept the party line for purely partisan reasons.

The focus of the furor, Haynsworth, spent most of the turbulent week sequestered in Washington's Mayflower Hotel. He offered nothing publicly except the assurance that he had no intention of withdrawing under fire. At Nixon and Mitchell's behest, he submitted to extensive questioning from Assistant Attorney General William F. Rehnquist, who heads the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel. Nixon knew that one more piece of damaging evidence against Haynsworth, however trivial, would surely tip the balance against the South Carolinian. Nixon wanted no more surprises. He seemed confident there would be none, and urged the Senate Judiciary Committee to move Haynsworth's name promptly to the floor for debate. What would happen there was anyone's guess at week's end. Barring some new development, most of the cloakroom vote counting indicated the President would win and get his Associate Justice. But if the vote were to be very close, the cost could be a divided G.O.P. and a Pyrrhic victory for the President.

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