THE WAR: DECISION TO LOWER THE PRESSURE

THE Nixon Administration has secretly decided to respond to the Communist lull in the fighting in Viet Nam. The Pentagon is drafting orders instructing the military command in Saigon to reduce and limit the current strategy of "maximum pressure." The decision came after months of subdued debate. Some top State Department officials seemed as reluctant to modify the allies' aggressive strategy as their counterparts in the Pentagon. The hard-liners at State agreed with their military colleagues that the lull has little if any political significance. If it had, they said, the Communists would have found ways and means to let the U.S. know.

Other State Department officials were more willing to take a chance. Their argument was that the strategy of maximum pressure puts the burden of cutting back the level of fighting entirely on the enemy. Sooner or later, U.S. pressure results in Communist counterpressure. The question is essentially whether or not the possibility of reducing the level of combat and taking another step toward total disengagement from the war is worth the military risk involved. Last week the Administration decided that it was.

Ignored Advice. General Earle Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was dispatched to Saigon to discuss the new tactics with General Creighton Abrams, commander of U.S. forces in Viet Nam. Wheeler will also discuss the feasibility of withdrawing as many as 100,000 more U.S. troops from Viet Nam by the end of this year, if the lull continues. The President was expected to meet with Abrams next week, either in Saigon or Bangkok, as part of his nine-day, 24,070-mile tour of seven countries.

The new orders do not deny the necessity of an active defense, but they would scale down the massive search-and-destroy missions that have dominated U.S. strategy. Said one Government official: "Where we used to have division-sized sweeps, we now want to see whether the job can't be done by 25-man patrols. Where we now send out 25-man patrols, we want to see whether a five-man patrol won't do. And we must keep in mind that we are no longer out for military victory." The new approach also calls for increased Vietnamization of the war. U.S. troops would spend less time in combat and far more time training ARVN. Obviously, both proposals are designed to cut U.S. casualties.

The new Nixon concept of conducting the war--withdrawing troops gradually, dropping the level of combat and sending fewer G.I.s out on missions--seems a limited step in the direction of the "enclave theory" that was advanced in 1965 by retired Lieut. General James Gavin. Under Gavin's plan, American troops would withdraw to garrisons in Saigon, Cam Ranh Bay and Danang, and concentrate on upgrading the South Vietnamese army. However, the new orders do not entail an actual movement of U.S. forces to fixed enclaves, as Gavin proposed.

The military did not accept the Gavin concept then, and they are not enthusiastic now about the prospects of deescalation. They argue that maximum pressure is nothing more than an "active defense." Unfortunatelv, the line between attack and defense is not always clear. The military, for example, regarded the bloody assault on Hamburger Hill last May as essentially a defensive action, though it cost the U.S. 84 killed and 480 wounded.

Understandable Reluctance. Overall, few experts would question that Abe Abrams' aggressive tactics in Viet Nam have been markedly more successful than those of his predecessor, General William Westmoreland. Last fall Abrams replaced Westmoreland's ponderous battalion and brigade assaults with squad-sized thrusts. His Operation Sting Ray called for hundreds--sometimes thousands--of small patrols daily. The enemy's infiltration trails through the jungles, mountains and paddies were denied him. American troops began operating after dark, and for the first time in the war the night no longer belonged to the Viet Cong. Last year more than 8,000 tons of Viet Cong ammunition and food were captured. In the first five months of this year, 5,000 more tons have been discovered. The Communists have been unable to launch major, concentrated attacks in the past ten months. With that record, the allied command in Saigon is understandably reluctant to shift tactics.

Military officials also insist that the lull is one of those recurrent pauses in which the enemy disengages his troops in order to regroup and resupply. Intelligence reports estimate that the North is still infiltrating 10,000 men per month into South Viet Nam. The Reds continue to cache food and arms in preparation for future offensives.

Plainly, the Administration's decision to reduce the level of combat is a gamble. Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky last week proposed a South Vietnamese pullout from the Paris peace talks and accused the U.S. of lagging in its efforts to train and equip ARVN troops. A great deal will, of course, depend on the ARVN's willingness and ability to assume a greater share of the fighting. Despite the dangers, the risk seems worthwhile. Last fall, when the Communists pulled three divisions back across the DMZ, Averell Harriman for one was convinced that it was an earnest sign of Hanoi's eagerness to limit the fighting and that the U.S. should make a reciprocal move. The Johnson Administration, committed to a military victory, failed to probe the possibilities. This time, the Communists deny that there is a lull, but the stillness on the battlefield may yet prove more eloquent than their words.

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