Friday, Jun. 27, 1969

A Quieter Round 3

Nelson Rockefeller swooped down into the sparkling capital city of Brasilia last week amid smiles and cordiality. A bevy of schoolchildren from the American School sang The Star-Spangled Banner, and beaming Brazilian dignitaries, headed by Foreign Minister Jose Magalhaes Pinto, listened approvingly to Rocky's arrival statement, made in Spanish-accented Portuguese. Not a demonstrator was in sight, and even the blue-clad security police were by and large inconspicuous.

The peaceful welcoming scene was a far cry from Rockefeller's two earlier missions to Latin America, where anti-U.S. demonstrations marred his consultations with local governments. But the calm in Brazil was scarcely a sign either of pro-American sentiment or of democratic stability in the country. It simply showed that the Brazilians had had sufficient warning, and had prepared accordingly. To forestall possible trouble, President Arthur da Costa e Silva's tough military regime had warned Brazil's press not to print anything unfavorable about the Governor's visit. It had also placed some 2,500 of Brazil's most militant students and other dissidents under preventive arrest to make certain that there would be no embarrassing demonstrations.

Cutting Inflation. Rocky knew this, of course, as he was hustled off to the National Palace to be briefed on the Brazilian regime's achievements. Costa e Silva pointed proudly to his government's success in cutting inflation to a mere 22% annually (down from 90% in 1964, when the military ousted left-leaning President Joao Goulart) and achieving an economic growth rate of 6%. At one point Costa e Silva grew so animated in his discourse that Rockefeller brought out a yellow pad and began taking notes.

Political questions, however, elicited less definitive answers from the Brazilians: when Rocky inquired about the prospects for a return to civilian rule and constitutional rights, his hosts explained that it would take time to create a climate in which order and democracy could coexist.

In neighboring Paraguay, Rocky was met by a cordial welcoming crowd of some 3,000 carefully selected Paraguayans. Again the Governor saw no hostility; President Alfredo Stroessner's experienced military dictatorship had seen to that. In friendly discussions, Paraguayan officials emphasized their landlocked country's need for $115 million in long-term U.S. loans.

Rockefeller had to hold over a day in Paraguay because riotous students had made Montevideo, Uruguay's capital and his next scheduled stop, unsafe for a visit. There were a number of firebombings, most aimed against firms with U.S. interests, and terrorists set fire to a General Motors plant, causing damage estimated at $1,000,000. Thus the Governor flew to the resort town of Punta del Este, where Uruguayan officials felt that they could discuss their problems in safety.

Insistent Demands. Throughout the week, Rockefeller and his advisers listened to essentially the same demands that they had heard on their two earlier swings: more U.S. aid without strings and the lifting of U.S. import restrictions on Latin American exports to the United States.

Washington seems to be moving in these directions. Last week President Nixon decided to abolish the often criticized principle of "additionality," which, since 1965, has forced Latin Americans to buy American goods with U.S. aid money. Last year, 92% of the $336 million aid package to Latin America was, in fact, spent in the U.S., compared with only 41% in 1960. Additionality was originally introduced to help improve the U.S. balance of payments, but has brought the U.S. a mere $35 million in annual savings. Since that amount is but a drop in the $4 billion annual U.S. sales to Latin America, it is hardly worth the trouble. Indeed, the additionality clause has convinced many Latin Americans that U.S. aid benefits U.S. business more than it does Latin America.

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