Commanding the the Skies

Over three Arab countries last week, Israeli jets struck with sudden and lethal fury. Following a series of guerrilla attacks launched from Jordan, including the mining of a military bus, Mirage and Skyhawk bombers breached the $85 million East Ghor irrigation canal, leaving the melon, banana and vegetable fields of thousands of Jordanian truck farmers without water. Next day the jets strafed and napalmed guerrilla hideouts 2,500 ft. up on forested Mount Hermon in southern Lebanon, the jump-off point for 21 attacks against Israeli farms and outposts in the past month. A third retaliatory raid silenced Jordanian heavy artillery near the Dead Sea, and a fourth hit Egyptian guns that had blasted Israeli troops on a beach south of Port Suez, killing one and wounding 19.

White on Blue. In the United Nations Security Council, Lebanon protested the Israeli strikes as an act of aggression. Premier Golda Meir, speaking in Haifa, replied that "if the Lebanese authorities do not deal with the terrorists, we shall have to do it." Almost certainly, the Israelis' method will be air strikes. They are finding air power to be quicker, less costly in casualties, and at least as effective as commando raids or other ground actions. From Suez to Syria, the white contrails of Israeli jets, only occasionally challenged by Arab MIGs and Sukhois, etch the blue summer skies. Since the Six-Day War, the aggressive and experienced Israeli pilots have made 53 "kills," losing eleven planes, mainly to ground fire. Last month alone, the Israelis out-scored the Arabs 21 to 2 in dogfights.

But Egyptian and Syrian jets recently made their first brief attacks on Israeli military positions, prompting some concern among the military planners in Tel Aviv. What if the four rebuilt Arab air forces were to strike simultaneously? With the Arab armies still confined behind such antitank obstacles as the Suez Canal and the Jordan River, and the Palestinian guerrilla drive slowed by, bombing and tight border patrols, air strikes have become virtually the only way for the Arabs to attempt serious blows at Israel. Says Jordan's King Hussein: "We can no longer allow the enemy a free hand in our skies."

Meticulous Maintenance. The Israelis may not have a free hand always, but they certainly have the upper hand now. In the Six-Day War, the Israeli air force virtually determined the outcome by swiftly destroying 393 Egyptian, Jordanian, Syrian and Iraqi planes on the ground. They shot down another 59 Arab craft in dogfights. All told, the Israelis lost only 36 planes, most to ground fire. Today, the Israelis have about 300 French-and American-built combat planes, against about 800 Soviet-supplied MIGs and Sukhois. But Israel has more combat-ready pilots and, with meticulous maintenance, always enough jets ready for them to fly.

The Israeli air force was born in the 1948 War of Independence, with patchwork squadrons of American B-17s, British Mosquitos, and Czech-built Messerschmitts, many flown by former R.A.F. officers. One Jewish pilot found himself shooting down a former British squadron mate flying a Spitfire for the Egyptians. Today there is nothing patchwork about the air force. Flyers undergo rigorous training. Selected from high school volunteers, cadets must solo in jet trainers within a year. Standards are high, and so are failure rates. In one class only one trainee got his wings. Cadets have been flunked ten days before graduation. Major General Ezer Weizmann, who devised the training system, says: "I would accept 25% fewer graduates as long as they were all top class." At flight schools, little time is spent on instrument flying because the Israelis figure that they can usually count on clear skies. Tactics, aerobatics and sharpshooting are stressed, with deadly results. Israel's Mirages consistently out-maneuver faster MIGs. In 1967, two pilots knocked out 16 parked Tupolev bombers in Egypt with only eight passes. In combat, Israeli pilots get in close with old-style 30-mm. cannon, preferring them to modern, long-range missiles.

There is considerable esprit but little spit-and-polish. Technicians call officers by their first names. Israeli flyers rarely bother to salute one another--or anyone else. Says a squadron commander: "You can teach any idiot to salute, but that doesn't make a good pilot or mechanic." The average age of pilots is 24, as compared with about 30 in the U.S. Air Force. Most live on base with their families, keep fit with volleyball, shun liquor, and often sleep in hammocks beside their planes. They fly an average of 24 hours a month, v. twelve to 16 in most other air forces. Reservists can fly as many hours as they wish, and often keep as sharp as the regulars. One reservist shot down a Syrian MIG-21 last month and was back driving a kibbutz tractor the next day.

The planes .are kept in superb condition. Eighty to 90% are ready at all times. During the Six-Day War, ground crews turned their jets around in an unprecedented average of less than eight minutes, enabling many pilots to make two sorties per hour. Captured Egyptian plans called for their planes to make a sortie every three hours.

Delayed Decision. If the Israeli pilots are deficient in any department, it is humility. They are openly contemptuous of the Arab air forces. From one base, TIME Correspondent Marlin Levin reported this interview with several cocky flyers:

Q. What do Egyptian air force pilots do wrong?

A. They take off.

Q. The Arabs fly the MIG-21, one of the fastest fighters in the world. Doesn't that give them an advantage?

A. Yes--in getting away.

The commander of the air force is General Mordechai Hod, 43, a jet combat veteran who took over in 1966 in time to perfect bombing plans for the Six-Day War. In a rare interview last week he predicted: "The outcome of the next war in the air will be the same as the last, although it may take a little longer and the price may be a little higher." The U.S. State Department believes that the Israelis retain overwhelming air superiority despite the Arabs' having more than twice as many planes. Thus, though Washington is committed to delivering 50 Phantoms to Israel this fall, it is likely to delay any decision on Jerusalem's recent request to buy 25 additional Phantoms and 80 Skyhawks. If the Arab air forces improve--and they have no place to go but up--the Israelis are likely to become more insistent in seeking additional planes. They are also likely to consider preventive strikes against Arab air bases.

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