Friday, Aug. 15, 1969
Debate on Doctrine
Though no formal friendship pact between the U.S. and Rumania was negotiated during President Nixon's visit to Bucharest, Rumanians seemed convinced last week that one had been signed, sealed and delivered. In an informal sense, it had. The images of Nixon's tour would remain for a long time. People folded away newspaper clippings showing a smiling Nixon with Rumanian shoppers and folk dancers (see color). They held onto the miniature U.S. flags handed out for the President's reception. Well into the week, at least one Bucharest shopwindow was still decorated with a homemade U.S. flag and pictures of the Apollo astronauts.
President Nicolae Ceausescu had to postpone the opening of the Tenth Congress of Rumania's Communist Party for two days in order to give workmen time to take down the American flags on the city's street lamps and replace them with substitute banners in honor of the guest delegations from 66 countries. The new decorations, however, could not paper over Rumania's deep disputes with the Soviet Union. As a result, the congress turned into an extraordinary confrontation between Rumania's policy of forming ties with the West and Moscow's rigid Brezhnev Doctrine that insists on obedience and conformity among the Soviet Union's East Bloc neighbors.
Marathon Speech. The 1,915 delegates and some 150 foreign guests, including representatives from Cuba and North Viet Nam, gathered in Bucharest's Palace of Culture, a striking futuristic building that was completed only this year. Though Ceausescu emphasized his evenhanded approach in the Sino-Soviet dispute by sending an invitation to Peking, the Chinese refused to attend. Apparently, they could not accept his precondition that while in Bucharest they refrain from polemics against other Communist nations. Foreign guests were whisked about in gleaming black Mercedes-Benz limousines, which have replaced Soviet-made Chaikas as the official car. The fleet serves as a reminder that Ceausescu has made West Germany his second-largest trading partner after Russia. Breaking with Communist tradition, Ceausescu allowed newsmen, including one Mao-suited Chinese reporter, to sit in the gallery and witness the full proceedings. Delegates soon found out why.
In a marathon five-hour opening speech, Ceausescu reiterated his departures from Kremlin orthodoxy. A major point was economics. The Soviets wish to bring about a greater consolidation with Comecon, the Communist counterpart of the European Common Market. But Ceausescu wants to widen trade relations and draw on the West's technical and financial strength. Declared the Rumanian leader: "The intensification of economic collaboration must allow the ever stronger development of each national economy. It must be based on respect for the independence and sovereignty of each socialist state."
Ceausescu also denounced interference by an outside power in the affairs of another country. As a reflection of his canny Balkan diplomacy, Ceausescu addressed his remarks to the Western imperialists, but the Soviets must have realized that the words also applied to them: "Imperialism disregards the national interests of the peoples, brutually encroaches on their sovereign rights." Ceausescu even remarked that Rumania has civilian defense units trained to "fight for the defense" of their homeland --a hint that Rumania would not be as easy to invade as Czechoslovakia.
Opening Swipe. Perhaps out of fear of receiving a less than enthusiastic reception in Bucharest, Soviet Party Boss Leonid Brezhnev stayed home. In his place, Moscow sent a delegate of lesser rank: Konstantin Katushev, party secretary in charge of dealing with foreign ruling parties. At 42, Katushev is, nonetheless, a rapidly rising figure in the Kremlin, and he undertook a spirited rebuttal to Ceausescu the next day. For openers, he took a rather startling swipe at the "perfidious tactics of 'bridge building' to the West." Its only purpose, he said, is "to drive a wedge between the socialist countries."
After that, Katushev launched into a defense of the Brezhnev Doctrine. Western imperialists, he said, have taken to "openly supporting antisocialist forces and counter-revolutionary plots in Communist countries." The Kremlin, of course, justified its invasion of Czechoslovakia by claiming such threats existed there. And Katushev left little doubt that the Soviets would intervene elsewhere in Eastern Europe for the same reason. Quoting a recent article by Brezhnev, he said: "Our party will spare no effort in order to strengthen the cohesion of the Communist movement and will carry out its international duty."
Russia succeeded in making two things clear in Bucharest. First, though the Kremlin originally reacted to news of Nixon's trip to Rumania with seeming equanimity, Soviet leaders are now thoroughly unhappy about it--probably because it was so successful. Second, the Brezhnev Doctrine has become a fundament of policy, which Russia expects both bloc members and the West to acknowledge, even to the point of clearing presidential visits.
Ceausescu's bold speech made it equally clear that Rumania remains committed to limited independence, doctrine or no doctrine. The Kremlin has so far suffered that policy because it is convinced that despite Ceausescu's foreign policy, the party maintains firm control of Rumania. As long as the country's skillful leader can hold the delicate balance between Rumania's goals and those of Russia, the Kremlin will probably content itself only with more disapproving speeches. Nevertheless, Katushev's address served Ceausescu an unmistakable warning.
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