ARMS CONTROL: THE CRITICAL MOMENT

The central fact today in the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union is that progress in technology has made it both necessary and possible to place restraints on the nuclear-arms race. The technological stars and planets are now in favorable conjunction--and they will not stay that way for long.

LAST week, after months of delay, the U.S. Government began to act on that warning from William C. Foster, head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in the Johnson Administration. For the first time, President Nixon's National Security Council devoted a full session to defining the negotiating positions that the U.S. will take when it discusses possible limits on nuclear weapons with the Soviet Union. A second Security Council meeting is scheduled for this week. The President also announced that, if the Soviets agree on time and place, SALT--the long-awaited strategic arms limitation talks--will begin between July 31 and Aug. 15.

Upset Balance. The risks that William Foster describes are real. Central to them is a frightening new weapon called MIRV, for "multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle" (see box, page 14). MIRV, even more than the anti-ballistic missile, threatens to upset the uneasy balance of deterrence that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have achieved. It may also set off a domestic debate that could surpass in fervor the acrimonious ABM dispute.

Both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. are already testing multiple missile launchers, although the U.S. is believed to have a wide lead. The Pentagon argues for continuing the tests, and for development of MIRV, on the grounds that the U.S. system is nearly operational and stopping tests would simply give the Russians a chance to catch up. The technical teams at work on MIRV in private industry would have to be disbanded, and they could not be rapidly reassembled in case the U.S.S.R. makes a dramatic breakthrough. On the other hand, the President is under considerable pressure to suspend MIRV tests, thereby demonstrating to the Soviets a deep U.S. commitment to arms control in anticipation of SALT.

Massachusetts Republican Edward Brooke last week lined up 39 Senators of both parties as cosponsors of a "sense of the Senate" resolution urging a halt to testing--if the Russians reciprocate. Nixon espoused the Brooke position cautiously, saying that "only in the event that the Soviet Union and we could agree that a moratorium on tests could be mutually beneficial to us, would we be able to agree to do so."

Warhead Nose Count. Unless such a moratorium is agreed to early in SALT, many experts believe, the chance of real progress toward arms limitation is small. If both the U.S. and the Soviet Union proceed to MIRV deployment, the ensuing uncertainty would make a freeze on nuclear weaponry almost impossible to achieve. Policing an agreement to regulate the number of warheads installed in missiles would not be feasible. Spy satellites can count launch vehicles, but not their contents. Even an inspector on the ground would have to take a missile nose cone apart and physically count the number of warheads inside. Neither side will readily agree to let the other's technical experts get so close to the business end of its nuclear arsenal. By contrast, enforcing a ban on flight tests would be relatively easy. Each side can observe its rival's launches from a distance.

Further, mutual deterrence would be put in question. Since MIRV would multiply many times the number of warheads either side could deliver against the other, a thin ABM system like Safeguard would not be sufficient to preserve enough of the defender's missiles to allow him to strike back effectively after a massive surprise attack. Thus, the temptation to deliver a pre-emptive strike in an acute crisis like the Cuban missile confrontation would increase. This new step-up in the arms race,* coupled with the Safeguard ABM, would cost the U.S. at least $20 billion and could lead to far vaster expenses if each side continued to expand its arsenal. These huge expenditures would bring no increase in security. More likely, both sides would become more vulnerable to attack.

Even in the absence of immediate new weapons deployments, the business of arms control is tremendously complex. Past agreements, such as the 1963 partial ban on nuclear-test explosions, were reached only after long negotiations and after Moscow and Washington came simultaneously to the conclusion that potential benefits outweighed the risks. Distrust between the two nations remains basic and deep. Intelligence experts and strategists deal in short-range "estimates" and long-range "assumptions" on what the other side is doing now and might do later. Military and intelligence professionals tend to be pessimists, and hence hawks. China's nuclear development has added a new factor of uncertainty. Despite these difficulties, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union recognize the immense stakes involved in arms limitations and seem prepared to go ahead.

Slipped Linkage. The President even seems willing to give up, at least for the present, his strategy of using arms talks as a carrot to gain other understandings. Nixon took office believing that the Johnson Administration had mistakenly pursued an arms pact with the U.S.S.R. without regard to basic political conflicts between the two countries. "What I want to do," he told his first presidential press conference, "is to see to it that we have strategic-'arms talks in a way and at a time that will promote, if possible, progress on outstanding political problems at the same time in which the U.S. and the Soviet Union, acting together, can serve the cause of peace."

The goal that became known as "linkage" has turned out to be more difficult to achieve than he thought. Nixon hoped to calm the Middle East by working with the Soviets, but last week he admitted: "I see very little defusing." The Russians are evidently content not to have genuine peace between the Arab nations and Israel, but a state of controlled tension. Nixon wanted Moscow to help him get a settlement in Viet Nam by applying pressure on the North Vietnamese. Although the Russians reportedly have tried, Hanoi remains intransigent at the Paris peace talks. He also sought to reopen conversations on the status of Berlin; the Russians have not responded. While the Soviets rejected linkage of all these issues from the start, they have at least sounded eager to pursue an arms agreement. For now, that may have to suffice.

* A recent study by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency estimated that the nations of the world have expended more than $4 trillion on wars and weaponry thus far in the 20th century. At the present rate of increase in military outlays, another $4 trillion will be spent in the next decade.

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